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This research aims to examine earnings management practices in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. This research was conducted in response to the ban placed on Deloitte by the 
Capital Market Authority (CMA) from carrying out auditing work for listed firms in the 
Kingdom for two years, starting 1 June 2015. A large volume of published studies provide 
evidence that auditor size (Big 4) plays an essential role in constraining earnings 
management and providing high audit quality. However, banning one of the Big 4 raises 
a question about the role of these auditors in constraining engagement in earnings 
management in Saudi Arabia. It also raises a question of whether Deloitte’s clients 
managed earnings compared with companies audited by the rest of the Big 4 accounting 
firms. This research uses a sample of 85 non-financial firms for the period from 2004 to 
2014. This research finds that the Big 4 firms have a role in curbing earnings management 
only in income-decreasing activities. Moreover, this research finds that firms audited by 
Deloitte do not differ from those audited by the other Big 4 in terms of earnings 
management. CMA banned Deloitte from auditing any listed firms because of the 
collapse in 2012 of the Al-Mojil Group, which had gone public in 2008. Deloitte audited 
the pre-IPO year financial statements of Al-Mojil as well as the four years after the group 
went public, from 2008 to 2011. This dilemma raises doubts regarding the possibility of 
engagement in earnings management before going public and the audit quality in IPO 
firms in the Saudi context. Therefore, this research examines firms’ earnings management 
engagement before going public and audit quality in pre-IPO years. Based on a sample of 
42 non-financial IPO firms for the period from 2005 to 2015, the findings of the current 
research confirm that the Saudi IPO firms did not engage in earnings management in the 
year before the IPO or the year of going public. Furthermore, the results of testing the 
role of the Big 4 in IPO firms show that the Big 4 firms are no deterrent to engagement 
in earnings management in pre-IPO years. This research finds that IPO firms audited by 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Overview  
General financial reporting is a means for the managers of a firm to communicate 
financial information and the performance of the company with stakeholders, as “The 
objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial information about 
the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders and other 
creditors in making decisions about providing resources to the entity” (Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting, 2010, p. A25). Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that 
as those at management level use financial reports to communicate the performance of 
their firms, accounting standards allow them to apply some judgement in their financial 
reports, as those at this level know most about the business. Hence, these researchers 
claim that managers select their reporting methods and make estimates that match the real 
performance of their business. The most important element that reflects and summarises 
a firm’s performance is earnings (Dechow, 1994). Dechow (1994) states that earnings are 
used, for example, in management compensation contracts, by firms looking to go public, 
and by stakeholders. As managers have an interest in reporting better earnings than those 
produced on an accounting accruals basis, they may misuse the discretion granted them 
by accounting standards to engage in the opportunistic behaviours that are known as 
earnings management. 
Earnings management is defined as occurring  
“when managers use judgment in the financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers “(Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999, p. 368). 
 
Based on the literature, earnings management can be classified into three categories: 
accrual earnings management, real earnings management and classification-shifting. 
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According to Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b), there are three types of methods available 
to managers under accrual-based earnings management: accounting method choice, 
accounting method application/discretionary estimates, and accounting method timing. 
Under real earnings management, managers are able to engage in earnings manipulation 
through a range of operating decisions. For example, a firm’s managers are able to engage 
in expenses shifting, from recurring items to non-recurring items, to inflate the core 
profitability of the business (Zalata & Roberts, 2017). 
According to Richardson (2000), conflicts of interest between managers and investors 
(agency conflict) are counted as the largest factor motivating managers to engage in 
earnings manipulation. It is argued that the separation of ownership and management 
increases the likelihood of engagement in earnings management (Francis, Maydew, & 
Sparks, 1999). This conflict comes with costs. Morris (1987) clarifies the costs that are 
related to an agency problem or conflict as follows: the cost of equity, which exists when 
managers act against the interests of shareholders; and the cost of bonding and monitoring 
managers, which exists to ensure that managers act in the interests of shareholders. It is 
argued by Watts and Zimmerman (1990) that using executive compensation may reduce 
the conflict between managers and shareholders. However, executive compensation 
induces those at a firm’s management level to maximise their wealth rather than that of 
the shareholders, by engaging in particular transactions with the aim of maximising their 
own compensation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Prior empirical studies confirm that 
managers engage in earnings management to maximise their own benefit (e.g.Baker, 
Collins, & Reitenga, 2003; Dye, 1991; Healy, 1985).   
One of the monitoring devices recognised by agency theory as mitigating conflicts 
between managers and shareholders and reducing the agency problem is the appointment 
of an external auditor (Piot, 2001). Culpan and Trussel (2005) argue that an external 
auditor must be independent of any interest in order to act as an effective monitoring 
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device. Thus, hiring an external auditor as an independent party is intended to minimise 
the agency problem by reducing the information asymmetry in a firm’s financial reports 
(Piot, 2001). Moreover, the existence of information asymmetry drives the need for 
external auditing (Hussainey, 2009). Nevertheless, the failure of auditors in detecting 
financial scandals committed by firms’ managers raises the question of the role of the 
external auditor as a deterrent regarding engagement in earnings management (Velury, 
2003). Thus, the literature makes a distinction between auditors in terms of the quality of 
their auditing. As a consequence of difficulties in measuring audit quality, the literature 
offers a number of proxies1, such as auditor size (e.g., Big N vs non-Big N). A 
considerable amount of the literature uses the size of an auditor as a proxy for audit quality 
(e.g.Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Houqe, 
Ahmed, & Zijl, 2017).  After reviewing all proxies for audit quality, DeFond and Zhang 
(2014) state that auditor size proxy is “its relatively high construct validity”(P.289). 
An initial public offering (IPO) event is a strong motivator for engagement in earnings 
management. In this event, a high level of information asymmetry exists between the IPO 
firm’s management and its investors (Nam, Park, & Arthurs, 2014; Teoh et al., 1998b).   
Teoh et al. (1998b) contend that the management of IPO firms engage in earnings 
inflation in the year of going public because they gain from doing so. The researchers 
also argue that this activity has the aim of inflating the stock price to a higher level, as the 
lock-up period places restrictions on insiders such as managerial ownership. Moreover, 
they claim that managers in these firms are motivated to meet the earnings forecasts that 
the firm made in the prospectus to maintain their reputations. The potential litigation risk 
that managers may face is another motivator.  
                                                           
1 More details about audit quality proxies are given in section 3.6  
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Previous studies find that IPO firms manipulate earnings management around an IPO 
event (e.g.Aharony, Lin, & Loeb, 1993; Alhadab, Clacher, & Keasey, 2015; Friedlan, 
1994; Gao, Meng, Chan, & Wu, 2017; Neill, Pourciau, & Schaefer, 1995). IPO firms hire 
a high-quality auditor to send a positive signal to potential investors about the quality of 
the financial statement due to the existence of high information asymmetry (Brau & 
Fawcett, 2006). Moreover, Chang, Gygax, Oon, and Zhang (2008) argue that IPO firms 
signal the quality of the firm by hiring one of the Big 4 and the researchers provide 
evidence that audit quality minimises doubts about a firm’s value around IPO. Chang et 
al. (2008) argue that firms use signalling to moderate the existence of information 
asymmetry. A considerable amount of IPO literature uses signalling theory and offers 
several of the signals identified as being used by IPO firms. For example, IPO firms may 
send a positive signal by retaining a high proportion of ownership (Leland & Pyle, 1977). 
Moreover, the length of the lock-up period can be used as a signal to convey the long-
term economic viability of the firm (Arthurs, Busenitz, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2009). 
According to Brau and Fawcett (2006), a signal frequently used by chief financial officers 
(CFOs) to convey a positive image of an IPO firm is to emphasise historical earnings. 
This is because potential buyers rely on prospectuses as they have no other public sources 
of information.     
1.2 Research Problem and Research Motivation  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the ban preventing Deloitte carrying out 
auditing work for listed firms in Saudi Arabia for two years from 1 June 2015, which was 
imposed by the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA). The CMA banned Deloitte from 
auditing any listed firms because of the collapse of the Al-Mojil Group in 2012, which 
had been listed publicly in 2008 with earnings per share of 2.41 and 6.35 SR (Saudi riyals) 
for 2006 and 2007, respectively. However, the earnings per share were -1.44 SR for 2010 
and the accumulated losses of the group’s capital until 31 December 2016 were 222%. 
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The sharp decline in reported earnings of the Al-Mojil Group raises the importance of 
examining the ban from an earnings management perspective. Therefore, this research 
fills a gap in the literature by examining the role of audit quality in mitigating earnings 
management and examining earnings management engagement and audit quality in IPO 
firms in the context of Saudi Arabia, where the ban occurred.   
This study is motivated by the desire to add to the current extremely limited literature 
relating to earnings management in emerging economies, particularly in the Middle East. 
Most of the earnings management literature has focused on the more economically 
developed countries. Developing stock markets exhibit greater variation in practice and 
have a different environment from those of developed capital markets, the latter 
characterised by greater efficiency, stronger regulatory frameworks and well-developed 
financial reporting. In contrast, developing capital markets suffer from a lack of 
regulation, compliance, enforcement and transparency, and might, therefore, be less 
efficient. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003, p. 525) provide evidence that the level of 
engagement in earnings management is high in countries that have “less developed capital 
markets and weak investor protection”. Saudi literature suffers from a shortage of 
accounting studies in general and particularly in audit quality and earnings management. 
Therefore, this study is motivated to add to Saudi accounting literature by providing an 
in-depth understanding of earnings management engagement and audit quality in the 
context of Saudi Arabia.   
Moreover, this research is motivated to examine the audit quality in Saudi Arabia as 
banning one of the Big 4 auditing firms raises a question about the quality of auditing in 
the Saudi environment, especially this ban was the first ban imposed by the CMA since 
it was established in 2004. This study, therefore, provides insights into the quality of 
auditing in Saudi Arabia from an earnings management perspective.  
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This research is also motivated by a desire to examine earnings management engagement 
and audit quality in IPO firms, as the ban was imposed on Deloitte because of the collapse 
of one of these firms (the Al-Mojil Group). Furthermore, Alsehali (2014) encourages 
researchers to study earnings management around IPOs, as he finds earnings per share 
have a positive association with the premium valuation of IPOs in the Saudi Stock Market 
(SSM). 
Saudi Arabia, a country that is representative of emerging economies, is especially worthy 
of study for several reasons. First, the Saudi economy is highly significant; it represents 
25% of the total Arab gross domestic product (GDP) and 44% of the total Arab market 
capitalisation (Albassam, 2014). Since 2008, it has become one of the top 20 economies 
in the world (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, & Fadzil, 2012). Saudi Arabia holds 18% of the 
world’s oil reserves and is the largest oil producer in the Organisation of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and was responsible for about 31% of the total OPEC 
production in 2015 (OPEC, 2015). Second, the Saudi government has been undertaking 
far-reaching steps aimed at improving the Kingdom’s investment climate, with a view to 
making it more appealing for the investment of domestic and foreign capital. Third, the 
market has only recently been established, and the regulatory framework is still 
developing. 
Furthermore, the issuance of a conceptual framework of accounting in 1986 and the 
creation of the Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) in 1992 
represented major landmarks in the development of the accounting and auditing 
profession in Saudi Arabia. The accounting profession in Saudi Arabia is not as strong as 
in developed countries as local standards are in use, only 23 for accounting2 and 17 for 
auditing. However, bank and insurance companies are required by the Saudi Arabian 
                                                           
2  From 1 January 2017, all listed firms have to apply by IFRS. 
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Monetary Agency (SAMA) to use international financial reporting standards (IFRS). 
Consequently, listed companies, other than banks and insurances, use US and IFRS 
standards to have a unified set of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The 
professional environment is also not of high quality, as Alghamdi and Alangari (2005) 
report violations in implementing quality review programmes in audit firms. Overall, 
these factors are expected to affect earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia. 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives  
The aim of this study is to examine earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia. Six 
objectives are drawn from the aim of this study as follows: 
• To examine the role of the Big 4 auditors in acting as a deterrent to earnings 
management engagement in Saudi listed firms. 
• To examine whether firms audited by Deloitte manage earnings compared with the 
other Big 4 firms. 
• To examine whether Saudi IPO firms manage earnings before going public.  
• To examine whether Saudi IPO firms manage earnings more in the year of going 
public compared with the pre-IPO year. 
• To examine whether Saudi IPO firms audited by the Big 4 have less engagement in 
earnings management.  
• To examine whether Saudi IPO firms audited by Deloitte have more engagement in 
earnings management. 
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses  
The research aim and objectives lay the foundation for addressing the questions posed in 
this study, which are: 
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1:  Do external auditors mitigate engagement in earnings management in Saudi 
listed firms? 
To answer this question, it is partitioned into the following sub-questions: 
1.1: Do Big 4 auditors mitigate engagement in earnings management? 
Hypothesis 1: There are no differences in the level of discretionary accruals in 
firms audited by the Big 4 compared with firms audited by non-Big 4 accounting 
firms. 
1.2: Do firms audited by Deloitte engage in more earnings management? 
Hypothesis 2: Firms audited by Deloitte are more likely to provide a higher level 
of discretionary accruals compared with firms audited by the other Big 4 
accounting firms. 
2:  Do Saudi IPO firms manipulate earnings around an IPO event? 
To answer this question, it is partitioned into the following sub-questions: 
2.1: Do IPO firms engage in earnings management in the pre-listing year? 
Hypothesis 3: Saudi IPO firms engage in income-increasing activities in the pre-
IPO year. 
2.2: Do IPO firms engage in more earnings management in the year of listing 
compared with the pre-listing year? 
Hypothesis 4:  Discretionary accruals in the IPO year are higher compared with 
the pre-IPO year. 
2.3: Do IPO firms audited by the Big 4 engage less in earnings management? 
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between income-increasing in pre-
IPO years and Big 4 auditors.     
2.4: Do firms audited by Deloitte engage in more earnings management? 
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Hypothesis 6: In pre-IPO years, firms audited by Deloitte are more likely to engage 
in income-increasing compared with firms audited by other accounting firms. 
1.5 Summary of Research Methodology 
This research adopts positivism as its research philosophy and assumes independence 
between the researcher and the subject because the feelings, perceptions and intuition of 
the researcher do not change the reality of what is being explored. This research adopts a 
quantitative method as its research strategy to draw meaningful results from a large body 
of quantified data. As the researcher developed the research questions and hypotheses 
based on the theories adopted, the researcher adopted a deductive approach to examine 
audit quality and engagement in earnings management in Saudi Arabia. 
The data used to fulfil the objectives of this research were gathered manually from annual 
reports. Two data sets are used in this research. The first data set contains 85 non-financial 
firms listed on the SSM for the period from 2004 to 2014. This time period was selected 
because annual reports are unavailable before 2004 and the ban on Deloitte started in June 
2015. Thus, no financial statements were audited by Deloitte for the years 2015 and 2016. 
The first data set is used to address the first main question of this research, which is related 
to audit quality. The second data set contains 42 IPO firms for the period from 2005 to 
2015. The second data set is used to address the second main question of this research, 
which is related to IPOs. 
For earnings management measurement, this study applies the work of Kothari, Leone, 
and Wasley (2005). The researchers claim that prior models have an error in the 
measurement of discretionary accruals and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) argue 
that prior models are possibly mis-specified as a firm’s performance has an impact on 
discretionary accruals. This study applies a cross-sectional method to estimate non-
discretionary accruals. Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2000) examine cross-sectional and 
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time-series approaches and find that the cross-sectional method is more powerful for 
identifying accruals earnings manipulation.  
This study includes firms’ financial characteristics that have an impact on discretionary 
accruals as control variables due to the importance of control variables in providing more 
precise results. Myers, Myers, and Omer (2003) argue that models without control 
variables may lead the primary variable to serve as a proxy for other factors that determine 
the independent variable. The following control variables are adopted in this study: firm 
size, cash flow, firm leverage, firm performance, firm growth, firm age, seasoned equity 
offering (SEO), and complexity. Six models are used to test the research hypotheses. 
1.6 Research Contributions 
This study offers contributions to the existing earnings management and audit quality 
literature. It also contributes to earnings management and IPO literature. Moreover, this 
study contributes to the literature of Saudi Arabia, in which accounting studies are limited, 
particularly in all aspects of the earnings management field. The findings of this research 
add to existing knowledge of audit quality and earnings management, as previous 
research has not reached the same conclusions in terms of the role of Big 4 auditors in 
acting as a deterrent to earnings management. For instance, DeAngelo (1981), Becker et 
al. (1998), Francis et al. (1999), Khalil and Ozkan (2016) and Houqe et al. (2017) find 
that firms audited by one of the Big N show less engagement in earnings management. In 
contrast, studies such as Jeong and Rho (2004), Haniffa, Abdul Rahman, and Fairuzana 
(2006), Piot and Janin (2007), Tsipouridou and Spathis (2012), Yasar (2013) and Huguet 
and Gandía (2016) find that there is no association between earnings management and 
Big N auditors.  
In response to the ban placed on Deloitte by the CMA in Saudi Arabia, this study 
examines the impact of audit quality on earnings management. To the best of the 
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researcher’s knowledge, no other studies have examined this ban in all aspects of 
accounting research. This objective is achieved by examining the role of the Big 4, as a 
whole, in mitigating earnings management. Moreover, this study examines whether there 
is any difference between Deloitte and the other members of the Big 4 in mitigating 
earnings management. Unlike three previous studies that examine audit quality in Saudi 
Arabia, the sample of this study covers the entire period in which data became available, 
from 2004 to 2014. For example, Alabbas (2008) examines the association between Big 
4 and earnings management for the period from 2002 to 2006, whereas Habbash and 
Alghamdi (2016) study this from 2006 to 2009. The most recent sample, by Gomaa 
(2013), from 2008 to 2012, does not contain all non-financial firms in the SSM. These 
studies also have weaknesses in their methodology.3 Moreover, this study adopts a 
different methodology by controlling for SEOs and excluding the lock-up period when 
estimating discretionary accruals, as Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a) report that SEO 
firms with a higher income growth in the year of issue and IPO are excluded to eliminate 
any discretionary accruals activities related to IPO firms (Myers et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, this study examines earnings management using current discretionary 
accruals, which has not been examined in the aforementioned studies. This study adopts 
the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) to classify firms in the SSM. As this study 
focuses on non-financial firms, the real-estate and multi-investment firm sectors are 
excluded, since they are classified as financial firms and were included in the other 
studies. This study is the first to examine whether the audit quality of Deloitte differs 
from that of the other Big 4 auditors. This study also contributes to audit quality and 
earnings management literature by examining audit quality in an IPO context. 
                                                           




As mentioned above, Saudi literature suffers from a shortage of studies in the accounting 
field, and this study is the first to examine earnings management around IPOs in the 
context of Saudi Arabia. This study contributes to IPO and earnings management 
literature as there is a conflict in previous findings. Researchers such as Teoh et al. 
(1998b), DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2001), Spohr (2004), Alhadab et al. (2015) 
and Gao et al. (2017) find that firms engage in earnings inflation around IPOs. 
Conversely, studies such as Ball and Shivakumar (2008), Cecchini, Jackson, and Liu 
(2012), Kimbro (2005) and Roosenboom, van der Goot, and Mertens (2003) find that 
firms do not  engage in earnings inflation around IPOs. Therefore, this study contributes 
to the existing knowledge by investigating this phenomenon in a different legal 
environment that has not been examined before. 
Armstrong, Foster, and Taylor (2015) argue that studies that examine earnings 
management in the year of an IPO ignore one important factor that may lead to inflating 
the accruals during the IPO stage. They state that IPOs report higher accruals in an IPO 
year due to capital raised during the IPO stage. They find that without controlling for the 
amount that IPOs received, the results will show that the IPO inflated earnings. However, 
when they control for proceeds, the results show that earnings are not inflated during the 
IPO year. This study contributes to the literature by adopting their methodology in a 
different legal environment: one that is considered a developing country. To the best of 
the researcher’s knowledge, no single study has examined this methodology in any 
different legal environment. 
As mentioned above, this study is the first to investigate the ban placed on Deloitte in 
Saudi Arabia. The current research fills a gap in the literature by examining whether there 
is any difference between Deloitte and the other members of the Big 4 in mitigating 
earnings management. Moreover, this study fills the gap in the literature by investigating 
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earnings management engagement and audit quality in Saudi IPOs because of the ban 
placed on Deloitte following its dealings with one of these firms.  
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
An overview of the Saudi Arabian market and regulations is given in the following 
chapter. It contains a brief background to Saudi Arabia and its legal system and includes 
an overview of the following regulatory authorities and laws related to listed firms in 
Saudi Arabia: the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI), the CMA, SAMA, the 
Saudi Stock Exchange (or Tadawul), SOCPA, and Companies Law. Moreover, chapter 2 
provides a brief of the accounting and auditing standards and listing rules in Saudi Arabia. 
Chapter 3 provides the conceptual framework for earnings management, in which a 
definition of earnings management is given and the earnings methods that may be used 
by managers to manage earnings are explained. The chapter also considers why managers 
are motivated to conduct opportunistic earnings management. A literature review is 
provided in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 discusses the theories used to develop the hypotheses. Explanations of agency 
theory and signalling theory are provided in this chapter. It also provides hypotheses 
development for the contexts of both audit quality and IPOs. 
Chapter 5 provides a brief explanation of the type of research philosophies used in the 
social sciences. The research strategies and approaches used are addressed in the chapter 
and an overview of the earnings management measurement provided. A description of 
the sample selection criteria is also given in the chapter.  
Chapter 6 tests the hypotheses of this research and presents the results of testing the 
hypotheses regarding audit quality. It also provides the results of testing the hypotheses 
related to IPO events.  
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The seventh and final chapter presents the conclusion of this research, where the 




















Chapter 2: Saudi Context 
2.1 Introduction  
The preceding chapter presents an introduction to this study, namely, the research 
motivations, objectives and contributions. It also provides the structure of the thesis. This 
chapter aims to present an overview of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The main purpose 
of this overview is to demonstrate how the Saudi environment is unlike others, 
particularly developing countries.   
The background to the Kingdom is presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 provides an 
overview of the legal system in Saudi Arabia. Section 2.4 presents the administrative 
bodies that have oversight of firms listed on the SSM: the MCI, the CMA, SAMA, the 
Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) and SOCPA. Section 2.5 gives an overview of Saudi 
Companies Law. Section 2.6 gives details of the accounting and auditing standards 
adopted by SOCPA. Section 2.7 provides the requirements for going public and the 
obligations that continue afterwards. Section 2.8 provides a summary of the chapter. 
2.2 Saudi Arabia: Background 
On the continent of Asia, Saudi Arabia is the fifth largest state, covering approximately 
830,000 square miles of land area.  Therefore, to acquire an elaborate study of the various 
elements of the state, it is important to acknowledge the general background of the 
political, economic and cultural aspects of the country. Thus, this section concentrates on 
the most significant components of the business environment of the Kingdom. The state 
formed by this unique and largest Gulf monarchy, or the KSA in its abbreviated form, is 
one of the fastest-growing countries emerging on the continent of Asia, and has Riyadh 
as its capital city. 
The current state of Saudi Arabia was founded in 1932, which is considered to be the year 
that King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud declared the establishment of the Royal Saudi monarchy 
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in the peninsula containing the holiest sites of Islam (Al-Angari, 2004). Although 95% of 
the Kingdom is covered by desert, in terms of area, it is the largest country in the Middle 
East (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2007).  
Saudi Arabia is characterised by sovereign rule, which is restricted to the hereditary 
succession of the male children of King Ibn Saud. The centralisation of the Saudi Arabian 
monarchy is another feature of the ruling system of the country. This implies that the 
existing King has broad authoritative power, which also includes its internal and external 
affairs, as well as the administrative bodies. Defence positions and sensitive political 
aspects, such as foreign and internal affairs, as well as the Department of Defence, are 
also confined to the heirs of King Abdulaziz. The Consultative (Shura) Council, 
inaugurated in the year 1991, is found to play a very limited role in the Kingdom's 
legislative system. However, this Council acts as a helping body to the existing king of 
the country. It is also important to note that decision-making procedures and their 
implementation are begun once they have been approved by the king (Alghamdi, 2012). 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia witnessed poverty in 1937, people at that time mainly 
relying on farming. It was in the same year that the Kingdom discovered a vast quantity 
of oil within its borders. At present, Saudi Arabia is the largest and leading producer of 
crude oil in the world due to the advent of crude oil, which has made the current position 
of the Kingdom stable and enabled it to develop. Oil has also brought steady development 
to the economic and social life of the inhabitants of the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia has also 
managed to acquire a stable political position in the Middle East, as well as worldwide.  
In the present day, the economic stability of the Kingdom is dependent on the exporting 
of petroleum products, which is considered to be one of the chief sources of national 
income. It has been observed that Saudi Arabia gains over 60% of its entire national 
income through the export of petroleum products (Ministry of Economy and Planning 
2016). According to the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2016), approximately 22% of 
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the total oil reserves in the world are located in Saudi Arabia. Even in the future, it is 
predicted that the Kingdom will still manage to retain its current position as the largest 
producer of crude oil in the world (OPEC, 2017). Furthermore, it is also expected that the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will yield an enormous percentage of the oil produced amongst 
the members of OPEC. The Kingdom is characterised by 31% of the total production of 
oil in OPEC, which implies that it is a significant factor in the oil prices set throughout 
the world (OPEC, 2015). As claimed by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources, the KSA will be able to produce and export oil for the coming century, due to 
its enormous reserves of crude oil. The estimated reserves of crude oil are around 266,578 
billion barrels (Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2015). 
In 2005, Saudi Arabia became an active participant of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2006). Therefore, it can be said that the 
Kingdom has seen various reforms take place in the fields of business, politics and legal 
work procedures. These changes led to the foundation of the Saudi Arabian General 
Investment Authority. It is to be noted that the major objective of this authority is to 
remove impediments and deficiencies in the Kingdom by improving the environment for 
investment in the country. In order to internationalise the stock activities, and to make 
access easy for foreign investors, Saudi Arabia has announced that Tadawul will be 
facilitating the process. Tadawul is worth more than $564 billion on the Arab stock market 
and provides easy access to foreign investors.  
2.3 The Legal System in Saudi Arabia  
The legal system of a country plays a significant role in the implementation of its 
regulations and practices. The Constitution of Saudi Arabia is based on the principles of 
the Holy Quran. These protocols are based on the traditional views of the Prophet 
Mohammed (Sunnah), and other concurrent sources that are intrinsically related to the 
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laws of Islam (Sharīah), which are considered to be a code of conduct. Furthermore, it 
can also be said that, in the context of judicial procedures and general terms, Saudi Arabia 
is an Islamic state. It complies with the regulations and principles of Islam (Alharkan, 
2005). The holy and sacred Muslim sites in Saudi Arabia are Mecca, which is the 
orientation to which the existing one billion followers of Islam have to pay homage 
through pilgrimage and direct their prayers, and Medina, where the emigration and burial 
site of the Prophet Mohammed is located (Falgi, 2009). Thus, Saudi Arabia has attained 
a significant position among Islamic and Arabic countries. Furthermore, the essential 
elements of life in Saudi Arabia are mostly ordered by the regulations and principles that 
are implemented by Islamic law; this includes social behaviour, as well as the 
Constitution. 
Thus, it can be said that Islam imposes a significant effect on operations and business life, 
which enhances the placing of ethical standards, human equality and strong beliefs. 
Therefore, it is important to note that, whenever Saudi Arabia attempts to adopt particular 
standards, it tends to formulate them in accordance with the Saudi environment and 
Islamic law in the fields of corporate government practices, accounting and auditing 
standards (Alharkan, 2005). Saudi Arabia can be said to be a tribal society, in the context 
of social behaviour and Arabic traditions. Thus, it helps in the maintenance of a 
reasonable degree of impact on national and local events. Furthermore, Islam has 
profoundly affected the legal Saudi framework, as the Constitution of the country is based 
on the principles of Islam. The Kingdom has largely developed its business environment 
due to the historical relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US and Britain, which 
have had a significant influence on accounting and auditing standards and companies law  
(Al-Angari, 2004). Although the regulations are considered to be national standards, they 
were initially acquired from the principles of the US and Britain. Based on a brief 
assessment, the legal procedures that are followed by Saudi Arabia are interrelated with 
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the business environment and are characterised by an admixture of the principles, rules 
and regulations of British and US legislation. Furthermore, it is controlled by a powerful 
Islamic framework (Al-Angari, 2004). However, it is to be noted that, even though Saudi 
Arabia attempts to borrow the legislating standards of the US and Britain, these have to 
be in line with Islamic law. 
2.4 Administrative Bodies of the Firms Listed in Saudi Arabia 
2.4.1 Ministry of Commerce and Investment (MCI) 
Established in 1953, the ministry’s primary objective is related to the monitoring of 
commercial activities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This ministry is also accountable 
for the initiation of trade policies, along with their implementation. Moreover, the MCI 
is accountable for the issuing of new regulations and for the maintenance of foreign trade 
relations. The MCI also facilitates the expansion of the production and export of non-oil 
products. However, it should be noted that one of the key responsibilities attributed to 
this ministry is to monitor Saudi companies as well as the Companies Law that was 
implemented in the country. Before the establishment of the CMA, the MCI was the only 
regulatory body to manage the affairs of listed firms and their shareholders. However, 
these duties of supervision of the MCI were transferred to the CMA after the Companies 
Law was updated in 2015. 
2.4.2 Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
The CMA began its unofficial existence in the early 1950s and continued its operations 
until, in the late 1980s, the government of Saudi Arabia set its basic rules and regulations. 
The Capital Market Authority was established by Royal Decree in 2003, which resulted 
in the formal existence of the CMA. The CMA is a government organisation, which is 
given financial, legal and procedural as well as administrative independence as it reports 
directly to the Prime Minister of the KSA. It became fully independent in 2004. The chief 
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functions of the CMA include the regulation and development of the Saudi Arabian 
capital market in accordance with the issues that are required in the implementation of 
the rules and regulations regarding the provisions of the Capital Market Law. However, 
it can also be said that another chief objective of the CMA is the creation of an adequate 
investment environment and the reinforcement of transparency. It also helps and protects 
investors from illegal acts that take place in the market. 
Furthermore, the basic key factor that has an influential effect on the level of investment 
in Saudi Arabia is mainly concerned with the opportunities and requirements for non-
resident and foreign investors, resulting in direct access to the market. It was in August 
2008 that both resident and non-resident non-Saudis were allowed to attain Saudi shares 
through the process of swap arrangements (SFG, 2009). These swap arrangements 
involve the approval of Saudi brokerage firms that are licensed by the CMA to buy and 
hold shares on account of foreign customers. It is important to note that the success of 
swap arrangements has facilitated direct foreign investment in the Saudi Stock Market 
since 1 June 2015. 
It is, therefore, important to understand the major duties that are performed by the CMA. 
These duties are as follows: 
• “To progress and regulate the Saudi Stock Market (Tadawul) and improve 
standards and transactions. 
• To enhance security by protecting investors and the public from unfair, 
unsound and illegal practices, including fraud and manipulation. 
• To improve the efficiency of the market and make transactions of securities 
more transparent. 
• To diminish the risks associated with transactions through the creation of 
appropriate measures and standards. 
• To monitor how committed Saudi listed companies are to disclosing the 
required information. 
• To oversee all activities and transactions on the Saudi market. 
• To improve and oversee the issuance of securities and under-trading 




2.4.3 Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) 
The central bank of Saudi Arabia came into existence in 1952, established by Royal 
Decrees issued on 20 April 1952. The first Decree was no. 30/4/1/1046, which established 
the Monetary Agency of Saudi Arabia. The second Decree was no. 30/4/1/1047, which 
was the Charter of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Furthermore, SAMA started 
practising on 4 October 1952. 
SAMA plays a significant role in the unification and improvement of the financial system 
of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, it is also to be noted that SAMA has played a major role 
in creating and paying significant attention to the need for the promotion and 
improvement of the national banking system in the KSA. SAMA, in its early initiation 
and continuation over the course of 12 years, which marked the period 1960–1972, 
concentrated on regulations for enlarging the banking industry and ensuring complete 
transformation to the national currency of the KSA since March 1961, and its mandate 
was legalised by Article VIII of the agreements associated with those of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (SAMA, 2015). In the years 1973–1982, the primary concern of 
SAMA was to reduce the pressures of inflation on the developing economy of the 
Kingdom, as well as to expand the banking system to manage the foreign exchange 
reserves of the Kingdom. Some of SAMA’s duties and responsibilities are as follows: 
• “Dealing with the Government’s banking affairs. 
• Minting and printing the national currency (the Saudi Riyal), strengthening 
the Saudi currency and stabilizing its external and internal value as well as 
strengthening the currency’s cover.  
• Managing Saudi’s foreign exchange reserves. 
• Managing monetary policy in order to maintain the stability of prices and 
the exchange rate.  
• Promoting the growth of the financial system and ensuring its robustness. 
• Overseeing commercial banks and exchange dealers.  
• Overseeing cooperative insurance companies and the self-employment 
professions related to insurance activity. 
• Overseeing finance companies. 
• Overseeing credit information companies” (SAMA, 2015). 
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2.4.4 Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) 
The stock market of Saudi Arabia, known as Tadawul, was unofficially established in 
1935 (Al-Jaser, 2002) and the first joint stock company in Saudi Arabia was the Arabian 
Automobiles Company (Tadawul, 2012). Although only five companies were listed in 
1954, by 1975, the number of businesses had increased by 14 (Al-Barrak, 2005). The 
number of listed firms continued to grow due to the expansion of the economy of Saudi 
Arabia by 1975 (Al-Barrak, 2005). This expansion happened because of the rapid rise in 
the price of oil, along with the Saudisation of the capital present in foreign banks. It was 
under foreign banks that the shares from foreign investors were bought and the market 
informally started operations in 1985 (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). SAMA was 
ordered by Royal Decree in 1984 to formulate regulations and monitor all the securities 
activities associated with them (SAMA, 2013). Furthermore, this particular government 
body was solely responsible for the supervision and determination of the predominant 
activities taking place in the market before the establishment of the CMA in 2003. This 
led to the CMA being recognised as the only body of administration responsible for the 
authorisation of the task of trading securities in Saudi Arabia. Thus, this arrangement 
constrained the foundation of Tadawul by government initiation on 19 March 2007. The 
establishment of the Saudi Stock Exchange was a significant improvement in the 
developing securities market.   
On 26 February 2017, Tadawul and the CMA officially launched Nomu, which is an 
alternative equities market with lighter listing requirements in comparison with the main 
market. Nomu serves as an alternative platform for publicising companies, although 
investing in this market remains restricted only to qualifying investors. The primary 
objective of initiating Nomu is that it acts as an additional source of funds for issuers to 
access the required amount of capital, along with a rise in the diversification and 
expansion of the capital market. Another major characteristic of Nomu is the liability of 
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conversion to the main market after the new filling process along with the CMA. It should 
be noted that the following regulations are associated with Nomu. The majority of Saudi 
and Gulf companies are eligible for listing and are owned by nationals. However, a 
minimum amount of 10 million SR of the capital is to be listed in this market and the 
public must own at least 20% of the total shares. It is to be noted that, if the market value 
of a firm’s shares is greater (or less) than 40 million SR, there have to be at least 50 (35) 
shareholders. The listed companies must operate their main activity for one financial year. 
Moreover, one year of financial statements is required and these are audited according to 
the standards issued by SOCPA. In recent years, the government of Saudi Arabia has 
planned to privatise most of its significant economic sectors, which has encouraged a 
significant number of family and private companies to go public. Therefore, the number 
of Saudi listed companies has drastically increased, from 61 in 2004 to 161 by 2014 
(Tadawul, 2015). On 31 July 2017,4 27.26% of the shares in the main market were owned 
by individuals, 66.09% by institutions, 2.18% were owned by investors from the Arab 
states of the Gulf, and 4.47% owned by foreign investors. Thus, it can be said that the 
main market in Saudi Arabia is institutionally oriented; however, the market has not 
attracted foreign investors yet, since they possess only 4.47% of the shares.  
The Arabic term ‘Tadawul’ initially meant the exchange process of stock in the capital 
market. It also refers to the Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange as an institution. The authority 
of Tadawul is administered by a board, which is self-regulating and comprises nine 
members nominated by the CMA. Three of the nine members are chosen from specified 
government organisations, namely, SAMA, the MCI, and the Ministry of Finance. Two 
of the members are appointed from amongst listed companies and the remaining four 
represent licensed brokerage entities. The Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia owns 
                                                           
4 Monthly Stock Market Ownership and Trading Activity Report (July 2017).  
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Tadawul, which has capital worth 1 billion 200 million SR. The responsibilities 
associated with this organisation are as follows:  
• “To issue and enforce professional standards for brokers and their agents. 
• To develop and enhance excellence of service for all customers, including 
brokers, issuers, investors, vendors, etc. 
• To increase and ensure fair and efficient activities in the market. 
• To ensure market integrity, quality and fairness. 
• To improve the exchange’s capabilities and competencies. 
• To support investor education and awareness efforts” (Tadawul, 2015). 
 
2.4.5 Saudi Organisation for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) 
SOCPA was established in 1991 as a semi-independent authority governed by the MCI. 
Before SOCPA was founded, the Commercial Business Regulation, which was issued in 
1931 by Royal Decree, ordered all firms to have proper maintenance of accounting 
records. It was in 1965 that listed firms had to start having their financial statements 
verified by independent external auditors in order to protect their shareholders (SOCPA, 
2012). The first Chartered Accountants’ Act was issued in 1974 and acted as an important 
element in the regulation of the accounting profession in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and was formulated under the guidance of the MCI.  
SOCPA is managed by its members, who are responsible for the enhancement and 
promotion of accounting, together with the verification practices of the profession 
(SOCPA, 2006). The primary responsibilities of SOCPA are to: 
• “Review, develop and approve accounting standards. 
• Review, develop and approve auditing standards. 
• Establish the necessary rules for fellowship certificate examination (CPA 
exam.) including professional, practical and scientific aspects of audit 
profession and applicable regulations. 
• Organize continuous education programs. 
• Establish an appropriate quality review program in order to ensure that 
Certified Public Accountants implement professional standards and comply 
with the provisions of Certified Public Accountants Regulations and 
relevant by-laws. 
• Conduct special research work and studies covering accounting, auditing 
and other related subjects. 
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• Publish periodicals, books and bulletins covering accountancy and audit 
related subjects. 
• Participate in local and international committees and symposiums relating 
to the profession of accounting and auditing” (SOCPA, 2006). 
2.5 Companies Law  
Companies Law, which was originally based on the British Companies Law, is considered 
to be a significant element of regulation in Saudi Arabia. It also provides the basis of 
attempts to formulate rules in Saudi companies. This law was enacted in 1965 by Royal 
Decree, followed by an update in 2015 (Royal Decree No. M3 dated 28/1/1437H (i.e., 
10/11/2015G). The law was published in the Official Gazette on 22/2/1437H 
(4/12/2015G) and came into force on 2 May 2016. Furthermore, it helped to sustain a 
basic system for all companies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as they are obliged to 
comply with Companies Law.  
The above law denominates the MCI as the sole regulator of all companies operating in 
Saudi Arabia. Listed companies have to comply with the rules and regulations issued by 
the CMA and Article 219 emphasises that, without prejudice to Companies Law, the 
CMA is the regulator of listed companies. Under this law, the CMA has enormous powers 
to regulate listed companies. The CMA also issues rules with which listed firms have to 
comply in addition to Companies Law, such as corporate governance and merger and 
acquisition regulations and listing rules. The Royal Decree enacting this law clarifies that 
the provisions of Companies Law do not apply to the funds and investments of special-
purpose entities. Thus, the CMA has the authority to regulate these entities in accordance 
with the Capital Market Law.  
The structure of a company is a large aspect of the determination of its legal position. 
Article 68 of Companies Law designates that public companies must be administered by 
a board of directors with a minimum of three members and a maximum of 11. 
Furthermore, it specifies that the directors must be appointed during the annual general 
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meeting of the company. Directors should also serve for at least three years, unless the 
constitutional documentation of the company states otherwise. The law stipulates that the 
chair must be restricted from holding any executive position in the company. There is 
also a necessity to appoint a deputy chair. Furthermore, it should be noted that the general 
meeting of the shareholders has the power to expel a director from the board, if that 
individual director does not attend three successive meetings held by the shareholders 
without a valid reason. Any shareholders that possess at least 10,000 shares can nominate 
him/herself to the board of directors. Under the new law, companies are given the 
authority to choose an appropriate method of remuneration for the benefit of the board of 
directors. Remuneration can, for example, be in the form of attendance allowance, a salary 
and a portion of the income of the company. In addition, the new law makes it compulsory 
for directors to declare their remunerations received from the company in the board of 
directors’ report.   
Article 133 states that companies need to appoint one external auditor to audit their 
financial statements. The new law restricts companies from the process of appointing the 
same auditor for a prolonged period. Thus, in order to reflect global trends for the 
promotion of fiscal objectivity, an auditor must not be appointed for more than five 
consecutive years. In such situations, a similar auditor can be appointed at intervals of 
two years. Furthermore, an external auditor is usually restricted from combining auditing 
with any other consultancy service, the company’s income tax and Zakat services being 
an exception. Article 135 also demands that the external auditor report to the annual 
general meeting of the company. It is important to note that the external auditor may be 
subjected to five years of imprisonment and/or a fine of 5 million SR for providing 
misleading or false data in a financial statement. Furthermore, if an external auditor fails 
to inform a company about violations uncovered during his/her work, the auditor is 
subjected to one year of imprisonment and a fine of 1 million SR (in some cases, this may 
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be considered a criminal violation). It is also important to note that the auditor will have 
to pay a fine of up to 500,000 SR if any breach of Companies Law takes place. 
2.6 Accounting and Auditing Standards  
In 1986, Saudi Arabia initiated the implementation of national accounting and auditing 
standards that are based on those of the US. It is to be noted that, before January 2017, all 
Saudi companies (listed and unlisted) used Saudi national accounting standards, apart 
from financial companies (banks and insurance companies) (IFRSs, 2010). Financial 
companies are required by SAMA to use IFRSs. SOCPA is accountable for issuing and 
enhancing accounting standards, which is achieved through establishing two committees: 
one for financial accounting standards and the other for auditing standards.  
The Committee of Financial Accounting Standards has issued 23 standards that relate to, 
for example, revenues and expenses recognitions standards, party disclosure, income tax 
and Zakat, and general disclosure. The Committee of Auditing Standards has issued 17 
standards related to external audits.  
SOCPA has translated and made some adjustments to the IFRSs, and all listed firms are 
required, from January 2017, to adopt them. These adjustments were necessary to bring 
IFRSs in line with laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, SOCPA has adopted 
IFRSs for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and all unlisted firms are, from 
January 2018, required to adopt IFRSs for SMEs 
2.7 Listing Rules 
The CMA issued listing rules on 20/8/1425H (4/10/2004G) and amended them on 
9/8/1437H (26/5/2016G). Article 5 demands that an IPO (issuer) has “an independent 
financial advisor and an independent legal advisor”. Furthermore, the firm is required to 
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prepare a prospectus. It is also important to note that the financial advisor must have a 
proper licence from the CMA. 
Article 11 requires the issuer to prepare at least the previous three years’ financial 
statements, which must be audited and prepared “in accordance with the accounting 
standards approved by SOCPA”. Article 13 also requires the issuer to have at least 200 
shareholders by the time of listing. It also demands that the public has to attain at least 
30% of the shares of the issuer by the time of listing.  
Part 8 of this regulation, entitled ‘Continuing Obligations’, consists of 13 articles that deal 
with the transparency and disclosure in annual corporate reports with the objective of 
reducing asymmetric information. Furthermore, Article 40 states that firms listed on the 
stock exchange are subject to informing the CMA and their shareholders regarding any 
major change in their operations. Thus, it is important to notify the issue on the Tadawul 
website at least two hours before the first period of trading on the stock market. Thus, the 
basic purpose of this demand is to create a sense of concern among stakeholders regarding 
possible impacts on the firm’s assets and liabilities.  
Article 42 states that companies need to make both quarterly and annual financial 
statements, which are to be available on the stock market website (Tadawul) after 
approval by the board of directors. The CMA makes it clear that financial statements need 
to be declared within 30 days for quarterly results and three months for annual results. It 
is important to note that Article 42 requires listed firms to announce their financial 
statements at least 14 days prior to the general assembly meeting. Article 42 emphasises 
the independence of external auditors, as it requires listed firms to ensure that there is “no 
ownership of shares or securities of the firm or any of its subsidiaries”. Moreover, Article 
42 states that before publishing, the financial statements of listed firm must be signed by 
the chief executive officer, the CFO and the authorised director. 
29 
 
When external auditors issue qualified opinions, the firm must disclose the reasons for 
this and any related information (Article 43). When a firm changes its external auditors 
before the end of the period for which the auditor is hired, the firm is required to disclose 
the reasons for this decision. 
Article 45 provides proper instruction on the preparation of the report of the public board 
regarding the ownership of the company by providing the names of those shareholders 
who are owners of at least 5% of the shares of the company. This regulation applies to 
both managers and directors, along with outsiders. It is also important to make the 
shareholders aware of any relevant changes in the ownership during a financial year. 
Furthermore, the listed firm must send a note to the CMA at the end of the trading day if 
“the ownership or interest of any of the directors or senior executives of the issuer 
increasing or decreasing by 50%” (as per Article 45). 
The lock-up period for owners for an IPO is six months from the date of trading (Article 
49). Article 50 indicates that the directors and senior executives and any person related to 
them are forbidden from buying or selling the firm’s shares during the following periods: 
• “during the 15 calendar days preceding the end of the financial quarter 
and until the date of the announcement of the reviewed interim financial 
statements of the issuer; and  
• during the 30 calendar days preceding the end of the financial year and 
until the date of the announcement of the reviewed interim financial 
statements or the audited annual financial statements of the issuer”. 
2.8 Summary  
This chapter reveals insights into the background of Saudi Arabia, which was established 
by King Abdulaziz in 1932. Saudi Arabia is the largest and leading producer of crude oil 
in the world. Since 2005, the Kingdom has been a member of the WTO. In 2015, it 
produced 31% of the total oil output for OPEC. By the end of 2016, it had around 22% 
of the total oil reserves in the world. 
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The Constitution of Saudi Arabia is based on the principles of the Holy Quran. In terms 
of the Kingdom’s administrative bodies, the MCI is responsible for issuing and 
supervising the implementation of Companies Law. The CMA is a government 
organisation that has the power to issue the regulations and rules that govern the SSM and 
all listed firms are supervised by the CMA. The financial sectors are supervised by 
SAMA. Companies Law in Saudi Arabia prevents auditors from combining auditing with 
any other consultancy service. However, company income tax and Zakat services are 
exempt from this. Regarding IPOs, listed firms are required to provide financial 
statements for the last three years, audited according to standards issued by SOCPA. 
The following chapter presents the conceptual framework related to earnings 
management and includes definitions and the types of and motivations for earnings 
management engagement. It also provides a review of the literature on earnings 




Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework and Literature Review  
3.1 Introduction 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) argue that managers are motivated to manipulate earnings for 
many reasons, including contracts, regulations, capital markets and initial public offerings 
(IPOs). According to the literature, earnings management can be seen to fall into three 
categories, based on the following: accruals, real activities and classification-shifting. 
Accrual-based earnings management is preferred by managers, as there is no direct impact 
on cash flow (Roychowdhury, 2006) and it cannot be detected directly (Young, 1999). 
This chapter provides a definition of earnings management in section 3.2 and an overview 
of the types of earnings that may be used by managers to manage earnings in section 3.3. 
Section 3.4 discusses the cost of earnings management, as past research finds that the 
manipulation of earnings is not cost-free. Section 3.5 explains why managers are 
motivated to conduct opportunistic earnings management. An in-depth discussion of the 
association between earnings management and audit quality is given in section 3.6 and a 
literature review of earnings management around IPOs is presented in section 3.7. Section 
3.8 provides a summary of the chapter.   
3.2 Definition of Earnings Management  
The literature offers numerous definitions of earnings management. The definition by 
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) is commonly cited in the literature and earnings 
management is stated as occurring  
“when managers use judgment in the financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”.   
Previous literature finds evidence that is in line with the definition by Healy and Wahlen 
(1999). For instance, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find that managers engage in 
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earnings management to evade debt covenant violations. Previous studies (e.g.Balsam, 
1998) find that managers engage in earnings management to achieve performance-based 
compensation.   
Another definition commonly cited in the literature is by Shipper (1989, p. 92), who 
defines earnings management as “purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain”. Rather than managers’ 
judgement, which encompasses a number of factors, such as experience and qualifications 
that may have an impact on their judgement, this definition focuses on the intention 
behind the act. The first definition considers the act of earnings management as being less 
offensive than the judgements given by accounting standards, whereas the second 
considers the act of earnings management itself to be offensive, as it emphasises 
intentions that lead to private gain. The researcher of this study adopts the second 
definition, as it is a broad one that includes all types of earnings management (see the 
next section). For example, no element of judgement is included in the accounting 
standards regarding real earnings management and, therefore, this type is not considered 
earnings management under the first definition; whereas, under the second definition, this 
act is considered as earnings management, since the intention is for managers to obtain 
private gains.   
Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) require managers to form estimates 
and judgements to reflect a firm’s underlying economic performance. However, giving 
an advantage to a firm’s management may create an incentive to misuse this benefit, 
which is known as opportunistic earnings management. Healy and Wahlen (1999) state 
that the intentional selection of accounting methods leads to deceiving financial statement 
users about the real performance of the firm or the gaining of a certain outcome from a 
contract agreement.  
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Scott (2009) differentiates between good and bad earnings management. He defines ‘bad’ 
earnings management as the intervention by management to enhance firm performance 
and achieve personal gains. In contrast, he argues that the ‘good’ practice of earnings 
management comes when managers engage in this to disclose inside information to 
stakeholders about the future performance of the firm. Hence, earnings management may 
be used as a device to enhance the usefulness of financial statements. According to Qintao 
(2007), a great deal of literature focuses on opportunistic types of behaviour and 
motivation. There are a number of types of earnings management that managers are able 
to use to engage in such activities, which are discussed in the following section.  
3.3 Types of Earnings Management   
Based on previous literature, earnings management falls into three categories: accrual-
based earnings management, real earnings management and classification-shifting. The 
following sections describe these methods in depth.    
3.3.1 Accrual-based earnings management 
Before discussing the methods available to managers under accrual-based earnings 
management, it is worthwhile clarifying the difference between non-discretionary 
(abnormal) and discretionary (normal) accruals. Non-discretionary accruals arise from 
factors over which managers have no control (Jones, 1991). For instance, a growth in 
sales will raise the balance of accounts receivable and bad debts, even though the credit 
policy has not changed. In contrast, discretionary accruals arise from factors over which 
managers do have control (Jones, 1991). For example, a manager may over- or 
underestimate the rate of bad debts for the allowance of doubtful accounts, with the aim 
of affecting the current reported expenses; any resulting accruals will be discretionary. 
Under GAAP, managers are able to manipulate accounting earnings, as they have the 
choice between accounting policies that treat accounting events differently. For example, 
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alternative treatments for accounting events can change reported income without any cash 
flow consequences. According to Teoh et al. (1998b), there are three types of methods 
available to managers under accrual-based earnings management:  
(1) Accounting method choice: Under this method, managers can postpone and advance 
the recognition of expenses and revenues to increase reported income. For instance, a 
straight line of asset depreciation minimises depreciation expenses in comparison 
with accelerated depreciation in the early years of depreciation. If a new management 
wants to delay revenue recognition for ongoing long-term projects to enhance its 
reputation, the completed-contract method might be used, as, in this method, revenues 
are recognised only at the completion of a project. In contrast, the percentage-
completion method allows revenue recognition as a percentage of the work completed 
during the reported year.  
(2) Accounting method application/discretionary estimates: Managers can affect reported 
income even after the choice of an accounting method via the application of 
accounting principles. Accounting standards permit managers to exercise their 
discretion in estimates, such as the salvage values and asset lives of depreciable assets 
and interest rates capitalised for leases and pensions. 
(3) Accounting method timing: As managers have discretion over how accounting events 
are recognised, they also have discretion over when they are recognised. For instance, 
they have discretion over how much to write off in terms of bad loans and impaired 
assets. 
Extensive studies have examined the engagement in discretionary accruals to manage 
earnings, such as Healy (1985), Jones (1991), Rangan (1998), Teoh et al. (1998b), 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Alhadab et al. (2015). 
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3.3.2 Real activities-based earnings management 
Roychowdhury (2006) states that accrual-based earnings management does not have any 
cash flow consequences, whereas the consequences of real activities-based earnings 
management have a direct effect on a firm’s current and future cash flows. According to 
Alhadab et al. (2015), real activities-based earnings management is preferred by 
managers over accrual-based activities for several reasons. First, accrual manipulations 
are more likely to come under regulators’ and auditors’ scrutiny. Second, accrual 
manipulations may lead to potential accounting fraud that exposes the firm’s management 
to litigation risk. Third, as preceding changes in accounting methods are accumulated in 
the balance sheet, managers may switch their engagement in earnings management from 
accruals to real earnings in the current period when accrual earnings are utilised widely 
in prior periods.   
Managers are able to engage in real earnings management through a range of operating 
decisions. The most common example of real activity is offering a price discount and 
highly flexible credit terms to customers, mainly towards the end of the year, in order to 
maximise sales. Dechow and Skinner (2000) consider that a reduction in research and 
development (hereafter, R&D) expenditures with the intention of reducing current period 
expenses is a real activities-based earnings management practice. They also mention a 
variety of activities that are considered real activities, such as delaying maintenance 
expenditures and altering shipment schedules to affect reported earnings.  
A number of studies have examined the engagement of earnings management based on 
real activities. For example, Bens, Nagar, and Wong (2002) find that firms may reduce 
R&D expenditures to partially fund stock repurchases. Another study by Roychowdhury 
(2006) demonstrates that firms can report a lower cost of goods sold (COGS) by offering 
price discounts to improve profit margins. He also finds that firms engage in a reduction 
of R&D expenditures to enhance reported profit. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) 
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interviewed managers of US listed firms, including financial executives, and show that 
firms engage in earnings manipulation through real activities, such as delaying 
advertising expenditure. Based on an examination of 138 IPO firms in the UK, Alhadab 
et al. (2015) find that firms engage in earnings management of both types (real and 
accrual) during the first year of becoming a public firm. They also provide evidence that 
IPO firms with a higher probability of IPO failure and a lower survival rate engage in real 
activities in earnings manipulation. However, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find that 
the use of real activities in manipulating earnings is limited. Roychowdhury (2006) claims 
that firms engage only in reducing research and development (R&D) expenses as other 
activities have a little evidence of real activities. 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010, p. 3) argue that “real management activities are less likely to 
be scrutinized by auditors and regulators”. Moreover, external auditors have an obligation 
to mitigate the misuse of the judgement allowed for firms under the accounting standards. 
Therefore, this study does not examine the real activities, as the main motivation is to 
investigate the ban on Deloitte in Saudi Arabia.     
3.3.3 Classification-shifting-based earnings management  
Another channel through which managers can engage in earnings management is 
classification-shifting-based activities. Managers are motivated to report core expenses5 
as income-decreasing special items in order to inflate core profitability (McVay (2006). 
Kinney and Trezevant (1997) indicate that market participants pay more attention to ‘core 
earnings’ than the net income figure. Thus, according to Yun, Barua, Cready, and Thomas 
(2010), financial statement users are deceived by shifting core expenses within the income 
statement. 
                                                           




Earnings management has also been investigated by McVay (2006), who finds that, based 
on the US context, special items include expenses that have been opportunistically shifted 
from core expenses. Similarly, based on the UK context, Athanasakou, Strong, and 
Walker (2009) demonstrate that a small part of the core expenses can be reclassified to 
include other non-recurring items to reduce the gap between reported income and the 
income expected by analysts. Another study from a UK sample conducted by Zalata and 
Roberts (2017) finds that UK firms manipulate core earnings by classifying some 
expenses as non-recurring items, whereas they should classify them as recurring. 
Moreover, Zalata and Roberts (2016) find that strong internal corporate governance curbs 
classification-shifting activities, and that firms with more independent directors, long 
tenure of directors and an effective audit committee can mitigate the engagement of 
classification-shifting activities. More specifically, they find three characteristics of an 
audit committee that prevent these activities: the existence of financial specialists on the 
committee, greater meeting frequency of the audit committee, and the existence of 
directors with long tenure.   
Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010) argue that, if managers are able to manipulate 
accruals throughout the year, they may face difficulties in manipulating them when the 
end of the year approaches. Thus, managers might resort to another channel for earnings 
manipulation: classification-shifting. 
3.4 The Cost of Earnings Management 
As noted above, previous literature has indicated that the manipulation of earnings is not 
cost-free. Roosenboom et al. (2003) contend that accrual-based earnings management 
will total zero over the long run, as the sum of earnings must equal the sum of cash flow 
over the life of the business. In addition, abnormal accruals in one period might well be 
offset by lower-than-normal accruals in subsequent periods (Roosenboom et al., 2003). 
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Therefore, managers are unable to engage in income-increasing earnings management 
over long periods without being detected. Graham et al. (2005) argue that aggressive 
accruals manipulation may attract the attention of board members and external auditors, 
particularly in a year of change. Another cost of accrual-based earnings management is 
that accruals earnings reduce future accounting flexibility because, when earnings are 
overstated in one period, managers have fewer degrees of freedom later (Nam et al., 
2014). Short-run earnings improvement by accruals activities may lead to poor 
performance, as managers may not be able to sustain inflated earnings numbers 
indefinitely (Roosenboom et al., 2003). Nam et al. (2014) perceive that firms may face a 
lawsuit filed by investors if any part of the registration statement includes false data or 
omits information. As a result, as DuCharme et al. (2001, p. 373) argue, “The potential 
litigation costs are sometimes large enough to even threaten the existence of the litigated”.  
According to McVay (2006), the cost of classification-shifting-based earnings 
management is quite low compared with that of accrual-based earnings management. 
Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley (2002) argue that shifting expenses to special items involves 
no change in the net income reported and future periods will not bear any accruals due to 
this shift. Thus, external auditors may overlook conducting an examination of this type 
of earnings management.    
Lo (2008) contends that the highest cost of earnings manipulation arises through real 
activities, as the impact will negatively affect future cash flow. Although real activities-
based earnings management is associated with high levels of cost, managers are quite 
willing to manipulate earnings through real activities, rather than engaging in other 
manipulation activities (Graham et al., 2005). Roychowdhury (2006) explains that 
managers are eager to bear such high costs, since accrual manipulations are more likely 
to come under regulators’ and auditors’ scrutiny. The next section presents the 
motivations behind engagement in accruals earnings management.  
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3.5 Motivations behind Earnings Management 
As one of the focuses of this study is to examine earnings management around IPOs, the 
latter being one of many elements that motivate managers to manipulate reported 
earnings, this section presents an in-depth discussion of the types of motivation involved. 
Previous literature has listed the incentives that explain why managers are motivated to 
conduct bad or opportunistic earnings management. According to (Healy & Wahlen, 
1999), the main earnings management incentives are as follows: 
1. capital market motivations; 
2. regulatory and political motivations; 
3. management compensation contract motivations; and 
4. lending contract motivations. 
3.5.1 Capital market motivations 
Stock prices might be a strong motivation for managers to manipulate earnings, as 
reported earnings affect stock prices. Kim and Yi (2006) offer evidence that public firms 
report higher discretionary accruals than private ones. This finding supports the view that 
the stock market motivates managers of listed firms to participate in earnings 
manipulation. 
Based on previous studies of capital market motivations for earnings management, the 
main incentives are as follows: (1) meeting participants’ expectations of the stock market 
(2) before IPOs or seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and (3) before acquisitions and 
mergers. The next sections discuss these incentives.   
3.5.1.1 Meeting participants’ expectations of the stock market 
Bartov and Mohanram (2004) argue that managers use earnings management as a tool to 
meet analysts’ predictions. In contrast, Matsunaga and Park (2001) argue that reporting 
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earnings that are below the benchmark earnings has a highly negative impact on stock 
returns. Another study conducted by Graham et al. (2005), who interviewed financial 
executives of US public firms, shows that managers are concerned about not meeting 
earnings benchmarks, as this may affect their reputation and share prices. The authors 
contend that managers’ concerns are a strong motivation for earnings manipulation. 
Tempting future investors by meeting or beating analysts’ predictions may also inspire 
managers to manipulate earnings. Managers may engage in earnings management by 
inflating incomes when these are lower than the expectation, and may engage in earnings 
management by decreasing incomes when these are above expectations (Koh, 
Matsumoto, & Rajgopal, 2008). 
Daniel, Denis, and Naveen (2008) provide evidence that meeting predicted dividend 
levels might be a strong motivation to engage in earnings manipulation. Similarly, from 
1994 to 2002, UK listed firms conducted earnings manipulation to avoid falling short of 
analysts’ earnings predictions and having to report negative earnings (Athanasakou et al., 
2009).  Duncan (2001) provides evidence that there was a 30% decrease in the stock 
prices of firms that did not meet analysts’ predictions in the first quarter of 2000. 
An investigation conducted by Osma and Young (2009) to examine the relationship 
between earnings benchmarks and R&D expenses changes reports that the probability of 
a reduction in current R&D spending is high when firms previously failed to meet the 
earnings benchmark. In addition, they document that firms engaged in a reduction of 
R&D expenses to meet current earnings benchmarks. 
3.5.1.2 Prior to IPOs or SEOs 
An enormous body of research provides evidence of managers’ manipulation around 
listing seasoned (or secondary) equity offerings. The next sections provide a summary of 
key articles that study earnings management around the issuing of shares.   
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IPO Motivations  
As the initial stock price of an IPO relies on pre-IPO financial statements, the incentive 
to manage earnings before going public to price the initial stock offering as high as 
possible is significant. Aharony et al. (1993) contend that managers of IPOs engage in 
opportunistic behaviour to maximise the proceeds from the initial offering. Moreover, 
Neill et al. (1995) consider the association between the price of the initial offering and 
the selection of accounting methods that inflate asset and income values and provide 
evidence that a positive relationship exists between them. (Section 3.7 provides an in-
depth literature review, as the focus of this study is on earnings management around 
IPOs.)    
SEO Motivations 
Issuing SEOs may motivate a firm’s management to engage in opportunistic earnings 
behaviours. According to Rangan (1998), a firm’s management will manipulate earnings 
upwards in favour of current shareholders, as this will increase the market value of the 
firm. Rangan (1998) contends that manipulating earnings upwards before SEOs may have 
a negative impact on stock prices in subsequent periods, as discretionary accruals earnings 
management will reverse in subsequent years, which may result in lower future earnings 
and lead to lower stock prices. Consistent with the results obtained by Rangan (1998), 
Teoh et al. (1998a) examined 1,265 US SEO issuers from 1976 to 1989. They report that 
SEO firms with a higher income growth in the year of issue showed significant 
underperformance in the following periods compared with non-issuing firms within the 
same industry.   
As Ritter (1984) argues, earnings are a significant factor in determining the value of firms 
with IPOs. Yongtae and Myung Seok (2005) hypothesise that SEO firms aggressively 
engage in earnings management to inflate their offer prices, which directly affects the 
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issuer’s wealth. They find a negative relation between SEO underpricing6 and 
discretionary accruals, indicating that seasoned equity issuers actively engage in earnings 
management, as well as inflating the offer price to increase offering proceeds. 
 Cohen and Zarowin (2010) argue that managers may also manipulate earnings though 
real earnings management activities. They find subsequent underperformance of issuing 
firms due to real and accrual earnings management activities. However, Roychowdhury, 
Kothari, and Mizik (2012) find an overvaluation of SEOs due to engagement in real 
earnings management activities. Thus, the underperformance of SEO firms is caused by 
real earnings management, not accruals activities. 
In an attempt to examine the effect of underwriter choice on the existence of earnings 
management around SEOs and post-issue performance, Jo, Kim, and Park (2007) 
determine that a negative relationship exists between underwriter reputation and earnings 
manipulation. Furthermore, Yongtae and Myung Seok (2005) suggest that issuers with 
less intention of manipulating earnings hire high-quality underwriters who care about 
their reputations; they restrict firms’ incentives to engage in earnings management, as 
they wish to avoid potential litigation risks. These researchers also emphasise that firms 
that hire high-quality underwriters exhibit better operating performance compared with 
firms that hire low-quality underwriters. 
Although Shivakumar (2000) identifies high abnormal accruals before SEOs, he contends 
that managers are motivated to engage in earnings management because investors expect 
them to do so. In addition, a firm’s management is unable to signal the absence of earnings 
management, as investors would doubt management information related to future 
earnings. 
                                                           
6 Defined as” the offer price less the closing price on the offer date”. 
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3.5.1.3 Acquisitions and mergers 
Erickson and Shiing-wu Wang (1999) suggest that a stock swap option in acquisitions 
and mergers may motivate the acquiring firm to engage in opportunistic earnings 
management to sustain a high stock price, as this will avoid the dilution of voting rights 
and lower the cost of acquisition or merger transactions. Based on an examination of 55 
firms, they find that acquiring firms manipulate earnings upwards prior to a merger 
announcement and that the proportion of earnings management is associated with the size 
of the merger deal. They also find no evidence of earnings management when cash is part 
of the merger deal.  
Consistent with the results obtained by Erickson and Shiing-wu Wang (1999), Louis 
(2004) finds that acquiring firms manipulate earnings upwards in the quarter before the 
announcement of a merger. He also compares cash and stock-for-stock acquisition in 
terms of post-merger performance, finding that firms with a cash merger perform better 
than stock-for-stock acquisition firms because of the presence of earnings management 
in the latter. 
In an attempt to establish whether pre-merger earnings management may lead to lawsuits, 
Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) examine the association between post-merger lawsuits and 
the level of earnings management. They find that the potential for post-merger lawsuits 
is positively correlated with the pre-merger earnings management level.  
3.5.2 Regulatory and political motivations 
Governments and politicians may motivate managers to manage their firm’s earnings in 
response to regulations. Firms may manage earnings downwards or upwards to avoid 
interference or the costs imposed by government. One of the common motivations for 
manipulating reported earnings downwards is to reduce tax expenses (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990). For example, 2,044 small Greek firms are found to manage their 
reported profit downwards to reduce income taxes (Spyros, 2004). Similarly, Russian 
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companies managed their profits downwards in 2001 and 2002 to lessen income taxes 
(Goncharov & Zimmermann, 2006). Firms may also take advantage of a new regulation, 
as Jones (1991) shows in her study. She finds the downward management of earnings 
during the year of import-relief investigations by the US International Trade Commission 
(ITC) in order to benefit from import-relief regulations. 
Political reasons may also create a motivation for managers to manipulate reported 
earnings, as argued by Verbruggen, Christaens, and Milis (2008) and Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990). Few studies have, however, been conducted on this topic. 
Nevertheless, Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) examine firms linked to US 
congressional members in the 2004 elections. They find that firms that previously 
contributed to a congressional candidate campaign managed their earnings downwards to 
manage the political cost. 
3.5.3 Management compensation contract motivations 
According to Scott (2009, p. 356), “an executive compensation plan is an agency contract 
between a firm and its managers”; in entering into such a contract, managers act as agents 
in trying to transfer wealth to themselves from the principal. Thus, managers are expected 
to be involved in earnings manipulation to maximise their own profit, which is often based 
on the firm’s performance (Beneish, 1997). Compensation plans are often associated with 
reported earnings and share price as measures of a firm’s performance (Scott, 2009). 
A number of studies have provided evidence that managers are involved in earnings 
management to maximise their own wealth. Healy (1985)’s study was the first to be 
conducted on this topic. Healy argues that enhancing a compensation plan might be a 
strong motivation for manipulating earnings, as he finds a statistically significant 
association between discretionary accruals and the existence of a compensation plan. 
Likewise, Dye (1991) suggests that attaching accounting figures to a compensation plan 
is the main incentive for opportunistic earnings management. A compensation plan might 
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be a strong motivation for managers to manipulate the time of release of good or bad news 
to the market (Baker et al., 2003). Therefore, managers can use the release time of bad 
news as a tool to minimise their exercise price.  
DeAngelo (1988) argues that managers engage in opportunistic earnings management to 
retain their positions by reporting steadily growing earnings to convince shareholders that 
they are performing efficiently.  
3.5.4 Lending contract motivations 
Creditors usually impose restrictions on long-term lending contracts to protect themselves 
from firm management actions that might conflict with their interests. These restrictions 
aim to prevent actions by managers that may weaken the immunity of existing creditors 
through excessive payment of dividends, additional borrowing or share buybacks (Scott, 
2009). In addition, debt agreements have terms and conditions that restrict investment in 
other firms, asset disposal, mergers and minimum levels of working capital (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990). 
Recent studies have shown that debt covenants are often used (Roberts & Sufi, 2009a, 
2009b).The violation of debt agreements and covenants may lead to what is called a 
technical default, which may result in debt repayments, a higher interest rate or debt 
agreement negotiation (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). Beneish and Press (1993) offer 
evidence that, on average, the interest cost increases by 0.84–1.63% of the market value 
of the firm’s equity because of refinancing. They also find that when firms violate debt 
covenants, they face more control from creditors. Surprisingly, Matsumoto (2002) argues 
that debt violation may lead to a reputation loss, which can, in turn, affect share price. 
Thus, managers are motivated to manipulate earnings to avoid costs that may be incurred 




A large and growing body of literature has investigated earnings management in a debt-
covenant context. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) provide evidence of earnings 
manipulation one year prior to a covenant violation by the increase of reported earnings 
using discretionary accruals. In addition, it is found that firms engage in earnings 
manipulation to lower the cost of additional borrowing and to avoid debt covenant 
restrictions (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996). Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009) highlight 
that managers make accounting choices to improve firm performance that is within or 
below covenant thresholds. Likewise, Jaggi and Picheng (2002) highlight that managers 
of firms that are in financial distress engage in income-increasing discretionary accruals 
when they are capable of obtaining waivers for debt covenant violations; moreover, 
managers engage in income-decreasing discretionary accruals when they are negotiating 
debt restructuring when waivers are rejected. 
According to Easton, Eddey, and Harris (1993), nearly 40% of Australian chief financial 
officers (CFOs) admit to engaging in asset revaluation with the intention of lowering the 
debt-to-equity ratio and satisfying their debt agreements. In addition, it has been 
statistically demonstrated by Cotter and Zimmer (1995) that firms resort to revaluing 
assets when facing a shortfall in cash flow.   
3.6 A Review of the Literature on Earnings Management and Audit Quality  
Audit quality is defined by DeAngelo (1981) as the possibility that the auditor will detect 
and report errors in financial statements. Higher audit quality implies an auditor’s 
capability to observe misstatements in financial statements and a higher likelihood of 
detected errors being reported. A high-quality audit comes with a cost, as Craswell, 
Francis, and Taylor (1995) find that large audit firms demand higher fees and use part of 




Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang (2003) argue that there is no single auditor characteristic for 
observing audit quality. Hence, a large number of studies examine different aspects of the 
association between earnings management and audit quality, including auditor tenure or 
rotation, auditors’ industry expertise,7 auditor fees and auditor type or size. The following 
is an overview of previous studies in this regard. 
Auditor tenure is the number of consecutive years that a firm is retained as auditor. An 
in-depth understanding of a firm’s system might allow the auditor to detect the firm’s 
specific risks and the proper audit procedures for detecting earnings management. 
Previous studies find a relationship between audit quality and auditor tenure. Johnson, 
Khurana, and Reynolds (2002) investigate the linkage between the number of years that 
a firm retains an auditor and the financial reporting quality in the firms audited by the Big 
6 from 1986 to 1995. The researchers use absolute discretionary accruals to proxy the 
quality of financial reporting. To do so, they create three variables: short tenure (two to 
three years), medium tenure (four to eight years) and long tenure (nine years or more). 
The level of absolute discretionary accruals is only statistically significant with short 
tenure. However, the researchers do not provide any justification for these arbitrary 
classifications. 
Myers et al. (2003) examine the association between auditor tenure and earnings quality 
in response to calls for ‘mandatory auditor rotation’, using discretionary accruals and 
current discretionary accruals as proxies for earnings quality. They find that discretionary 
accruals and current discretionary accruals are lower with longer auditor tenure. Hence, 
they conclude that long tenure has no impact on audit quality. However, they state that 
the result does not suggest that retaining the same auditors would improve audit or 
                                                           
7 Audousset-Coulier, Jeny, and Jiang(2016) examine 30 industry specialist auditor proxies and conclude 




earnings quality. As they provide evidence that both auditor type and tenure mitigate long 
and current discretionary accruals, they added a variable to interact between non-Big 
auditors and tenure. They state that “the number of new auditor-client combinations for 
Big N auditors is 3,590 versus 1,561 for non-Big N auditors” (P.784); therefore, Big 
auditors may lead the result for tenure, as around 70% of the sample was audited by them. 
Using firms audited by the Big 6 from 1989 to 1998, Balsam et al. (2003) examine the 
association between the level of absolute discretionary accruals and auditors’ industry 
expertise. They find absolute discretionary accruals are low when firms are audited by 
industry-expert auditors. Another study consistent with the results obtained by Balsam et 
al. (2003) is by Krishnan (2003a), who finds absolute discretionary accruals are high 
when firms are audited by non-industry-expert auditors. A recent study by Yuan, Cheng, 
and Ye (2016) explores whether there is any association between the client’s business 
strategy and the auditors’ industry expertise, based on 12,253 observations of Chinese 
firms for the period from 2000 to 2010. They find an association between audit quality 
and earnings management, especially when the client’s business strategy is different from 
the industry standards. This deviation influences audit quality by moderating the role of 
the auditor in providing high audit quality.  
Jong-Hag, Jeong-Bon, and Yoonseok (2010) argue that auditors who are paid more than 
the normal audit fees by their clients may allow the financial statements to be substandard. 
They believe that auditors are willing to bear the costs associated with substandard 
statements to retain profitable clients. Absolute discretionary accruals are proxies for 
audit quality. After examining 7,061 observations in the US for the years from 2000 to 
2004, they find that a negative association exists between audit quality and positive 
abnormal audit fees, whereas the relationship between audit quality and negative 
abnormal audit fees is statistically insignificant. They believe that this study explains why 
prior studies provide mixed results, as the association between audit quality and audit fees 
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depends on an indication of abnormal audit fees. They strongly believe that examining 
the relationship between audit quality and audit fees without partitioning the sample 
according to this indication may lead to finding an insignificant relationship between 
audit quality and audit fees.  
Nevertheless, none of the audit-quality proxies referred to above are appropriate to 
answering the research question. Banning Deloitte from carrying out any audit work for 
listed firms for two years implies that Deloitte’s audit quality was lower than the other 
Big 4 firms and raises a further question about the other four firms. Thus, audit firm type 
is chosen to be used in this study, as DeFond and Zhang (2014) state that the strength of 
using Big N as a proxy for audit quality is “its relatively high construct validity” (P.289). 
They also believe this type of measurement is the most valuable for studies examining 
“the client's demand for audit quality” (P289).  
Using audit size as a proxy for audit quality is not new in the literature. For instance, 
Boone, Khurana, and Raman (2015) use this kind of proxy to investigate the disciplinary 
order against Deloitte by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in 
the US. As the focus of this study is on audit firm type as a proxy for audit quality, prior 
studies are covered in depth below. 
A considerable amount of literature uses audit firm type as a proxy for audit quality. 
DeAngelo (1981) argues that opportunistic behaviour is less and perceived audit quality 
is high with a large auditor size, as these firms have stronger motivations and higher levels 
of competence.  
Becker et al. (1998) investigate the association between audit quality and earnings 
management by examining 10,379 firms audited by the Big 6 and 2,179 firms audited by 
non-Big 6 firm-years in the US. They find that firms audited by non-Big 6 auditors report 
higher discretionary accruals than firms audited by the Big 6. The study concludes that 
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the Big 6 auditors provide a higher quality of audit than non-Big 6 firms and indicate that 
higher audit quality is related to less “Accounting flexibility”. However, they do not 
provide any analysis of signed discretionary accruals. Big 6 firms may constrain earnings 
only when firms manage earnings upwards, as the result shows a negative significant 
association between discretionary accruals and the dummy variable of the highest 10% 
of leverage.  This strong negative association between them coincides with the opinion 
of DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), who argue that firms with high leverage engage in 
income-decreasing to benefit from debt agreement renegotiations.  
Francis et al. (1999) examine whether firms with a tendency to produce accruals are more 
likely to be audited by Big 6 auditors. Using a sample from 1975 to 1994, they argue that 
such firms have a motivation to choose one of the Big 6 to add assurance to the earnings 
reported. They find that the probability of hiring the Big 6 auditors is increased with a 
tendency to generate accruals. They also find that firms audited by the Big 6 report lower 
discretionary accruals, although the level of total accruals is high in firms audited by the 
Big 6. They conclude that a constraining of aggressive reporting of accruals is associated 
with Big 6 auditors.   
Based on a sample consisting of 367 IPO firms between 1999 and 2002 in Taiwan, Vinten, 
Chen, Lin, and Zhou (2005) find that Big auditors constrain accruals earnings 
management for Taiwan IPO firms. They use Big 5 versus non-Big 5 and industry 
specialists to measure audit quality. As the literature shows both brand name and industry 
specialists mitigate earnings management, and both are used as proxies for audit quality, 
using both in one model may lead the proxies to influence each other. For example, 
Krishnan (2003a) and Balsam et al. (2003) examine industry expertise within the Big 6 
audit firms.  
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Consistent with the results obtained by Vinten et al. (2005), Alhadab, Clacher, and Keasey 
(2013) find that Big N auditors mitigate real and accrual-based earnings management 
when they examined 515 IPO firms from 1998 and 2008 on the London Stock Exchange. 
Using a sample of 6,568 US firm-years from 2003 and 2005, Francis and Yu (2009) find 
that Big 4 office size provides higher-quality audits. They argue that the probability of 
issuing going-concern audit reports is high with Big 4 offices. They also argue that 
opportunistic earnings management behaviour is less when firms are audited by a Big 
office. 
Khalil and Ozkan (2016), in their examination of 6,568 Egyptian firm-years from 2005 
and 2012, find that earnings management magnitude is less when firms are audited by the 
Big 4. Other related studies include that of Alzoubi (2016), who aimed to study the 
relationship between earnings management and the Big 4 as a proxy for audit quality in 
the Amman Stock Exchange for the years 2007–2010. He provides evidence that 
incentives for mitigating discretionary accruals exist in firms audited by one of the Big 4 
in Jordan. He concludes this finding after examining 86 firms in the industrial sector. This 
result cannot, however, be generalised to other sectors and, therefore, other non-financial 
sectors need to be examined before generalising the finding to an entire market. However, 
Idris (2012) finds that the Big 4 mitigate earnings management with income-decreasing 
activities.   
Zhou and Elder (2001) examine the association between the engagement of earnings 
manipulating and audit quality. They measure audit quality using two proxies: industry 
specialisation and audit size. From a sample containing 1,048 observations for the years 
1996–1998, they provide evidence that the two proxies they use mitigate earnings 
management in pre-IPO year. However, they use the two proxies in an empirical analysis 
of the sample, which leads to an inaccurate result as the proxies may have interacted with 
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each other. For example, Krishnan (2003a) and Balsam et al. (2003) examine industry 
expertise within Big 6 audit firms. 
In an attempt to examine the impact of Big 4 auditors on the existence of earnings 
management in private firms in European countries, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2008) provide evidence that the engagement of earnings management is less when firms 
are audited by one of the Big 4. 
Ming Chia, Lapsley, and Lee (2007) also examined the role of the Big 6 in Singapore in 
mitigating earnings management in the service sector during the Asian financial crisis for 
the period 1995–1998. After examining 318 observations, they provide evidence that the 
Big 6 constrained earnings manipulation activities in the service sector.  
A sample of 100 firms from 2009 to 2013 was drawn from Tehran listed firms by Rad, 
Salehi, and Pour (2016), who provide evidence that auditor reputation and tenure have a 
positive effect on curbing discretionary accruals. However, they do not provide a clear 
explanation of auditor reputation and whether this relates to local or international 
standing. Iran was under economic sanctions at the time examined by the study and, 
therefore, the Big 4 auditors that are known internationally did not operate in Iran. The 
methodology for identifying auditor reputation is not given. Moreover, the researchers do 
not include a variable that interacts between auditor reputation and tenure, as the result 
provided for the tenure variable might be driven by reputable auditors.   
Cahan and Zhang (2006) offer evidence that Big 4 auditors that acquired clients from 
Arthur Andersen in 2002 after the Andersen crisis in 2001 reported lower, and a major 
reduction in, discretionary accruals. The researchers reached this conclusion after 
examining 1,639 observations. However, they mention that the result was very strong 
with Ernst & Young’s clients, which may have driven the result for this finding. In other 
words, this finding may not be applicable to all Big 4 firms. Similar evidence is also found 
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from 856 observations made by Krishnan (2007), who applies four measures to 
examining earnings conservatism for clients of Arthur Andersen who switched to one of 
the Big 4 auditors in 2002. Regarding accruals earnings conservatism measurement, the 
study concludes that “the asymmetric timely recognition of losses via accruals has 
increased following the auditor change only for former Andersen clients” (Krishnan, 
2007, p. 159). Other related studies include that of Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008), 
who examine clients of Arthur Andersen and their engagement in earnings management 
compared with the other Big 5 firms from 1996 to 2000. From a sample of 6,027 
observations, they provide evidence that clients of Arthur Andersen aggressively 
participated in earnings management. Using a sample of 663 former Andersen clients 
from 2001 until the end of 2002, Lai (2013) finds that Big 4 firms curbed the level of 
discretionary accruals in these clients, compared with non-Big 4 firms that audited former 
Andersen clients. 
Houqe et al. (2017) studied the impact of audit quality on earnings management from a 
sample drawn from firms in India. Based on an examination of 7,303 observations for the 
period from 1998 to 2009, they document that Big 4 firms curbed positive earnings 
management (income-increasing). 
Although a large number of studies provide evidence of the presence of Big auditors 
curbing earnings management, other studies provide findings of no impact on earnings 
manipulation. Piot and Janin (2007) offer evidence that Big 5 audit firms do not mitigate 
earnings management in France. Studying a sample drawn from firms in Portugal, Alves 
(2013) finds that Big 4 auditors are positively associated with earnings management. 
However, she finds that Big 4 auditors constrain earnings management when an audit 
committee exists. 
For a US sample taken from 2005 to 2010 consisting of 5,709 observations, Boone et al. 
(2015) examine the audit quality of Deloitte compared with the other Big 4 before and 
54 
 
after the disciplinary order against Deloitte by the PCAOB. They examine audit quality 
three years before and after the order and find no evidence that Deloitte audit quality 
differed from the rest of the Big 4, either before or after the order. 
A sample was drawn from manufacturing industry firms listed on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange from 2003 to 2007. In the study, Yasar (2013) argues that the general notion 
that Big 4 auditors provide high-quality audits does not exist in Turkey, as he believe that 
there is no oversight mechanism for auditors. He finds that Big 4 auditors do not constrain 
earnings management.  
Other related studies include that of Tsipouridou and Spathis (2012), who aimed to 
examine the association between earnings management and auditor reporting (measured 
by audit firm size among the Big 4) in the Athens Stock Exchange after adopting 
international financial reporting standards (IFRS) for the years 2005–2009. They provide 
evidence that the incentives for mitigating discretionary accruals are limited in both Big 
4 and non-Big 4 auditors in Greece. 
Huguet and Gandía (2016) examine audit quality in small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). From a sample of 34,562 Spanish SMEs, they find that firms that that volunteer 
to have their financial statements audited report lower discretionary accruals than firms 
that do not have their financial statements audited. They also find that Big 4 firms do not 
mitigate earnings manipulation in Spanish SMEs.  
Based on a sample of 337 observations from the SSM from 2006 to 2009, Habbash and 
Alghamdi (2016) argue that the role of the Big 4 in mitigating earnings management does 
not exist in Saudi Arabia. However, they do not mention the minimum number of 
observations in each industry per year required to run Kothari et al. (2005) estimation 
model, as some sectors in the Saudi capital market have fewer than six firms, and must 
be excluded to meet the minimum number of observations required by the literature 
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(e.g.DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). For example, in 2009, the telecommunications sector 
Saudi Arabia had four firms, the hotels and tourism sector had three firms, the power 
sector had two firms, media and publishing had three firms, and the transportation sector 
had four firms. The researchers also include the real estate sector, which is considered to 
be part of the financial sector in all international industry classifications (e.g., the Industry 
Classification Benchmark). Therefore, the researcher of the current study has concerns 
regarding the accuracy of estimating discretionary accruals, which also leads to concerns 
regarding the results provided. The researchers also include five proxies for audit quality 
in one model: Specialised auditor, Audit delay, Auditor change, Auditor opinion and 
BIG4 auditors. Using these proxies in one model may lead the proxies to influence each 
other.  
Another sample was drawn from the SSM by (Gomaa, 2013), who examines the impact 
of audit quality (for both external and internal audits) on earnings management. He uses 
a mixed-methods approach, i.e., quantitative and qualitative. He measures the audit 
quality of an external audit using two proxies: auditor size and auditor industry 
specialisation, whereas he measures internal audit quality using a questionnaire. Six 
measures are used in the questionnaire: internal auditor experience; the number of 
professional certification holders in the internal audit department; training hours 
compared to working hours; the independence of the internal auditor (‘1’ if he/she reports 
to the audit committee); the number of hours that the internal auditor spends in work 
related to the financial reports; and the size of the internal audit department. He finds that 
auditor size (BIG 4) has no impact on minimising engagement in earnings management. 
Conversely, earnings management is mitigated when a firm is audited by specialists in 
the industry. He also finds that the experience, qualifications and independence of the 
internal auditor curb earnings management. However, he included audit firm size and 
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auditor industry specialisation in one empirical analysis, which are used in the literature 
as substitutes for each other. This may lead the variables to interact with each other.  
Alabbas (2008) finds no role of the Big 4 in mitigating earnings management in the SSM. 
He examines 241 observations from 2002 to 2006. However, he uses univariate analysis 
(a t-test for the difference between two means) instead of multivariate analysis to draw 
his conclusion, which leads to weak results. Using multivariate analysis allows the 
researcher to use control variables that explain variation in the dependent variable rather 
than the main variable. Consequently, the result of this study cannot be relied on.       
After examining 2,117 firm-year observations in the Korean Stock Market during the 
period from 1994 to 1998, Jeong and Rho (2004) find that audit firm size, as a proxy for 
audit quality, does not have an impact on discretionary accruals. In addition, they provide 
evidence that there is no difference in discretionary accruals between firms that switch 
from non-Big 6 to Big 6 auditors and firms that switch from Big 6 to non-Big 6. 
Bauwhede, Willekens, and Gaeremynck (2003) investigate the role of Big 4 auditors in 
Belgian firms. After examining 62 firms (both public and private) for the period from 
1991 to 1997, they find that there is no role for the Big 4 companies when the profit of 
the firm is below the target profit. They argue that the Big 4 do not pay attention to 
earnings management in these cases, as the litigation risk in Belgium is low.  
Haniffa et al. (2006) find that the presence of Big 5 auditors does not curb the existence 
of earnings management in Malaysia. They use the Big 5 as a control variable for the 
reduction of earnings management when they investigated the linkage between corporate 
governance characteristics and earnings management. 
3.6.1 Critical evaluation of the literature on earnings management and audit Size 
In light of the studies stated above, the role of Big N auditors in mitigating discretionary 
accruals is still arguable, especially in developing countries. Some studies in developing 
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countries find a positive role of Big N auditors in constraining discretionary accruals 
(e.g.Khalil & Ozkan, 2016; Vinten et al., 2005). Other studies in developing countries 
find no role for Big N auditors in constraining discretionary accruals (e.g.Tsipouridou & 
Spathis, 2012; Yasar, 2013). Even within the same country, the results are contradictory. 
For example, in Jordan, Alzoubi (2016) provides results that are counter to the finding of 
Idris (2012). Moreover, the results differ within developed countries. For instance, Piot 
and Janin (2007) find no role for the Big N in France. It is also clear from the mixed 
results mentioned above that these differ between legal and institutional environments. 
Habbash and Alghamdi (2016) argue that the findings from developed countries cannot 
be generalised, as Saudi Arabia has a weak and less-well-developed stock market and 
local accounting standards are applied.8 
As a result of the weakness in the methodology of studies conducted in Saudi Arabia and 
the issue of the banning of Deloitte, this study re-examines the role of the Big 4 in curbing 
engagement in earnings management for large samples. Considering the weakness in the 
methodology of prior studies, the banning of Deloitte raises a question about the role of 
the rest of the Big 4 auditors. It also raises a question of whether Deloitte’s clients 
managed earnings compared with companies audited by non-Deloitte accounting firms. 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no such study examines this ban in Saudi 
Arabia.   
3.7 A review of the Literature on Earnings Management and IPO 
While examining earnings management practice before going public is challenging, a 
considerable body of literature observes this phenomenon. A study of 277 US IPO firms 
by Friedlan (1994) indicates that IPO firms engage in income-increasing discretionary 
accruals in a pre-IPO year. It also reports an extreme case of turning losses into profits 
                                                           
8 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Saudi Arabia has adopted IFRSs since 1 January 2017.    
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using discretionary accruals. Another study of 682 US IPO firms by Jain and Kini (1994) 
provides evidence that firms take part in window dressing in pre-IPO years to make them 
appear promising by improving operating performance prior to offerings. 
Teoh et al. (1998b) argue that IPO firms are exposed to earnings management as a result 
of the information asymmetry that exists between investors and the issuers of IPOs. They 
also demonstrate that the earnings of IPO firms are managed upwards in pre-IPO years to 
enhance the terms that are required to sell their shares publicly. 
Another study that examines the presence of earnings management around IPOs is that of 
DuCharme et al. (2001). These researchers show a negative association between the 
existence of discretionary accruals (in the year before an IPO and the year of the IPO) 
and subsequent stock returns. They also reach the conclusion that the aggressive use of 
discretionary accruals leads to a sharp drop in investors’ future returns. Having studied 
56 Finnish IPO firms, Spohr (2004) argues that the performance of individual firms is 
lower than that of institutional firms, as earnings are managed upwards in pre-IPO years. 
Spohr (2004) further supports the claim that there is a high probability of managing 
earnings upwards amongst single-owner entrepreneurs. 
Based on an examination of 58 Danish IPO firms from 1984 to 1996, Gramlich and 
Sorensen (2004) argue that firms that voluntarily announce earnings forecasts to investors 
engage in earnings management to minimise the difference between the forecast and 
reported earnings. They demonstrate that Danish IPOs engage in earnings management 
to meet forecast earnings. Earnings management in the voluntary earnings forecast 
context has also been investigated by Mashayekhi and Azar (2008), who find that 90 
Iranian IPO firms managed earnings upwards to meet the level of earnings that were 
voluntarily forecast while going public. 
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Alhadab et al. (2015) investigate the possibility of failure and the ability to survive of IPO 
firms after going public as a result of real earnings manipulation in UK firms from 1998 
to 2008. They report that IPO firms engaged in upwards earnings management, both real 
and accrual-based, during the IPO year. Moreover, they provide evidence that a positive 
relationship exists between engagement in earnings manipulation during an IPO year 
(both real and accrual-based) and the possibility of failure and an inability to survive. 
A recent study by Gao et al. (2017) examines the impact of institutional investors on the 
offer price of Chinese IPOs for the period from 2010 to 2012. Chinese law requires 
institutional investors to price the IPO firm in which they are willing to invest. Based on 
a sample of 472 firms, the researchers provide evidence that there is a negative correlation 
between discretionary accruals in the year before an IPO and the price offered by 
institutional investors. They argue that the investors are aware of the earnings 
manipulation as they offer a lower price. In relation to a sample drawn from Chinese 
SMEs, Gao, Cong, and Evans (2015) conclude that these firms engaged in earnings 
management in pre-listing years, which leads the stock to show poor performance in the 
market.   
To establish whether group affiliation9 in Asian countries10 has an impact on pre-IPO 
discretionary accruals, Kouwenberg and Thontirawong (2016) examine 1,427 firms that 
went public from 2001 to 2010. The research provides evidence that the level of 
discretionary accruals in IPO firms that are considered to have group affiliation is lower 
compared with other IPO firms. They state that less engagement in earnings management 
by group affiliation is driven by the ease of raising funds compared with a state of non-
group affiliation.  
                                                           
9 The researchers define group affiliation as “a firm being a member of a business group”. 
10 These countries are “Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand”. 
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Lo, Wu, and Kweh (2017) examine the impact of institutional investors on earnings 
manipulation during IPO events and argue that institutional investors are motivated to 
facilitate engagement in earning manipulation to maximise their wealth. They examine a 
large sample of IPOs from 1990 to 2013 and their findings support their argument, as they 
find that institutional investors facilitate engagement in discretionary accruals in pre-
listing years. However, they find that institutional investors also play a role in mitigating 
engagement in earnings management. 
Gounopoulos and Pham (2017) investigate whether IPO firms rated by a credit rating 
agency engage in earnings management. They argue that credit rating agencies have the 
ability to uncover misbehaviour conducted by firms’ management due to their experience 
and concern for their own reputation. Moreover, the researchers contend that litigation 
risks motivate credit rating agencies to monitor and examine any misreporting activities 
in great depth. After examining 2,602 IPO firms for the period from 1991 to 2011, they 
find that when IPO firms are rated by one of the agencies, the engagement in earnings 
management is less in the year of an IPO.   
Based on a sample of 226 firms in the US from 1990 to 2009, Chahine, Mansi, and 
Mazboudi (2015) examine the association between media coverage and earnings 
management in pre-IPO years in the case of an equity carve-out (ECO).11 Their results 
show that a negative association exists between media coverage and earnings 
management in the years before an equity offering. However, when they distinguish 
between informative and uninformative news, they find that the negative association 
exists only with informative news. 
                                                           




Another study that examines earnings management engagement around IPOs is that of 
Rakhman (2013), who examines 168 Indonesian IPO firms from 1999 to 2012 and 
contends that IPO firms engage in income-increasing activities in the two years before an 
IPO. The study also provides evidence that IPOs inflate the discretionary accruals in the 
year they go public.   
A recent study by Shette, Kuntluru, and Korivi (2016) examines 150 Indian IPO firms 
from 2001 to 2006 and investigates discretionary accrual levels in IPOs for the seven 
years from an IPO year. They use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality 
and find that earnings quality in years subsequent to the IPO year are higher than in the 
year of the IPO. 
After examining 68 Kuwaiti IPO firms from 1997 to 2007, Algharaballi (2012) finds that 
firms engaged in earnings management in the year before going public. Using a sample 
of 568 French IPO firms for the period from 1995 to 2008, Miloud (2014) finds that IPOs 
in France managed earnings in both the year before and the year of the IPO. From a 
sample of 59 Egyptian IPO firms for the period from 1995 to 2000, Kamel (2012) 
provides evidence that IPO firms that were entirely owned by private investors engaged 
in earnings manipulation in the pre-IPO year, whereas IPO firms owned by the Egyptian 
government did not engage in earnings manipulation in the pre-IPO year.     
Cotten (2008) provides evidence that US IPO firms engaged in earnings management. He 
divided his sample into three sub-samples: firms that issued primary shares, firms that 
issued secondary shares, and firms that issued a combination of primary and secondary 
shares.12 After examining 3,476 firms from 1988 to 2002, he finds that firms that issued 
primary and secondary shares engaged in earnings manipulation, whereas no engagement 
                                                           
12  Cotton (2008) defines primary shares as “The shares issued by the company” and secondary shares as 
“the shares sold by the insiders” (p. 90). 
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in such activities is found in firms that issued a combination of primary and secondary 
shares. 
Buchner, Mohamed, and Saadouni (2017) argue that UK IPO firms that provide earnings 
prediction in their prospectuses were less likely to manage earnings post-IPO. From a 
sample of 368 IPOs for the period from 1985 to 2012, they find that UK IPO firms that 
did not provide any earnings forecast engaged in earnings management after an IPO 
event. Furthermore, they find evidence to support their argument.      
Although a number of studies have provided evidence of a manipulation in earnings 
around a listing, others find no evidence for such manipulation. The latter relies on the 
hypothesis that issuers make a great effort to maintain high-quality financial reporting in 
their prospectuses, and thus use conservative accounting methods. 
Armstrong et al. (2015) argue that studies that examine earnings management in the 
context of an IPO ignore one important factor that may lead to an inflation of the accruals 
during the IPO stage: they state that IPOs report higher accruals in an IPO year due to the 
capital raised during the IPO stage. To test their claim, the researchers re-examined US 
data from 1987 to 2006 by controlling for the amount that IPOs received to raise their 
capital. Their results are inconsistent with prior studies that claimed IPOs engage in 
opportunistic behaviours to inflate their earnings. They find that, without controlling for 
the amount that IPOs received, the results show that IPOs inflate their earnings. However, 
when they controlled for the proceeds, the results show that earnings are not inflated 
during an IPO year. They conclude that the change in working capital that occurs during 
the IPO stage leads researchers to conclude that IPOs engage in earnings manipulation.     
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) investigate earnings management engagement in UK IPO 
firms for the years from 1995 to 1999. They limit their sample to firms that are alike in 
the features of their prospectuses and financial reports. After examining 171 firms, they 
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conclude that IPO firms in the UK are more conservative and show no evidence of 
engagement in earnings management. Ball and Shivakumar (2008, p. 346) believe that 
IPOs in the UK have less engagement in earnings manipulation pre-IPO due to the need 
“to meet the market demand for higher quality financials from public firms, and in 
response to public-firm regulation”. However, their paper is discussed by Lo (2008), who 
rolls out possibilities for their results contrasting with those of most IPO studies. The first 
possibility is that Ball and Shivakumar (2008) limited their sample to firms that are alike 
in certain features of their prospectuses and financial reports, which may have led to the 
exclusion of IPO firms that engaged in earnings management. In other words, firms that 
manage earnings might have been excluded. The second possibility argued by Lo (2008) 
is that, as UK IPOs are allowed to restate pre-IPO financial statements (by mentioning 
the restatement in their prospectuses), firms are most probably providing financial 
information in restated statements that is different from the data in the prospectuses, to 
render the readers of financial reports less able to detect any engagement in earnings 
manipulation.  
Cecchini et al. (2012) argue that managers may engage in earnings manipulation of a 
single accrual account instead of aggregate accruals. They examine two accounts: the 
allowance for uncollectible accounts and bad debt expense. Based on a sample of 2,524 
IPO firms for the period from 1997 to 2004, they find that IPO firms are more 
conservative regarding their allowance for uncollectible accounts; namely, when they get 
closer to the IPO event. They also find that IPO firms engage in income- decreasing 
decreeing, as they report a higher amount of bad debt expense compared with non-IPOs. 
After examination of 691 Chinese IPO firms, Kimbro (2005) contends that IPO firms may 
use conservative accounting methods in periods subsequent to IPO years that permit them 
to decrease accrual income as a reserve income for future periods. Consistent with this 
view, Venkataraman, Weber, and Willenborg (2008) find that the accruals amount before 
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an IPO is lower than in subsequent periods. They also find that auditing fees are higher 
when auditors audit the financial statements of IPOs, as auditors are more cautious when 
auditing prospectuses. 
Based on an examination of 512 IPO firms in 24 countries, Seger (2009) provides 
evidence that a small percentage of the sample had been involved in opportunistic 
behaviour. After investigating 64 Dutch IPOs, Roosenboom et al. (2003) provide 
evidence that no earnings management exists in the pre-IPO period.  
3.7.1 Critical evaluation of the literature on earnings management and IPOs 
In light of the studies discussed above, whether managers engage in earnings management 
before listing is still a controversial issue. The results vary between developed countries. 
For example, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) find no engagement in earnings amendment 
before an IPO in the UK, whereas Teoh et al. (1998b) find a contradictory result in the 
US. Moreover, the results differ within developing countries. For example, Rakhman 
(2013) finds that Indonesian IPOs engaged in earnings amendment before an IPO, 
whereas Roosenboom et al. (2003) find a contradictory result in relation to Dutch IPOs. 
It is clear from the mixed results mentioned above that the findings also differ between 
legal and institutional environments. Therefore, the present study empirically examines 
the possibility of earnings management in Saudi IPOs to determine whether it is evident 
in these firms. This study adopts the argument of Armstrong et al. (2015) regarding the 
control of cash proceeds during an IPO to re-examine this argument in relation to a sample 
in a developing country, which has not been studied in any developing countries. This 
research also examines the ban of Deloitte within the context of Saudi IPOs as the ban 
occurred because of an IPO firm13 (Al-Mojil Group). 
                                                           
13 See section 1.2 for more details  
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3.8 Summary  
This chapter provides definitions for earnings management and audit quality. It also 
provides an in-depth description of the methods that are accessible to managers to conduct 
earnings management, namely, accrual-based, real activities-based and classification-
shifting-based earnings management. Whatever methods are used, they are not cost-free. 
This chapter presents a detailed explanation of why managers might be motivated to 
conduct opportunistic earnings management, especially around the issuing of shares. It 
also presents the distinction between discretionary accruals and non-discretionary 
accruals. This chapter provides an overview of proxies that are used to examine the 
association between earnings management and audit quality; namely, auditor tenure or 
rotation, auditors’ industry expertise and auditor fees. It also provides in-depth discussion 
of the use of audit size as a proxy for audit quality, as it is the most appropriate proxy for 
answering the research questions. It also provides a review of the literature on earnings 
management studies related to audit quality and IPOs.  
The following chapter presents theories that relate to the area of interest of the research; 
namely, IPOs, audit quality and earnings management. It also develops the hypotheses 










Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Development 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented a definition of earnings management, an overview of 
earnings management methods and in-depth discussion related to the motivations for 
earnings management. It also provided a definition of audit quality and a description of 
the association between earnings management and audit quality. Moreover, the preceding 
chapter offered a description of earnings management literature around IPO events.   
This chapter aims to provide an explanation of the theories used to develop the hypotheses 
in this research. Section 4.2 discusses theories of earnings management. Sections 4.3 and 
4.3 provide the hypotheses development for the contexts of audit quality and IPOs, 
respectively. Section 4.5 offers a summary of the chapter.  
4.2 Theories of Earnings Management  
In the following subsections, theories of earnings management that relate to the research 
problem are discussed, as these were used as the basis for developing the hypotheses in 
this research. The theories reviewed are agency theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy 
theory and signalling theory.  
4.2 .1 Agency theory 
Agency theory was introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976). It is one of the most 
important theories in the context of earnings management and a growing body of literature 
applies agency theory to earnings management studies, such as Alhadab et al. (2015), 
Bédard, Coulombe, and Courteau (2008), Sun, Salama, Hussainey, and Habbash (2010) 
and Prior, Surroca, and Tribó (2008).  
When a contractual agreement is signed between two parties, the principal (shareholders) 
and the agent (managers), an agency relationship occurs. As per the agreement, one party 
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provides capital (the principal) and the other (the agent) acts on behalf of the principal. 
This kind of agreement is obvious in public firms where the ownership is widely spread 
among the shareholders, who do not engage in the daily operation decisions of their firm. 
Thus, the principal directs risk and delegates decision-making to the agent. Decision-
making delegation may lead to disputes between the agent and the principal, as managers 
may abuse the situation by obtaining private gains, which may have an impact on 
shareholders’ wealth. This conflict exists because of the information asymmetry between 
the agent and the principal, which raises agency costs (Beatty & Harris, 1999). Morris 
(1987) argues that there are two types of agency cost: the agency costs of equity and the 
costs of bonding and monitoring managers. The agency costs of equity exist when 
managers act against the interests of shareholders. For example, managers may accept a 
project that produces less profit compared with another project to achieve some personal 
interests. The costs of bonding and monitoring managers exist to ensure that managers 
act in the interests of shareholders. For instance, “the principal and the agent may prefer 
different actions because of the different risk preference” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58). 
DeAngelo (1981) argues that agency costs vary from firm to firm and that they vary 
within a firm over time. Firm characteristics, such as the complexity of the firm and its 
size, may cause agency costs to increase (Jensen, 1993). 
Piot and Janin (2007) state that agency conflict may create motivations and chances for 
managers to engage in earnings management. This may lead to the existence of 
information asymmetry between the two parties, as the agents (managers) can manipulate 
accruals in favour of their own interests, which minimises earnings quality and the 
relevance and reliability of financial statements. Xie, Davidson Iii, and DaDalt (2003) 
view the engagement of managers in earnings management as an agency cost. They argue 
that engagement in such behaviour harms the users of financial information, such as 
investors and capital markets (by impacting on the efficiency of the market, which relies 
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on the information flow to that market). Xie et al. (2003, p. 297) argue that “earnings 
management obscures real performance and lessens the ability of shareholders to make 
informed decisions” and, therefore, view the cost of such behaviour as an agency cost. 
This cost can be classified under the agency costs of equity, following the classification 
offered by Morris (1987). Jiraporn, Miller, Yoon, and Kim (2008) find that a strong 
negative relationship exists between agency costs14 and earnings management.   
Beatty and Harris (1999, p. 300) claim that periodic financial statements do not 
completely reduce information asymmetry and agency problems and, therefore, 
“shareholders and managers design contracts in an attempt to further mitigate them”. It is 
believed that executive compensation may reduce the conflict between managers and 
shareholders and align their interests (Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). Conversely, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) state that this kind of compensation might induce those managing a 
firm to maximise their wealth rather than that of the shareholders by engaging in 
particular transactions with the aim of maximising their compensation. Consistent with 
the view of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Xie et al. (2003, p. 297) argue that when 
managers are rewarded on the basis of the firm’s financial performance, it may motivate 
them “to give the appearance of better performance through earnings management”, 
which may cause an agency problem. Previous empirical studies confirm that managers 
engage in earnings management to maximise their own benefit and to meet performance-
based compensation targets. For example, Healy (1985) argues that increasing a 
compensation plan might be a strong motivation for manipulating earnings, as he finds a 
statistically significant association between discretionary accruals and compensation 
plans.  
                                                           
14  Agency costs are measured using the Governance Index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003).   
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Baker et al. (2003) believe that managers manipulate the release time of good and bad 
news to the market to minimise their exercise price. Previous literature also shows that 
earnings manipulation reduces shareholders' wealth and subsequent reported earnings and 
stock performance are negatively associated with earnings manipulation (Chang, Chung, 
& Lin, 2010; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; DuCharme et al., 2001; Qintao, 2007). 
4.2.1.1 Agency theory and audit quality  
Principals bear costs to minimise the risk of delegating decision-making to agents 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, the principal incurs some costs in monitoring and minimising 
irregular behaviours by the agent, such as by hiring an external auditor. Agency costs 
exist due to information asymmetry and conflicts of interest, which raise the demand for 
monitoring activities. As a result of the segregation between ownership and management 
in public firms, agency problems are strong in comparison with private firms, which leads 
to the demand for the monitoring of financial statements through high audit quality (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983).  The level of agency problem has an impact on the demand for 
monitoring through higher audit quality, and Francis and Wilson (1988) argue that the 
choice of Big 8 firms is due to the high level of agency costs. Likewise, the demand for 
higher audit quality is increased when the agency costs are changed (DeFond, 1992). The 
conflict of interest between the agent and the principal varies between firms; the demand 
for audit quality also varies. 
Piot (2001) states that an external auditor is one of the monitoring devices recognised by 
agency theory as mitigating conflicts between managers and shareholders and reducing 
the agency problem. After examining more than 1,500 audit-related adjustments for 15 
years, Kinney  and Martin (1994) come to the conclusion that external auditors minimise 
the positive inflation in pre-audit net earnings and net assets. Under the agreement 
between the principal and the external auditor, the latter acts as an agent who should be 
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independent of the other agent (the manager). Culpan and Trussel (2005) argue that when 
hiring a monitor as one of the devices recognised by agency theory, the monitor should 
be free from any interest in the firm and its administration. Blouin, Grein, and Rountree 
(2007) find that firms that have high agency problems changed their external auditor after 
the Arthur Andersen scandal. The researchers argue that the costs that the firms bear by 
changing the external auditor are far lower than the agency costs that may have been 
borne by retaining Arthur Andersen. Blouin et al. (2007, p. 647) claim that “companies 
for whom agency concerns are the most acute consider the independence of their auditor”.  
The principal appoints an external auditor as an independent party to minimise agency 
problem by reducing the information asymmetry in the firm’s financial reports (Piot, 
2001). Likewise, Hussainey (2009) believes that the existence of information asymmetry 
and an agency problem between managers and shareholders leads to a demand for 
auditing. Becker et al. (1998) contend that auditing minimises information asymmetries 
by allowing the users of financial statement to substantiate their validity. Dang (2004) 
points out that the external auditor makes an assertion to the users of the financial 
statements that these documents are free of inaccuracies. Gul, Lynn, and Tsui (2002) 
contend that agency costs are lower when high quality auditing exists (the Big 6). 
Furthermore, they claim that accounting earnings are more informative and discretionary 
accruals are lower when firms are audited by one of the Big 6, as they find that “Big 6 
auditors reduce the negative association between low director ownership and 
discretionary accruals” (p. 48). Moreover, as the external auditor is recognised by agency 
theory as an external device to monitor managers, Watts and Zimmerman (1983) claim 
that high-quality external auditing curbs opportunistic behaviours by management and 
reduces agency costs.  
Becker et al. (1998) argue that even though audit services are useful in minimising 
managerial discretion, the quality of audit services relies on the quality of the audit firm. 
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Therefore, appointing a high-quality external auditor reduces managers’ engagement in 
earnings management and Becker et al. (1998) provide evidence that big accounting firms 
constrain earnings management.  
DeAngelo (1981) argues that opportunistic behaviour is less and perceived audit quality 
is high with a large auditor size. Francis et al. (1999, p. 19) explain why Big N auditors 
act as a deterrent to earnings management by stating that Big N auditors “are more likely 
to constrain aggressive or questionable accounting accruals”. Big N accounting firms 
have a better understanding and interpretation of accounting standards due to their greater 
experience, which reduces engagement in accruals earnings management (Francis et al., 
1999). Moreover, Palmrose (1988) finds that litigation risk against Big 6 firms is low 
compared with non-Big 6, which is interpreted by DeAngelo (1988) as conservatism  
attributable to the former. Furthermore, Francis et al. (1999, p. 19) argue that Big N 
auditors have “better technologies for detecting problem areas”, which can be explained 
by the finding of Craswell et al. (1995) that an audit fee premium15 is earned by Big 6 
accounting firms. Higher audit fees allow accounting firms to adopt more advanced and 
efficient technology. 
Big N firms have characteristics that distinguish them from non-Big firms. Big N firms 
are economically independent as they have a larger number of clients and, therefore, do 
not rely financially on any one client (Reynolds & Francis, 2000). Reynolds and Frances 
(2000) also argue that when external auditors have only a few clients, they “compromise 
their independence and report favourably in order to retain clients” (p. 376). Big N 
auditors have more resources that they use to train their staff and utilise more advanced 
technology for auditing (Rusmin, 2010). Rusmin (2010) also argues that Big N auditors 
                                                           
15  Craswell et al. (1995) use an OLS regression model to measure audit fee premiums. 
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are concerned about their reputation and, therefore, it is in their own best interests to 
report breaches in financial reports.   
4.2.1.2 Agency theory and IPOs 
Teoh et al. (1998b), DuCharme et al. (2001), Brau and Fawcett (2006) and (Gounopoulos 
& Pham, 2017) point out that high information asymmetry exists in the IPO setting 
between potential investors and issuers due to the lack of public information about IPO 
firms. The existence of information asymmetry leads potential investors to rely on 
prospectuses when making decisions about investing in IPO firms (Teoh et al. (1998b), 
which may encourage issuers to engage in earnings manipulation activities (Alhadab, 
Clacher, & Keasey, 2016).  
 Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) argue that, when information asymmetries 
exist, managers may use accounting choices as a channel to communicate with outsiders 
about “the timing, magnitude, and risk of future cash flows” (p. 262). They also argue 
that information disparity between managers and outsiders may motivate managers to 
engage in earnings management to satisfy their self-interest, believing that “higher 
earnings will result in higher stock prices, contributing to their compensation or 
reputation” (p. 262). Thus, an agency problem exists, as Beatty and Harris (1999) contend 
that information asymmetry leads to agency costs. Agency costs of equity are expected 
to exist, as IPO managers act against the interests of potential shareholders by engaging 
in earnings management, whose interests to be able to assess the really performance of 
IPO firms. In other words, when IPO managers (as agents) engage in earnings 
management, potential investors (as principals) are not able “to evaluate the 
appropriateness of reported accounting figures in reflecting the firm’s future 
performance” (Gounopoulos & Pham, 2017, p. 157).  
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Earnings management literature around IPOs has shown that managers engage in 
opportunistic behaviour to maximise the proceeds from an initial offering (Loughran & 
Ritter, 1995; Neill et al., 1995; Qintao, 2007). Acting on managerial opportunism, IPO 
managers may promote the future earnings of their firm using earnings management to 
mislead investors (Qintao, 2007) and (DuCharme et al., 2001). Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) claim that there is then subsequent underperformance of IPO firms because of 
earnings management activities. 
Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b) examine the existence of earnings management in the US 
market around issuing periods (IPOs and SEOs). They find a strong negative association 
between earnings manipulated upwards by accruals and the subsequent stock return. They 
believe that earnings manipulation before equity offerings deceives investors in the US 
market. Thus, if managerial opportunism exists in a strongly regulated market, it is highly 
probable that it occurs in less-regulated environments, such as Saudi Arabia.   
4.2.2 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholders are “Persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in 
a corporation and its activities, past, present, or future. Such claimed rights or interests 
are the result of transactions with, or actions taken by, the corporation, and may be legal 
or moral, individual or collective” (Clarkson, 1995, p. 106). 
The concept behind stakeholder theory is further explained by Solomon  and Solomon 
(2004), who argue that firms have influence on society and, therefore, should consider 
the needs of all groups who are affected by their actions; these groups also have influence 
on firms in some way. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) consider the association between firms 
and society to be interdependent. Moreover, Deegan, Rankin, and Tobin (2002) consider 
firms to be part of the social system, whereby firms impact and are impacted. Thus, 
Culpan and Trussel (2005) argue that firms have a duty to all stakeholders, not only their 
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shareholders. Solomon  and Solomon (2004, p. 23) argue that shareholders “hold a ‘stake’ 
rather than simply a ‘share’ in companies”.  
As stakeholders incorporate “shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, 
communities in the vicinity of the company’s operations and the general public, the 
extreme proponents of stakeholder theory suggest that the environment, animal species 
and future generations should be included as stakeholders” (Solomon  & Solomon, 2004, 
p. 24). However, Albassam (2014) claims that each group of stakeholders has a different 
expectation of the firm concerned; for example, shareholders desire a high return, whereas 
employees desire a high salary. He also argues that creditors want the firm to have a good 
financial position to be able to pay back its debts, whereas regulators want the firm to 
comply with regulations. Thus, firms have a moral duty to balance the different interests 
among stakeholders, although these duties are to a vague standard, according to Culpan 
and Trussel (2005).  
Sternberg (1997) argues that stakeholder theory is incompatible with the main aim of a 
firm, which to maximise long-term shareholder value. She also claims that shareholders 
do not allow others to gain from their investment. Moreover, she questions the ability of 
firms to balance the competing interests of stakeholders, as she states that “Since all 
organisations with substantive ends aim at something other than `balanced stakeholder 
benefits', they are all ruled out by stakeholder theory” (Sternberg, 1997, p. 4). In contrast, 
Collier (2008) claims that one the roles of governance is to balance the different interests 
among the stakeholders and firms need, therefore, to consider each group of stakeholders. 
Furthermore, satisfying only the wishes of shareholders is a short-term strategy, as long-
term “survival and success” require the needs of all stakeholders to be satisfied (Collier, 
2008, p. 935). 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) state that some stakeholders might be misled about underlying 
economic performance by a firm’s engagement in earnings management. Therefore, 
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managers may advance their private interests over the interests of stakeholders, whereby 
stakeholder theory sees the firm’s management as an agent of all stakeholders in the firm. 
However, Ming Chia et al. (2007) believe that stakeholders in listed firms who have the 
ability to monitor earnings management activities impose a need for high audit quality. 
Moreover, Baker and Owsen (2002) argue that all stakeholders, such as investors and 
creditors, will benefit from enhanced audit quality. Likewise, Culpan and Trussel (2005) 
argue that employees have a financial stake in their firm, as they may be rewarded with 
compensation plans, and, therefore, employees will also gain from high audit quality. 
Ashbaugh and Warfield (2003) state that audit studies tend to adopt agency theory to 
explain the demand for high audit quality. However, they argue that stakeholder theory 
might be applied where shareholders are less dispersed and “debt is a more important 
source of capital” (p. 6). Furthermore, Eilifsen (1998) contends that tax authorities are 
considered an important stakeholder that may demand high audit quality. 
4.2.3 Legitimacy theory 
In the last decade, legitimacy theory has gradually come to be used in accounting research 
(Hoque, 2006). Legitimacy is defined as “a generalised perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman (1995, p. 574). Legitimacy 
theory takes into consideration the expectations that society has of firms; therefore, it can 
be argued that organisational legitimacy is a resource to be used in order for many firms 
to survive (Hoque, 2006). In addition, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, p. 177) state that 
legitimacy “attracts resources and the continued support of its constituents”. Guthrie and 
Parker (1989) argue that there is a social contract between firms and society, in which 
firms must comply with the expectations of society. This social contact may be revoked 
when society is not convinced that a firm is operating in a legitimate manner (Deegan, 
2002). For example, 30 years ago, many Australian stores that sold animal fur had to 
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close, owing to the way in which “changing community attitudes were driven by various 
media campaigns run by animal welfare organisations” (Hoque, 2006, p. 163). However, 
Suchman (1995) contends that organisational legitimacy varies from one time to another 
and from society to society.  
In terms of audit quality, Holm and Zaman (2012, p. 53)  state that “accounting firms are 
image-sensitive organizations that rely on creating and maintaining an impression of their 
activities to correspond with public expectations”. Rusmin (2010) argues that Big N 
auditors are concerned with their reputation. Moreover, it is argued that the users of 
financial statements believe that auditors with a higher reputation have more strength in 
monitoring (Watkins, Hillison, & Morecroft, 2004). Therefore, it is in their own best 
interests to report breaches of financial reports to legitimise their work by convincing the 
users of financial statements that the documents are free from misreporting. The 
legitimacy of Big N auditors “relies not only upon following accepted social norms of 
conduct but also higher ideals and values such as independence, truth, fairness, and public 
service” (Whittle, Mueller, & Carter, 2016, p. 120). Thus, firms appoint Big N auditors 
to legitimise their financial statements by persuading their stakeholders that the financial 
reports can be trusted. Moreover, it is contended that firms use auditing as a legitimation 
tool in order “to manage perceptions of their constituencies and to legitimise their 
behaviour” (Chiang, 2009, p. 8). Davidson, Jiraporn, and DaDalt (2006) claim that firms 
change their external auditors from Big N to non-Big N auditors due to legitimate 
disagreement between the firm and the external auditor, as Big N auditors are more 
conservative in choosing accounting methods whereas non-Big N auditors are less so and 
are less restricted by engagement in earnings management. 
4.2.4 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory was introduced by Akerlof (1970) and developed by Spence (1973), 
mainly to explain labour market behaviour. According to signalling theory, education 
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level is a credible signal relating to job applicants. The theory argues that managers may 
not detect the level of employees’ productivity and that those with greater abilities would 
signal their abilities through reliable characteristics, such as education level. Morris 
(1987)  claims that even though signalling theory was developed in the labour market, it 
can be applied in any market in which information asymmetry exists. In other words, as 
information asymmetry exists in the market, signalling is used as a device to convey 
inside information. Nam et al. (2014) argue that a signal has two characteristics in order 
to be effective. They argue that the signal has to be visible and expensive to the sender 
because, if it were not costly, others of lesser quality would imitate the signal. They also 
believe that a signal is an important factor in influencing the price that buyers are willing 
to pay.     
Brau and Fawcett (2006) believe that signalling theory is significant for IPO studies 
because of the existence of information asymmetry between two parties: IPO 
management and potential buyers. DuCharme et al. (2001) also contend that high 
information asymmetry exists in IPO firms, which leads to buyers and investors being 
unable to estimate the real value of IPOs. Consequently, IPO firms that have positive 
information are motivated to moderate the existence of information asymmetry by 
signalling that information to potential investors (Chang et al., 2008). In addition, Arthurs 
et al. (2009) argue that, as IPO firms are motivated to overstate prospects, signalling the 
quality of the firm may reduce ambiguity regarding the true value of the firm.  
A considerable amount of IPO literature uses signalling theory and offers several signals 
held to be used by IPO management, such as appointing a reputable auditor to audit IPO 
financial statements to signal the quality of the documentation (e.g.Chang et al., 2008; 
Titman & Trueman, 1986). The smaller the proportion offered for sale to outsiders is also 
observed as a positive signal (Leland & Pyle, 1977). When firms hire a reputable 
underwriter during an IPO, it is observed as a positive signal. Yung and Zender (2010) 
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find that information asymmetry is less during the IPO stage when an underwriter exists. 
Moreover, the length of the lock-up period can be used as a signal to convey the long-
term economic viability of a firm (Arthurs et al., 2009). 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) conducted a survey with CFOs in three types of firm: (1) firms 
that have accomplished an IPO, (2) firms that started the IPO process but withdrew their 
application, and (3) firms that qualified to apply for an IPO but did not have any intention 
of pursuing it.  The researchers provide evidence that the frequent signals used by CFOs 
to signify positive aspects of an IPO firm emphasise historical earnings, because potential 
buyers rely on prospectuses as they have no other public sources of information.    
Previous research shows that multiple signals might be used during the IPO stage. Datar, 
Feltham, and Hughes (1991) provide evidence that IPO firms employ both auditor 
reputation and retained ownership as signals of IPO quality and value. Copley and 
Douthett (2002) argue that IPO firms that offer a significant proportion for sale to 
outsiders will hire a high-quality auditor as a substitute for the negative signal of selling 
a sizeable portion of ownership. Another study also supports the notion of multiple 
signals. Yue and McConomy (2004) provide evidence that IPO firms use earnings 
forecasts as a signal regarding the economic value of the firm. However, they find that 
earnings forecasts are negatively associated with the proportion of ownership retained 
and conclude that two signals are employed to substitute each other. Grinblatt and Hwang 
(1989) support the notion of multiple signals as they present evidence that newly issuing 
firms send a signal of true firm value by holding a large percentage of the shares and 
selling shares at a discount. 
4.3 Hypotheses Development for Audit Quality  
Francis et al. (1999) argue that the separation of ownership and management in public 
firms increases the likelihood of engagement in earnings management. The opportunistic 
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behaviour of management leads to a need for external monitoring to control these 
activities and reduce agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). External auditors reduce 
information asymmetries between principals and agents, as they provide validation for 
financial statements (Becker et al., 1998). The rise in agency costs induces the need for 
Big accounting firms because their assertions carry greater weight (Becker et al., 1998; 
Francis et al., 1999).  
Most prior studies provide evidence that large accounting firms deliver a higher audit 
quality and constrain earnings management. The lowering of discretionary accruals is 
associated with a higher quality of auditing, as auditors who provide a high-quality 
service are expected to identify aggressive engagement in discretionary accruals 
manipulation. Agency theory suggests that to minimise agency conflict between manager 
and shareholders, an effective monitoring scheme should exist to ensure that managers 
act in the interests of shareholders. One monitoring devices recognised by agency theory 
is the external auditor, who should be highly independent in order to achieve effective 
monitoring. Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo (2010) believe that a high level of 
independence can be assumed in Big N firms as they are deeply concerned about their 
reputation. The researchers also argue that, as it is found that Big N firms withdrew from 
providing auditing services for 1,200 clients after the Enron–Andersen scandal, litigation 
risk may encourage a high level of independence. Furthermore, DeAngelo (1981) 
positively associates independence with audit quality. Albassam (2014) argues that firms 
on the SSM are largely owned by government and family shareholdings, which leads 
firms to preference the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. Hope, 
Thomas, and Vyas (2017) claim that other stakeholders (e.g., creditors and other 
shareholders) may be misled about a firm’s performance by engaging in earnings 
manipulation, which may lead them to demand higher audit quality. It is argued by 
(Chiang, 2009) that the perceptions of firms’ stakeholders are managed by using auditing 
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as a legitimation tool for firms’ behaviour. However, it is also stated that Big N auditors 
are concerned about their reputation Rusmin (2010) .Therefore, Big N auditors are more 
likely to report any breaches in financial reports in order to legitimise their own work by 
assuring the users of financial statements that the documents are free of misstatement.  
Becker et al. (1998) use discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality. They find that 
firms audited by the Big 6 produce fewer discretionary accruals and conclude that the Big 
6 deliver high audit quality. Another key article in the area of audit quality and earnings 
management is by Francis et al. (1999), who find that a constraining of the aggressive 
reporting of discretionary accruals is associated with the Big 6 auditors. Big 4 auditors 
that acquired clients from Arthur Andersen in 2002 after the Andersen crisis in 2001 
mitigated the discretionary accruals in Andersen’s former clients (Cahan & Zhang, 2006). 
Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) provide evidence that the engagement of earnings 
management is less when firms are audited by the Big 4 auditors in European countries. 
A very recent study by Houqe et al. (2017) finds that the Big 4 firms curb positive earnings 
management (income-increasing) in India. 
This study chooses the Big 4 accounting firms as a proxy for audit quality. Becker et al. 
(1998) believe that the Big 6 are the most-used proxy in the literature for audit quality. 
They also claim that Big accounting firms are concerned about their reputation, which 
encourages them to be independent. DeFond and Zhang (2014) state that the strength of 
using the Big N as a proxy for audit quality is “its relatively high construct validity” 
(P.289). They also believe this type of measurement is the most valuable for studies 
examining “the client's demand for audit quality” (p. 289). 
This study investigates the ban on Deloitte from carrying out any audit work for listed 
firms for two years in Saudi Arabia, as this ban was the first by the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) since it was established, which implies that Deloitte’s audit quality was 
lower than that of other audit firms. Furthermore, this research investigates the role of the 
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Big 4 auditors in constraining discretionary accruals in Saudi Arabia. As this ban was the 
first by the CMA, it indicates that litigation risk is low in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, 
the Big 4 are driven by reputation loss to provide high audit quality rather than face 
litigation. Although agency theory and most prior studies suggest that the Big N curb 
earnings management activities, banning one of the Big 4 raises a question about the role 
of these auditors in providing high audit quality in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, the 
hypotheses are developed as follows:  
H1: There are no differences in the level of discretionary accruals in firms audited by the 
Big 4 compared with firms audited by non-Big 4 accounting firms. 
H2: Firms audited by Deloitte are more likely to provide a higher level of discretionary 
accruals compared with firms audited by the other Big 4 accounting firms. 
4.4 Hypotheses Development for IPOs 
The CMA banned Deloitte from auditing any listed companies in Saudi Arabia following 
the collapse in 2012 of the Al-Mojil Group, which went public in 2008. Deloitte audited 
the pre-IPO-year financial statements of Al-Mojil, as well as for the four years after the 
company went public from 2008 to 2011. From 2010, the Al-Mojil Group had been 
announcing losses. This dilemma raises doubt about the engagement in earnings 
management before going public and the audit quality in IPO firms in the wider Saudi 
context. Therefore, this study examines earnings management engagement before going 
public and audit quality in the pre-IPO years. The following sections develop hypotheses 
for earnings management and audit quality in the years before a firm goes public.       
4.4.1 Earnings management before going public 
This research adopts agency theory as a theoretical framework. There is a relationship 
between current shareholders (the agent) and future investors (the principal) and agency 
theory explains the motivation for insiders to engage in income-increasing earnings 
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management. As an IPO is the first chance for the current shareholders of a private firm 
to sell a significant portion of their shares to the public, insiders are motivated to do so to 
inflate the offer price to increase offering proceeds (Aharony et al., 1993). Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) argue that UK private firms have less restrictive regulation regarding 
financial reporting. If this is the case in a developed country, the regulation of financial 
reporting is likely to be less restrictive in a developing country such as Saudi Arabia. Al-
Barrak (2005) considers Saudi Arabia to be an emerging market. It is found that the level 
of engagement in earnings management is high in countries that have “less developed 
capital markets and weak investor protection” (Leuz et al., 2003, p. 525). Saudi Arabia 
suffers from weaknesses in investor protection (Habbash & Alghamdi, 2015). They also 
argue that legal enforcement is weak in Saudi Arabia. Less restrictive regulation is 
another motivation for manipulating earnings before listing. 
This research also adopts signalling theory to explain the motivation to engage in earnings 
management around an IPO. Managers of IPOs use historical earnings as a positive signal 
that they send to future investors (Brau & Fawcett, 2006). They came to this conclusion 
after surveying over 300 IPO managers. Future investors consider the quality of IPOs by 
the signal that insiders send due to the existence of information asymmetry between the 
two parties. The interpretation of signals will have an impact on the price of the IPOs that 
future investors are prepared to pay (Nam et al., 2014).  
Prior et al. (2008) argue that future investors are misinformed by inflated earnings that 
impede future investors from making the right economic decisions. Hence, Saudi IPO 
insiders have an incentive to engage in earnings increasing in order to convey the 
impression to future investors that the firm has a promising economic future. 
Accordingly, buyers of IPO shares will positively overvalue the real value of an IPO. 
As stated previously, prior studies offer examples of several signals that can be used by 
IPOs to convey the information that insiders have. The signals most nominated by the 
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literature are historical earnings or earnings reported in prospectuses, the lock-up period 
and auditor reputation. Brau and Fawcett (2006) provide evidence that a signal frequently 
used by CFOs to signal positively about an IPO firm is an emphasis on historical earnings. 
Two signals are examined in this current research: reported earnings and auditor 
reputation.  
Teoh et al. (1998b) provide evidence that IPOs engage in income-increasing activities in 
an IPO year to inflate the share price to the highest possible value. They argue that the 
lock-up period is a motivation for IPO firms to keep the performance of the firm as high 
as possible to influence the share price, which maximises the wealth of pre-IPO 
ownership. Therefore, as the lock-up period in Saudi Arabia is six months, Saudi IPOs 
are more likely to engage in greater earnings management in the year of an IPO, as well 
as in the pre-IPO year.  
Another reason that IPO firms manage earnings in an IPO year instead of the pre-IPO 
year is that when IPO firms report a decline in earnings in the IPO year compared with 
earnings in the years before the IPO, they may face a risk of litigation. Gramlich and 
Sorensen (2004) provide evidence that IPO firms that engage in earnings manipulation 
before an IPO event are more likely to manipulate earnings in the IPO year, which 
probably indicates these kinds of firms engage in these activities to avoid litigation risk. 
An additional reason for IPO firms managing earnings in an IPO year instead of in the 
pre-IPO year is that prospectuses provide earnings predictions, which puts pressure on 
IPO firms to achieve their predictions to avoid litigation risk and reputation damage. It is 
argued by Gramlich and Sorensen (2004) that IPO firms manage earnings in the first 
reported year after an IPO to meet the forecast they made in their prospectus. Teoh et al. 
(1998b) strongly believe that compensation plans are a strong motivation for IPO 
managers to engage in income-increasing earnings management, as the vesting date is 
usually after the date of the IPO.   
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Numerous studies find that IPO firms engage in earnings management. Friedlan  )1994( 
indicates that IPO firms engage in income-increasing discretionary accruals in the pre-
IPO year. They also report an extreme case of turning losses into profits by using 
discretionary accruals. Jain and Kini (1994) provide evidence that firms take part in 
window dressing in pre-IPO years to make them appear promising by improving 
operating performance prior to offerings. DuCharme et al ) .2001(  show a negative 
association between discretionary accruals (in the year before an IPO and the year of the 
IPO) and subsequent stock returns. They also reach the conclusion that the aggressive use 
of discretionary accruals leads to a sharp drop in investors’ future returns. Alhadab et al .
)2015(  report that IPO firms engage in upwards earnings management in both real and 
accruals during the IPO year. A recent finding by Gao et al. (2017), who examine the 
impact of institutional investors on the offer price of Chinese IPOs, provides evidence 
that there is a negative correlation between discretionary accruals in the year before an 
IPO and the offering price for institutional investors. They argue that investors are aware 
of such earnings manipulation as they offer a lower price. Rakhman (2013) contends that 
IPO firms engage in income-increasing activities in the two years before the year of an 
IPO. He also provides evidence that IPOs inflate discretionary accruals in the year of 
becoming public. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H3: Saudi IPO firms engage in income-increasing activities in the pre-IPO year. 
H4: Discretionary accruals in the IPO year are higher compared with the pre-IPO year. 
4.4.2 Earnings management before listing and auditor size 
Past research shows that multiple signals might be used during an IPO (Copley & 
Douthett 2002; Datar et al., 1991; Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989; Yue & McConomy, 2004). 
Another signal that Saudi IPO firms may use during the IPO stage, in addition to historical 
earnings before listing, is appointing one of the Big 4 auditing firms to audit pre-listing 
financial statements. Chang et al. (2008) argue that IPO firms signal the quality of their 
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firm by hiring one of the Big 4 and the researchers provide evidence that audit quality 
minimises the doubt around IPO firms. As potential buyers have no access to the 
information that managers have to evaluate the real quality of an IPO easily, they may 
consider financial statements audited by one of the Big 4 as a signal that differentiates the 
quality of the firm (i.e., high vs low quality).   
A considerable volume of literature provides evidence that Big accounting firms mitigate 
accruals earnings management. For example, Becker et al. (1998) examine the association 
between audit quality and earnings management and find that firms audited by non-Big 6 
auditors report higher discretionary accruals than firms audited by the Big 6. Vinten et al. 
(2005) find that Big N auditors constrain accruals earnings management for Taiwan IPO 
firms. Zhou and Elder (2001) also examine the association between audit quality and 
earnings management. They provide evidence that there is a negative association between 
these variables and use two proxies for audit quality: auditor size and industry specialist.  
Based on the above discussions, Saudi IPOs audited by the Big 4 auditing firms use 
auditor reputation as a signal to distinguish their own from low-quality firms. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is developed:  
H5: There is a negative relationship between income-increasing in pre-IPO years and 
Big 4 auditors.     
One of the aims of this study is to investigate the ban on Deloitte from carrying out any 
audit work for listed firms for two years in Saudi Arabia, which implies that Deloitte’s 
audit quality is lower than that of other audit firms. This research anticipates that IPO 
firms audited by Deloitte will engage in positive discretionary accruals. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is developed:  
H6: In pre-IPO years, firms audited by Deloitte are more likely to engage in income-




This chapter provides an in-depth explanation of the theories related to the research topics 
that were used to develop the research hypotheses. Agency theory explains the need for 
an external auditor to minimise the risk of giving decision-making to agents and to reduce 
the information asymmetry in firms’ financial reports. Stakeholder theory clarifies the 
demand for high audit quality by stakeholders (e.g., creditors) in order to provide more 
credibility for financial statements. Legitimacy theory explains how firms use Big N 
auditors as a legitimation tool and how these auditors legitimise their work by reporting 
breaches, if there are any, in financial reports. 
Agency theory is used in the context of IPOs as it is argued that IPO managers may engage 
in earnings management to deceive investors about the real earnings of an IPO. Another 
theory adopted in the IPO context is signalling theory. The adoption of this theory in this 
study is due to the existence of information asymmetry between IPO management and 
potential buyers. The literature shows that IPOs use several signals to reveal inside 
information.  
The next chapter provides a discussion of the research philosophy followed in this study 
and the measurements of earnings management employed to answer the research 





Chapter 5:  Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction  
After discussing theories relevant to this study and developing the research hypotheses in 
the preceding chapter, this chapter provides an in-depth discussion related to the research 
methodology and methods and identifies the most appropriate for fulfilling the aims of 
this study.  
The types of research philosophy available for researchers to use in the social sciences 
are discussed in section 5.2. Research strategies and approaches are addressed in sections 
5.3 and 5.4, respectively. Measurements of discretionary accruals used in this study are 
demonstrated in section 5.5 with a brief discussion of all the models developed in the 
literature that are considered to be the basis of the chosen model. Section 5.9 presents the 
multiple regression model used to test the research hypotheses and the sample selection 
criteria are presented in section 5.10. 
5.2 Research Philosophy 
Two main philosophical positions are adopted in the social sciences: phenomenology and 
positivism. The phenomenological philosophy posits that the researcher is part of reality 
and is socially constructed; it is, therefore, subjective. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe 
(1991) indicate that, according to phenomenological philosophy, when research is being 
conducted, the focus should shift to the constructions and perceptions that individuals 
hold based on their experiences, instead of focusing on facts and measurements. 
Similarly, Miller and Brewer (2003) argue that discovering reality and developing an 
understanding of the world come from individuals’ experiences and their interpretations 
are thus based on their world understanding. 
On the other hand, positivism presumes that reality is isolated from the researcher. Thus, 
when reality is explored, objective methods should be used to isolate feelings, perception 
88 
 
or intuition. Positivism advocates the belief that as reality is external, knowledge cannot 
be real unless it is observable (Hjørland, 2005). To put it simply, the philosophical stance 
of positivism is to presume an absolute separation between the researcher and the subject. 
Johnson and Duberley (2000, p. 37) state that in “positivism, the truth is found” through 
the “researcher’s passive registration” of established facts. Similarly, Easterby-Smith et 
al. (1991) argue that in positivism findings are assumed to be measurable, generalisable 
and to result from causal effects, which are deduced from hypothesis testing. This 
research project adopts positivism as its research philosophy and assumes independence 
between the researcher and the subject because the feeling, perception or intuition of the 
researcher does not change the reality of what is being explored. Moreover, the 
hypotheses in this study are developed from existing theories. In this case, Saunders, 
Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2011) suggest adopting a positivist approach. 
Furthermore, Johnson and Duberley (2000) believe that most business research studies 
are considered to be positivist, stating that “a quick scan of the majority of business 
journals, particularly those from the USA, provides clear examples of positivism 
assumptions” (p. 83). Therefore, the researcher of this study has adopted a positivist 
position to answer the research questions and test the research hypotheses.  
5.3 Research Strategy   
Three research strategies exist: quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods. Smith (1983) 
believes the difference between these three strategies lies in their epistemological 
foundations. According to Bryman and Cramer (2001), quantitative research involves a 
strategy that focuses on “quantification in the collection and analysis of data” and, hence, 
includes the gathering and examination of numerical data and the conducting of statistical 
tests. According to Johnson and Duberley (2000, p. 44), a study that applies quantitative 
techniques “tends to emphasize the importance of large-scale and representative sets of 
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data and is perceived as gathering observable facts”. It is based on the positivist 
philosophy and uses a deductive approach to test a theory.  
In contrast, Johnson and Duberley (2000, p. 61) define the approach of qualitative 
research as “mostly exploratory in nature, involving relatively small numbers of 
respondents who have not been sampled on any scientific basis, although they have been 
carefully selected, and where no attempt to qualify or draw hard and fast conclusions is 
made”. Consequently, studies use qualitative methods whenever the need exists to 
understand how things occur or how they are associated with each other, instead of merely 
measuring the association between variables. 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) characterise qualitative research as answering the questions 
regarding ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’, but not ‘how many’. Based on the interpretivist 
philosophy, the emphasis in qualitative research is on words rather than quantification. In 
qualitative research, an inductive approach is used to generate a theory.  
The mixed-methods approach amalgamates the two approaches (Creswell, 2009). This 
type of research has been welcomed because it integrates the analysis of quantitative and 
qualitative data (Elnathan, Lin, & Young, 1996). The use of mixed methods is based on 
the post-positivist paradigm (Howell, 2013). As financial statements are the main source 
used, this study uses quantitative research to draw meaningful results from a large body 
of quantified data. In addition, as this research examines the relationships between 
independent and dependent variables to test research hypotheses that are deduced from 
theory, a quantitative approach should be used (Saunders et al., 2011). Moreover, Crotty 
(1998) and Saunders et al. (2011) point out that adopting a positivist position tends to 
mean using quantitative methods. Therefore, a quantitative approach was adopted in this 
research to achieve the research objectives and answer the research questions. 
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5.4 Research Approach 
A theory plays an important role in research design because it influences whether the 
researcher uses a deductive or inductive approach. The deductive approach tests a theory 
or hypothesis developed by the researcher, who also designs the research strategy 
(Saunders et al., 2011). When research is conducted to explain or examine the association 
between variables, the deductive approach is adopted, as this is usually undertaken when 
following a quantitative method (Soiferman, 2010). 
The first source of knowledge in a deductive approach is the theory that leads the 
researcher to deduce a hypothesis that is then subjected to empirical examination. 
Knowledge production is considered a linear process that starts from a theory and ends 
with the confirmation or rejection of the hypothesis (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). The 
deductive approach tends to be preferred more by positivist researchers than interpretivist 
ones (Veal, 2005).  
In the inductive approach, the researcher deduces a theory or hypothesis from his or her 
findings. In other words, knowledge production starts with data collection, upon which 
data are analysed to build a theory or hypothesis. However, Eriksson and Kovalainen 
(2008) argue that in business research, theory can be established by empirical research 
but not the other way around. Overall, the inductive approach explores why a certain 
aspect occurs, whereas the other approach gives an explanation of what is happening 
(Saunders et al., 2011). In the social sciences, the deductive approach is by far the most 
common way of developing a theoretical knowledge base (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). 
The inductive approach tends to be preferred more by interpretivist researchers than 
positivist ones (Veal, 2005). 
In this study, the researcher adopts a deductive approach to examine Deloitte’s audit 
quality and the presence of earnings management around the time of listing in the context 
of both theories used in the relevant literature: signalling theory and agency theory 
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(presented in detail in chapter 4). The researcher developed the research questions based 
on these theories and then formulated the hypotheses accordingly (see chapter 3). In the 
deductive approach, hypotheses must be subjected to empirical scrutiny, so this study 
uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to test them, leading either to 
acceptance or rejection of the hypotheses in accordance with the chosen theories. 
5.5 Earnings Management Measurement 
Earnings management literature distinguishes between three methods of accruals earnings 
manipulation:16 accounting method choice, accounting method application and 
accounting method timing. The first method is easily scrutinised, as firms are required to 
disclose any change in accounting method, whereas the others are more difficult. Healy 
(1985) believes that managers who engage in earnings management prefer to manipulate 
accruals, as engaging in changing accounting policies is more costly to managers. The 
literature on earnings management proposes several models to capture earnings 
manipulation due to the difficulties in detecting accruals earnings management. 
A large and growing body of literature uses discretionary accruals to scrutinise the 
engagement of earnings manipulation (e.g.Boone et al., 2015; Dechow et al., 1995; 
Francis et al., 1999; He, 2016; Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b). This research demonstrates the 
measurements of discretionary accruals used as proxies for earnings management through 
illustrating prior research that developed and improved these methods. 
The first to develop a measurement for discretionary accruals was Healy (1985), who 
examines whether managers engage in earnings manipulation to maximise their reward 
from bonus schemes. After examining 94 firms in the US in 1980, Healy (1985) provides 
evidence that managers engage in income-increasing accruals to meet their targeted 
performance. Healy (1985, p. 86) calculates total accruals as “the difference between 
                                                           
16 See chapter 3 for more details.  
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reported earnings and cash flow from operation”. Discretionary accruals are estimated in 
Healy (1985) model as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = �TOTACC𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� / 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1    (1) 
Where: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = Firm’s discretionary accruals for the year.  TOTACC𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡= Firm’s total accruals for the year. 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = Firm’s total assets for the previous year.  
 
Although Healy points out that total accruals comprise non-discretionary accruals, he 
ignores non-discretionary accruals when examining earnings management, as he assumes 
that non-discretionary accruals do not occur during the estimation period. However,  
Kaplan (1985) argues that the assumption that non-discretionary accruals equal zero is 
inappropriate, as non-discretionary accruals rely on the economic conditions of the firm 
and managers have no control over them. 
To overcome the fragility in Healy’s model, DeAngelo (1986) argues that the variation 
in non-discretionary accruals over time is almost zero. Consequently, the variation in total 
accruals between years is assigned to discretionary accruals. Nevertheless, Friedlan 
(1994) claims that DeAngelo’s assumption is false, as accruals are the difference between 
years due to growth. Discretionary accruals are estimated according to this model as 
follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� /𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1   (2) 
Where: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = Firm’s total accruals for the previous year; the other variables are 
defined in equation (1). 
 
This study applies Kothari et al. (2005) modification of a developed version of Jones 
(1991) model, which introduced the notion of overcoming the assumption of constant 
non-discretionary accruals by Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986).  
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Jones (1991) model includes a change in revenues to control for non-discretionary 
accruals from operating or working capital, and includes the gross for property, plant and 
equipment to control for non-discretionary accruals from depreciation (Perry & Williams, 
1994).  
Dechow et al. (1995) point out that this model takes into consideration the influence of 
the economic conditions of a firm on non-discretionary accruals. Jones model estimates 
discretionary accruals by generating coefficients that are used to predict non- 
discretionary accruals, as follows:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1  = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝛽𝛽1 � 1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2 �∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3 �𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  (3) 
  
Where:  
∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡= Change in firm’s revenues for the year.  
𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡= Firm’s gross property, plant, and equipment for the year.   
𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡= Error term; the other variables are defined in equation (1). 
 
The coefficients from the previous equation are used to estimate non-discretionary 
accruals as follows:  
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  = ?̂?𝛽0 + ?̂?𝛽1 � 1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� + ?̂?𝛽2 �∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� + ?̂?𝛽3 �𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1�     (4) 
Where:  
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡= Firm’s expected non-discretionary accruals for the year; the other variables 
are defined in equations (1) and (3). 
 
Discretionary accruals are then calculated as follows: 
                        𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 =  �𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� −  𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡      (5)   
Where:  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = Firm’s expected discretionary accruals; the other variables are defined in 




Dechow et al. (1995) believe that managers can engage in earnings manipulation over 
revenues. They presume that managers could manipulate earnings through credit sales as 
they may inflate credit sales towards the end of the fiscal year before cash is received. 
Consequently, total accruals will increase because of the discretion from unreceived cash. 
Based on this argument, they claim that any change in account receivables derives from 
earnings management. Thus, revenues are not entirely free from managerial discretion, 
as managers can boost revenues by relaxing the credit policy.   
Dechow et al. (1995) modify Jones (1991) model by subtracting the change in account 
receivables from the change of revenues when computing non-discretionary accruals, as 
follows: 
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  = ?̂?𝛽0 + ?̂?𝛽1 � 1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� + ?̂?𝛽2 �∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1  �+ ?̂?𝛽3 �𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1�          (6) 
Where:  
∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡= Change in firm’s receivables for the year; the other variables are defined in 
equations (1), (3) and (4).  
 
They believe that this amendment eliminates any earnings management through revenues. 
To support their arguments, they examine Healy (1985) and Jones (1991) using their 
modification. They conclude that Jones (1991), with the proposed modification, is the 
more powerful model among these models.  
A further improvement on Jones model is recommended by Kothari et al. (2005). 
Evidence is provided by Dechow et al. (1995) that a positive relationship exists between 
discretionary accruals and return on assets (ROA). Therefore, Kothari et al. (2005)  
believe that Jones model and the modified model by Dechow et al. (1995) suffer from an 
error in the measurement of discretionary accruals, as they ignore operating performance. 
They recommend adding ROA as a regressor to control for operating performance, 
especially with excessive performance, and this will moderate heteroscedasticity and 
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error in the measurement of discretionary accruals.  They estimate discretionary accruals 
using Jones model, the modified Jones model and an adjusted performance model to 
compare the three. They find that the adjusted performance model produces more reliable 
inferences. Kothari et al. (2005) measure discretionary accruals as follows:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1  = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝛽𝛽1 � 1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2 �∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽3 �𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1�+ 𝛽𝛽4 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡           (7) 
     Where:  
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1= Firm’s return on assets for the preceding year; the other variables are 
defined in equations (1) and (3).  
 
The coefficients from the previous equation are used to estimate non-discretionary 
accruals as follows:  
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  = ?̂?𝛽0 + ?̂?𝛽1 � 1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� + ?̂?𝛽2 �∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 � + ?̂?𝛽3 �𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1�+  ?̂?𝛽4 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1      (8) 
All variables are defined in equations (1), (3), (4) and (6). 
 
Discretionary accruals are then calculated as follows: 
                        𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 =  �𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� −  𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  (9)  
All variables are defined in equations (1), (4) and (5). 
 
5.5.1 Total accruals measurement  
The first step in estimating discretionary accruals is to calculate total accruals. The 
literature offers two alternative methods for calculating total accruals. The first method is 
the balance sheet approach, which is employed by some previous studies, for instance, 
Healy (1985), Jones (1991) and Dechow et al. (1995). In this approach, total accruals are 
calculated indirectly, as follows: 




𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = Change in firm’s current assets. 
𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = Change in firm’s cash. 
𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = Change in firm’s current liabilities. 
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = Change in firm’s long-term debt contained in current liabilities. 
𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = Firm’s depreciation and amortisation expenses; the other variables are 
defined in equation (1).  
 
The second method is the cash flow approach, which is employed by studies such as 
DeFond and Subramanyam (1998), Yun et al. (2010), Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b), Boone 
et al. (2015) and Jaggi, Leung, and Gul (2009). In this approach, total accruals are 
calculated directly from the cash flow statement, as follows: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡     (11) 
Where: 
𝑅𝑅𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡= Firm’s earnings before extraordinary items for the year. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = Firm’s cash flow from operations for the year; the other variables are 
defined in equation (1).  
 
Hribar and Collins (2002) examine the difference between two approaches in generating 
an accurate measurement of total accruals. They find that the cash flow approach 
generates an accurate measurement when companies experience a merger or acquisition 
or discontinue operation events. They also find that substantial frequency and magnitude 
of errors exist when the balance sheet approach is used. In addition, they argue that using 
the balance sheet approach when firms discontinue some of their operations may lead to 
bias, as discontinuing operations might be considered discretionary. Furthermore, Kothari 
et al. (2005, p. 159) recommend that future research uses the cash flow approach, as the 
use of balance sheets “not only reduces the discretionary accrual models’ power to detect 
earnings management, but also has the potential to generate incorrect inferences about 
earnings management”. In this study, therefore, the cash flow approach is used to compute 
the total accruals. 
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5.5.2 Current accruals model 
Total accruals can be divided into two parts: current and long-term accruals (Teoh et al., 
1998a). Teo et al. (1998a) argue that most of the manipulation in earnings management 
occurs with current accruals, which are driven from daily operations.17 Beneish (1998) 
believes that engaging in earnings management over depreciation is explicit. He therefore 
argues that there is some doubt in using depreciation to manage earnings due to the 
availability of other means that are less explicit. Following Beneish (1998) call to use 
current discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management, some studies have 
applied it, for instance, Roosenboom et al. (2003), Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2011) 
and Athanasakou et al. (2009).  
Teoh et al. (1998a) and Roosenboom et al. (2003) define accruals as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − 𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − 𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡    (12) 
Where: 
𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = Firm’s current accruals for the year; the other variables are defined in 
equation (10).  
 
Current discretionary accruals are measured using the Kothari model, as follows:  
𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1  = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝛽𝛽1 � 1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽2 � ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  (13) 
All variables are defined in equations (1), (3), (7) and (12). 
  
The coefficients from the previous equation are used to estimate non-discretionary current 
accruals, as follows:  
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = ?̂?𝛽0 + ?̂?𝛽1 � 1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1� + ?̂?𝛽2 �∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 � +  ?̂?𝛽4 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1  (14)  
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡= Firm’s expected non-discretionary current accruals for the year; the other 
variables are defined in equations (1), (3), (6) and (7). 
 
                                                           




Discretionary current accruals are then calculated as follows: 
                        𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 =  �𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1  � −  𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡   (15) 
Where:  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = Firm’s expected discretionary current accruals for the year; the other 
variables are defined in equations (12) and (14). 
 
5.5.3 Time-series versus cross-sectional methods 
Earnings management literature proposes two methods for using Jones’ model and the 
modified models: time-series and cross-sectional. The time-series method requires 
several years (up to 10) to predict the coefficient of non-discretionary accruals before the 
period of interest that is wanted for examining earnings management. The method 
presumes that no systematic earnings management occurs during the period of interest 
(Dechow et al., 1995). The cross-sectional method requires yearly estimation for each 
industry to predict the coefficient of non-discretionary accruals. In other words, the 
coefficient of non-discretionary accruals is predicted every year for each industry. 
This study applies the cross-sectional method to estimate non-discretionary accruals for 
several reasons. First, given the requirement of a long period of time (up to 10 years) for 
the time-series method to be applied, the cross-sectional method seems to be more 
suitable as it produces a larger sample. Second, this study is not an event study to use 
time-series. Third, prior studies demonstrate that the cross-sectional method produces 
more accurate estimates (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996). Moreover, 
Peasnell et al. (2000) examine both methods and find that the cross-sectional approach is 
more powerful at identifying accruals earnings manipulation. Bartov, Gul, and Tsui 
(2001) encourage researchers to use the cross-sectional instead of the time-series method, 
as the latter minimises the sample size and may cause survival biases. It is also argued 
that external economic circumstances that impact on industries can be controlled by using 
the cross-sectional method (Kaplan, 1985).   
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5.6 Dependent Variable Measurement  
This study adopts the latest modification of Jones model by Kothari et al. (2005), as they 
claim that the Jones and modified Jones models suffer from heteroscedasticity and error 
in the measurement of discretionary accruals. Dechow et al. (1995) also argue that these 
models are possibly mis-specified, as there is an association between discretionary 
accruals and the performance of the firm. The adoption this model follows recent studies 
in accruals earnings management, such as Filip and Raffournier (2014), Mao and 
Renneboog (2015), Shust (2015) and He (2016). 
5.6.1 Earnings management measurement for audit quality  
In this study, the estimation model is run yearly for each industry using the Kothari et al. 
(2005) model for the period from 2004 to 2014. The sample is restricted to a minimum of 
eight observations for each industry per year to run the estimation model to be consistent 
with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Yuan et al. (2016). Following Qintao (2007) and 
Myers et al. (2003), this study excludes the lock-up period of IPO firms from the 
estimation model. This exclusion is undertaken to eliminate any discretionary accruals 
activities related to IPO firms (Myers et al., 2003). Nam et al. (2014) find that venture 
capitalists with a high reputation moderate the strong association between earnings 
management and abnormal returns before the end of a lock-up period. Teoh, Wong, and 
Rao (1998c) exclude the IPO year as the lock-up period is six months in the US market.  
Consequently, lock-up periods are excluded in this study in order to have an accurate 
estimation model when predicting discretionary accruals.   
Following previous studies (e.g.Boone et al., 2015; Carcello, Hollingsworth, & Mastrolia, 
2011; Chen, Chen, Lobo, & Wang, 2011; Francis & Michas, 2013; Krishnan, 2003b; 
Reynolds & Francis, 2000), this study uses absolute discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
audit quality. Boone et al. (2015) argue that higher absolute discretionary accruals 
indicate a lower quality of financial statements. Piot and Janin (2007) distinguish between 
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discretionary accruals and absolute discretionary accruals. They point out that while 
discretionary accruals are used as a proxy for conservatism, the latter are used as a proxy 
for a tendency towards earnings management. Furthermore, Becker et al. (1998) argue 
that absolute discretionary accruals are an indicator of the level of discretion that is 
exercised in earnings. Moreover, Francis et al. (1999, p. 21) argue that, as previous 
literature provides evidence that management engages in income-increasing and 
decreasing, depending on the particular circumstances, absolute discretionary accruals are 
“the appropriate measure of the extent to which potential earnings management behavior 
could be occurring”. Hence, absolute discretionary accruals are adopted to capture the 
size of the variance in earnings instead of the direction of earnings management. 
5.6.2 Earnings management measurement for IPOs  
As mentioned above, this study applies a cross-sectional method, using Kothari et al. 
(2005) to estimate discretionary accruals. Nevertheless, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) 
highlight that applying the modified Jones model using the previous year’s assets as a 
deflator inflates the estimated discretionary accruals. They point out that IPO firms invest 
the proceeds from an IPO in their assets and, therefore, the assets at the end of the IPO 
year are far higher than prior to the IPO year. Therefore, they propose a modification to 
the Jones model to account for IPO context by using the average of current and previous 
year total assets instead of the previous year’s total assets, as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,(𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡−1)/2  = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝛽𝛽1 � 1𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,(𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡−1)/2� + 𝛽𝛽2 � ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,(𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡−1)/2�+ 𝛽𝛽3 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,(𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡−1)/2 +  𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡      (16) 
Where:  
𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,(𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡−1)/2= Firm’s average total assets.  
𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1= Firm’s average return on assets; the other variables are defined in 




The coefficients from the previous equation are used to estimate non-discretionary 
accruals, as follows:  
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  = ?̂?𝛽0 + ?̂?𝛽1 � 1𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,(𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡−1)/2� + ?̂?𝛽2 �∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,(𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡−1)/2 �+  ?̂?𝛽3 𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,(𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡−1)/2   (17) 
All variables are defined in equations (3), (6), (14) and (16).  
 
Discretionary accruals are then calculated as follows:                         𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 =  � 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,(𝑡𝑡+𝑡𝑡−1)/2 � −  𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡   (18) 
All variables are defined in equations (12), (14), (15) and (16). 
 
The above methodology has been applied by recent IPO research, such as Armstrong et 
al. (2015) and Alhadab et al. (2015) and, therefore, this study also applies it. Furthermore, 
this research adopts a current version of the Kothari et al. (2005) model to examine both 
current and long-term discretionary accruals.   
Applying the cross-sectional method requires running an estimation model yearly for 
each industry. However, the estimation model in this study is run yearly instead of on an 
industry basis due to the small number of firms that were traded on the SSM in the early 
years (e.g., 44 non-financial18 firms in 2004). In other words, the year itself is considered 
as a portfolio. Previous literature requires an industry to comprise at least six firms to run 
an estimation model on an industry basis (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994)). Running 
an estimation model on an industry basis also excludes some IPO firms, as it omits some 
industries that do not meet the minimum requirement set by the literature. Furthermore, 
this methodology is consistent with Roosenboom et al. (2003), Park and Park (2004) and 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006). To estimate discretionary accruals accurately, the first three 
years from the IPO year are excluded from the estimation model.  There are two lock-up 
periods for firms listed on the SSM: for firms listed as IPOs, the lock-up period is six 
                                                           
18 This study follows the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) for defining a non-financial industry.   
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months, and for firms that start as public firms without any previous operation, the lock-
up period is three years. Therefore, the first three years are excluded. Furthermore, 
excluding three years is consistent with prior literature,19 such as (Ahmad-Zaluki, 
Campbell, & Goodacre, 2011). 
5.7 Independent Variables Measurement  
5.7.1 Independent variables for audit quality model 
To examine the difference in audit quality between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors, a 
dummy variable is created that takes ‘1’ if a firm is audited by one of the Big 4 (KPMG, 
EY, Deloitte or PwC) and ‘0’ otherwise. This measurement is consistent with previous 
studies (e.g.Becker et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2011; Myers et al., 2003; Piot, 2001). As this 
study hypothesises that the Big 4 do not differ from non-Big 4 accounting firms, this 
research does not predict an association between discretionary accruals and the Big 4 
variable due to the ban placed on one of the Big 4. 
As one of the objectives of this study is to examine the audit quality of Deloitte, a dummy 
variable is created that takes ‘1’ if the firm is audited by Deloitte and ‘0’ otherwise. This 
measurement follows studies that examine audit quality for a specific audit firm 
(e.g.Boone et al., 2015; Cahan & Zhang, 2006; Nagy, 2005). As a result of the ban placed 
on Deloitte by the CMA, this research hypothesises a positive association between 
discretionary accruals and Deloitte. 
5.7.2 Independent variables for IPO model  
Five dummy variables were created to testing the IPO hypotheses. The first dummy takes 
‘1’ for the year before listing and ‘0’ otherwise. The second dummy takes ‘1’ for the year 
of listing, ‘0’ otherwise. A positive relationship is expected between discretionary 
accruals and the two dummy variables for the year before listing and the year of listing, 
                                                           
19 Prior literature varies from one year to five years, without giving any justification.  
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as this study hypothesises that IPO firms engage in earnings management in the pre-IPO 
year and the IPO year. The third dummy takes ‘1’ if the firm is audited by one of the Big 
4 auditors and ‘0’ otherwise This study expects a negative association between Big 4 
auditing firms and pre-IPO discretionary accruals, as Saudi IPOs audited by the Big 4 
auditing firms use auditor reputation as a signal to distinguish their own from low-quality 
firms. The fourth dummy takes ‘1’ if the firm is audited by Deloitte and ‘0’ otherwise. 
The fifth dummy takes ‘1’ if the firm is audited by one of the Big 3 auditors (KPMG, EY, 
or PwW) and ‘0’ otherwise. As a result of the ban on Deloitte due to the collapse of an 
IPO firm (the Al-Mojil Group), this research anticipates a positive association between 
pre-IPO discretionary accruals and Deloitte. 
These measurements are consistent with prior studies (e.g.Alhadab et al., 2015; 
Armstrong et al., 2015; Gounopoulos & Pham, 2017; Rakhman, 2013; Vinten et al., 
2005). 
5.8 Control Variables 
To provide more precise results, this study includes a number of firm financial 
characteristics as control variables that have an impact on discretionary accruals. Johnson 
et al. (2002) state the importance of using control variables, as they argue that some 
variables, other than the primary variable, may cause differences in the independent 
variable. Myers et al. (2003) also argue that models without control variables may lead 
the primary variable to serve as a proxy for other factors that determine the independent 
variable. Thus, this study uses several control variables. Following relevant previous 
studies, nine control variables were chosen: firm size, firm leverage, firm growth, cash 




Firm size  
Most earnings management researchers use firm size as one of the control variables  
(e.g.Balsam et al., 2003; He, 2016; Liu & Lu, 2007). Firm size is measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Becker et al. (1998) argue that size has a potential impact on 
discretionary accruals selection, as they believe that the motivation for engaging in 
earnings management is less in large firms, which are monitored indirectly by outsiders 
such as financial analysts.  
Consistent with this view, Dechow and Dichev (2002) find that quality of accruals is 
associated positively with size (the larger the size, the fewer the discretionary accruals 
reported). Xie et al. (2003) find that the size of discretionary current accruals is high in 
smaller firms. They conclude that larger firms are subject to strict scrutiny and, therefore, 
engagement in earnings management is less.  
However, Lobo and Zhou (2006) point out that the impact of size on earnings 
management could be either positive or negative. They argue that large firms could face 
great pressure from outsiders because of their market influences, and thus have no 
motivation to manage earnings. Alternatively, large firms could manage earnings due to 
the ramifications for their operation and outsiders may not be able to spot any earnings 
manipulation. Following the above arguments, this study does not predict the direction of 
the effect of size on earnings management. 
Firm leverage 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) provide evidence that firms that are near to violating a debt 
agreement manipulate both current and long-term discretionary accruals. A large number 
of studies find a positive association between leverage and discretionary accruals, as they 
argue that firms that have a high leverage ratio are more motivated to conduct income-
increasing discretionary accruals to evade the consequences of violating a debt agreement 
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(e.g.Braam, Nandy, Weitzel, & Lodh, 2015; Krishnan, 2003a; Yuan et al., 2016). 
According to these studies, leverage is defined as ‘long-term debt divided by total assets’.  
However, DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) find discretionary accruals are negatively 
associated with leverage.   
This research predicts a positive association between positive discretionary accruals and 
leverage following the notion that firms with high leverage conduct income-increasing 
activities. It also predicts a negative association with income-decreasing, as DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) argue that firms in financial crisis engage in income-decreasing to 
benefit from debt agreement renegotiations. 
Firm growth  
Managers are keen to have steady growth in order to achieve targets, as bonuses are 
received when a certain performance is achieved (Bens et al., 2002). In addition, Skinner 
and Sloan (2002) believe that the motivations behind meeting income forecasts are high 
in growth firms, as there is a strong reaction from the market if they do not meet the 
forecasts. Matsumoto (2002) also contends that managers engage in accruals income- 
increasing to evade unexpected income loss. Smith and Watts (1992) believe that the 
flexibility of accounting choices is greater in growth firms. This may be because of the 
weakness of internal controls, as Hall and Renner (1988) contend that weak internal 
controls exist in this type of firm. 
Several studies find a positive correlation between growth and earnings management 
(e.g., DeFond et al., 1998; Wild, 1996). In contrast, a finding by Behn, Jong-Hag, and 
Kang (2008) proposes a negative correlation between them. Following DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998) definition of growth, it is the difference between the current and 
total assets of the preceding year divided by the prior year’s total assets. Following the 
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argument of Matsumoto (2002) and Smith and Watts (1992), this research predicts a 
positive association between discretionary accruals and firm growth. 
Cash flow 
Numerous studies document the negative relationship between operating cash flow and 
both discretionary and absolute discretionary accruals (e.g.Boone et al., 2015; Dechow et 
al., 1995; Francis & Dechun, 2008; Myers et al., 2003; Nagy, 2005). 
Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) argue that better performance is associated with 
higher operating cash flow and, therefore, this study considers the differences in 
performance between firms by controlling for operating cash flow. Following prior 
studies, such as Nagy (2005), operating cash flow is scaled by the total assets of the 
preceding year. This research predicts a negative association between absolute 
discretionary accruals and operating cash flow. 
Firm performance  
Many studies find that firm performance is positively correlated with earnings 
management (e.g.Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). The literature also offers the following 
definitions of firm performance: a change in operating income in absolute value divided 
by fiscal year total assets (e.g.He, 2016) and  income before extraordinary items divided 
by the prior year’s total assets (e.g.Jaggi et al., 2009). This study adopts the latter 
definition to avoid heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the models. Studies such as 
Jaggi et al. (2009) and Wuchun, Ling Lei, and Mikhail (2011) apply the latter definition 
as a control variable. This research predicts a positive association between absolute 
discretionary accruals and firm performance.  
This research also controls for negative performance, following Chen et al. (2011), 
Francis and Dechun (2008), Klein (2002) and Krishnan (2003b). A dummy variable is 
created by taking ‘1’ if the firm reports negative income during the fiscal year and ‘0’ 
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otherwise. Francis and Dechun (2008) argue that firms with negative income are 
motivated to engage in earnings management. Therefore, this research predicts a positive 
association between discretionary accruals and negative income. 
Firm age  
Myers et al. (2003) argue that the life cycle of firms has an impact on discretionary 
accruals. Studies such as Gul, Fung, and Jaggi (2009), Myers et al. (2003), Shust (2015) 
and Yuan et al. (2016) control for age and find a negative association between absolute 
discretionary accruals and age. This result suggests that the greater the age, the less the 
engagement in earnings management. Following Shust (2015) and Yuan et al. (2016), this 
research defines age as the natural logarithm of a firm’s years since it became a public 
company. This research predicts a negative association between absolute discretionary 
accruals and age.   
Seasoned equity offering (SEO) 
Issuing SEOs may motivate a firm’s management to engage in opportunistic earnings 
behaviours. Teoh et al. (1998a) report that SEO firms had higher income growth in the 
year of issue. Therefore, this research controls for SEOs to eliminate any discretionary 
accruals activities that may have an impact on the main test variable. Following Francis 
et al. (1999), a dummy variable was created by taking ‘1’ if the firm issues an SEO and 
‘0’ otherwise. This research predicts a positive association between absolute discretionary 
accruals and SEO.   
Complexity 
Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2012) provide evidence that firms that have foreign 
subsidiaries in a less strict legal environment engage in earnings management. In the 
sample for this study, 45% of the firm-year observations have subsidiaries. Therefore, 
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following Cameran, Francis, Marra, and Pettinicchio (2015) and Dyreng et al. (2012), this 
research controls for complexity by creating a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm 
has a subsidiary and ‘0’ otherwise. This research predicts a positive association between 
positive discretionary accruals and complexity.   
5.9 Multiple Regression Model  
This study adopts OLS regression to test the research hypotheses related to earnings 
management. The research design of this study for testing earnings management follows 
McNichols and Wilson (1988), who introduced this type of research design. They propose 
a linear model to test earnings management, as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡       (20) 
Where: 
Dum = A dummy variable that divides the sample into two sets: one is given to the set for 
which earnings management is predicted; all the other variables are defined in equation 
(1).  
 
However, Dechow et al. (1995) argue that variables that may have an impact on 
discretionary accruals should be included in the model, as follows:      
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  = 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡     (21) 
Where: 
Con = Control variables that may impact on discretionary accruals; all the other 
variables are defined in equations (1) and (20).  
 
This research follows the research design of Dechow et al. (1995) due to the importance 
of using control variables, as explained in section 5.8. The following sub-sections 
demonstrate the multiple regression models that are used to test the hypotheses of this 
research. 
5.9.1 Multiple regression models for audit quality  
The following models are used to test the research hypotheses that relate to audit quality 
and earnings management and follow prior research (e.g.Becker et al., 1998; Boone et al., 
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2015; Chen et al., 2011; Francis & Dechun, 2008; Jeong & Rho, 2004; Krishnan, 2003a; 
Myers et al., 2003; Yuan et al., 2016). The following model is used to test hypothesis H1: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽3𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽4𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 +                           𝛽𝛽6𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝛥𝛥 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸 +                          𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 +   𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 +  𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡    (22) 
Where: 
ADISACC = Absolute discretionary accruals.  
BIGAUD = A dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm is audited by one of KPMG, EY,    
                   Deloitte or PwC; ‘0’ otherwise. 
LOGA    = The natural logarithm of fiscal year total assets. 
LAGE   = The natural logarithm of a firm’s years since it became a public company. 
LEVE   = Long-term debt divided by total assets. 
ROA   = Income before extraordinary items divided by the prior year’s total assets. 
NEG = A dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm reports negative income and ‘0’  
                otherwise. 
SEO = A dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm issues an SEO and ‘0’ otherwise. 
CFL= Operating cash flow is divided by the prior year’s total assets. 
ASGR = The difference between the current and the prior years’ total assets  
               divided by the prior year’s total assets. 
COMLX = A dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm has at least one subsidiary and 
‘0’ otherwise. 
 
To test H2, all firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors are excluded in order to examine 
whether Deloitte provides less audit quality compared with the rest of the Big 4, following 
prior research such as Boone et al. (2015). The following model is used to test hypothesis 
H2: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 +  𝛽𝛽3𝛥𝛥𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽4𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 +                         𝛽𝛽6𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺 +    𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝛥𝛥 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸 +                      𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 +  𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 +  𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡                    (23) 
Where: 
DELO = A dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm is audited by Deloitte and ‘0’ 




5.9.2 Multiple regression models for IPOs 
This study follows Alhadab et al. (2016), Chahine, Arthurs, Filatotchev, and Hoskisson 
(2012) and Morsfield and Tan (2006), who adopted this type of research design in the 
context of IPOs by restricting the sample to IPO firms.  
The following model is designed to test pre-listing earnings management (H3):  
𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 + +𝛽𝛽3𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺 +              𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝛥𝛥 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 + 𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 +  𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡   (24) 
Where:  
CURRACC = Current discretionary accruals. 
IPO_B = A dummy variable that takes ‘1’ for a pre-IPO year and ‘0’ otherwise; all the 
other variables are defined in equation (22).  
To test the engagement of earnings management in the year of listing (H4), this study 
follows the argument of Armstrong et al. (2015) that the existence of discretionary 
accruals in an IPO year shown in previous studies is due to not controlling for cash 
proceeds during an IPO. Therefore, this research controls for cash proceeds during an IPO 
as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇_𝑌𝑌0 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽3𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽4𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 +                   𝛽𝛽6𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺 +    𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝛥𝛥 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 + 𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡                    (25) 
Where: 
IPO_Y0 = A dummy variable that takes ‘1’ for an IPO year and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Proceed = Cash proceeds during an IPO divided by average total assets; all the other 
variables are defined in equations (22) and (23).  
The following model is designed to test audit quality for the years before an IPO year 
(H5) as follows:  
𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇_𝛥𝛥𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵4 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 + +𝛽𝛽3𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺 +
𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝛥𝛥 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 + 𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 +  𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡             (26) 
Where: 
IPO_Big4 = A dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 and 




The following model is designed to test the audit quality of Deloitte for the years before 
an IPO year (H6):  
𝐷𝐷𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇Deloitte + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵3 + 𝛽𝛽3𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 + +𝛽𝛽4𝛥𝛥𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 +                             𝛽𝛽5𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝛥𝛥 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 + 𝑌𝑌𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 +                             𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑌𝑌𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 +  𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡             (26) 
Where: 
IPO_ DELO 20 = A dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm is audited by Deloitte and 
‘0’ otherwise; all the other variables are defined in equations (22) and 
(23). 
IPO_Big3 = A dummy variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm is audited by one of KPMG, EY 
or PwC and ‘0’ otherwise; all the other variables are defined in equations 
(22) and (23). 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the variables used in this study.  
Table 1 Summary of variables 







The absolute value of 
discretionary accruals 
measured using the Kothari et 







Current discretionary accruals 
measured using the Kothari et 






A dummy variable that takes 
‘1’ if the firm is audited by one 
of KPMG, EY, Deloitte or PwC 
and ‘0’ otherwise. 
 
Big 4 auditors BIGAUD 
Independent 
variable 
A dummy variable that takes 
‘1’ if the firm is audited by 
Deloitte and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Deloitte audit firm  DELO 
Independent 
variable 
A dummy variable that takes 
‘1’ for a pre-IPO year and ‘0’ 
otherwise. 





A dummy variable that takes 
‘1’ for an IPO year and ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
The year of listing  IPO_Y0 
                                                           
20  Deloitte cannot be examined among the Big 4 as in equation 23 due to the sample size. Two dummy 
variables were created in order to overcome this weakness: one for Deloitte and one for the rest of 





A dummy variable that takes 
‘1’ if the firm is audited by one 
of the Big 4 and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Big 4 auditors in the 




A dummy variable that takes 
‘1’ if the firm is audited by 
Deloitte and ‘0’ otherwise. 






A dummy variable that takes 
‘1’ if the firm is audited by one 
of KPMG, EY or PwC and ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
Big 3 auditors 
(Deloitte excluded) 





The natural logarithm of fiscal 
year total assets. 












The difference between the 
current and the prior year’s 
total assets divided by the prior 
year’s total assets. 





Operating cash flow divided by 






Income before extraordinary 
items divided by the prior 






A dummy variable that takes 
‘1’ if the firm reports negative 






The natural logarithm of a 
firm’s years since it became a 
public company. 





A dummy variable that takes 
‘1’ if the firm issues an SEO 






A dummy variable that takes 
‘1’ if the firm has at least one 





5.10 Sample Selection Criteria  
5.10.1 Sample selection and data collection – audit quality 
The sample for testing the audit quality hypotheses includes all Saudi firms listed on the 
SSM. The sample is restricted to the period from 2004 to 2014. This period was chosen 
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for two reasons: (1) annual reports are unavailable before 2004, and (2) the ban on 
Deloitte started in June 2015. 
Several criteria were chosen that a firm must meet to be included in the sample. These 
criteria are: (1) the firm’s fiscal year must end on 31 December; (2) availability of annual 
reports; (3) following previous literature (i.e.Mouselli, Jaafar, & Hussainey, 2012; Zalata 
& Roberts, 2017), financial sectors, for example, banks and insurance companies, are 
excluded from the sample. Financial sectors also have specific reporting criteria and 
hence different financial reporting practices21 (Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority 
[SAMA], 2009). Following Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016), the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) is used to define sectors. Therefore, the real estate sector is not included 
in the sample as it is considered a financial sector under the ICB; and (4) consistent with 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Shust (2015) and Yuan et al. (2016), the sample is restricted 
to a minimum of eight observations for each industry per year. 
Eighty-five firms (Table 2) met these criteria, which produced 591 observations for the 
period 2004–2014. Annual reports were downloaded from the Argaam website22 
(www.argaam.com). All financial statement data was manually collected from the annual 




                                                           
21  Banks and insurance firms are required by SAMA to apply international financial reporting standards 
(IFRS) instead of local standards. 
22  The official website of the Saudi Stock Market (www.tadawul.com.sa) only provides data for the last 
five years.     
23  At the beginning, the researcher used Datastream to collect the data for this study. A lot of data were 
missing. The researcher started collecting the missing data from annual reports but noticed that 
some of the figures obtained from Datastream were different from the information in the annual 
reports. The researcher contacted Datastream to discuss this issue. They replied that "we do some 
adjustments, as per our collection policies". Therefore, the researcher collected the data manually. 
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Table 2 Sample selection for audit quality 
Total number of firms listed until 
December 2014  
 168 
Minus: excluded firms    
Financial (according to ICB classification) 62  
Missing reports 1  
Ending in March  3  
Do not meet criteria for a minimum of eight 
observations in each industry per year 
17  
Total excluded firms  (83)  
Final selected sample   85 
 
Table 3 shows the industry distribution for the sample regarding audit quality. This 
sample contains four industries: basic materials, industrial, consumer goods and 
consumer services. The industrial industry dominates the sample, as it has the highest 
percentage (35%). The basic materials industry accounts for 27% of the sample. The two 
industries with the smallest proportions are consumer goods and consumer services, as 
they account for 20% and 18% of the sample, respectively.   
Table 3 Industry distribution 2004–2014 
Industry  Frequency  Percentage  
Basic materials 23 27 
Industrial 30 35 
Consumer goods 17 20 
Consumer services 15 18 
Total  85 100 
 
5.10.2 Sample selection and data collection – IPO 
The sample for testing earnings management around the IPO hypotheses includes all 
firms that went public on the SSM during the period 2005–2015. This period was chosen 
for two reasons: (1) prospectuses were not available before 2005, and (2) 2016 is not 
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included in the sample, as one year after listing is required to make a comparison between 
the listing year and the year after the year of listing. 
In addition to criteria (1) and (3) in the audit quality sample, two years of financial 
statements must be available in the prospectuses to test earnings management for a pre-
IPO year and audit quality for pre-IPO financial statements.  
Forty-two firms met these criteria for the period 2004–2015 (Table 4). Annual reports 
were downloaded from the Argaam website (www.argaam.com), whereas prospectuses 
were downloaded from the official website of the CMA.24 All financial statement data 
were collected manually from annual reports and prospectuses.     






Table 5 shows the time distribution of the IPO sample during 2005–2015. The highest 
number of firms to go public is six, which occurs in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2012. In 
contrast, the lowest number of firms to go public is two and occurs in 2009 and 2011. 
 
 
                                                           
24 www.cma.org.sa 
Total number of IPO firms until December 2015   58 
Less: excluded firms    
Financial 6  
Real estate 2  
Firms providing one year of financial reporting in 
the prospectus 
4  
Ending in March 4  
Total excluded firms  (16)  
















This chapter provides an overview of the research philosophy positions in the social 
sciences: phenomenology and positivism. The latter is adopted in this study due to the 
absolute separation between the researcher and the subject. The quantitative method is 
chosen from the three strategies available for use (quantitative, qualitative and mixed 
methods). As this research adopts theories from which hypotheses are developed, the 
deductive approach is used.  
This chapter also demonstrates the measurements for the discretionary accruals that are 
used as proxies for earnings management through illustrating prior research that 
developed and improved the measurements. The Kothari model is used in this research to 
estimate non-discretionary accruals for both versions: long-term and current accruals. The 
Kothari model is preferred over other models as it demonstrates that the Jones and 
modified Jones models suffer from heteroscedasticity and errors in the measurement of 
discretionary accruals. A cross-sectional method is adopted to estimate non-discretionary 
Year  Frequency  Percentage  
2005 1 0.02 
2006 6 0.14 
2007 6 0.14 
2008 6 0.14 
2009 2 0.05 
2010 4 0.10 
2011 2 0.05 
2012 6 0.14 
2013 3 0.07 
2014 3 0.07 




accruals, as previous researchers have shown that the cross-sectional method produces 
more accurate estimates. 
As a consequence of the importance of using control variables in providing more precise 
results, this study adopts several of the control variables used by prior studies and which 
may cause differences in the independent variable: firm size, cash flow, firm leverage, 
firm performance, firm growth, firm age, SOE and complexity. Moreover, this study 
excludes the financial and real estate sectors because of their different financial reporting 













Chapter 6: Empirical Findings 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter provides a discussion of the research methodology and methods 
used in this study. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, OLS regression is used as a 
method of data analysis. Six models were adopted to test the research hypotheses; hence, 
this chapter presents the results of testing using these models. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section (6.2) shows the results 
concerning audit quality in Saudi Arabia. This section is divided into six sub-sections, as 
follows: section 6.2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample used to test audit 
quality; section 6.2.2 shows the correlation matrix; section 6.2.3 presents the results of 
testing normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation; section 6.2.4 
presents and discusses the results of testing the audit quality of the Big 4; Section 6.2.5 
presents and discusses the results of testing the audit quality of Deloitte; and section 6.2.6 
discusses the results of audit quality within the context of Saudi Arabia. 
The second section (6.3) shows the results concerning earnings management in IPO firms 
and the audit quality of these firms. This section is divided into eight sub-sections, as 
follows: section 6.3.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the IPO sample; section 6.3.2 
shows the correlation matrix for the IPO sample; section 6.3.3 shows the results of testing 
normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation; section 6.3.4 presents 
the results of testing earnings management in the pre-listing year; section 6.2.5 presents 
the results of testing for earnings management in the listing year; section 6.2.6 presents 
the results of testing the audit quality in pre-listing years; section 6.2.7 shows the results 
of testing the audit quality of Deloitte and the Big 3 versus non-Big 4 firms in pre-listing 




6.2 Empirical 1: Earnings Management and Audit Quality  
6.2.1 Descriptive statistics25 
Table 6 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for all the variables (dependent, 
independent and control) used to examine the audit quality in Saudi Arabia, in which 
absolute discretionary accruals (ADISACC) is the dependent variable and Big 4 auditors 
(BIGAUD) and Deloitte auditor (DELO) are the independent variables. 
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of the audit quality sample 
As shown in Table 6, the mean value of absolute discretionary accruals (ADISACC) is 
0.0477, with a standard deviation of 0.0433. The table also shows the existence of a large 
variation in absolute discretionary accruals in the study sample, with a minimum of 
0.0001 and a maximum of 0.2365. The minimum value is almost zero, which indicates 
                                                           
25  To minimise the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are Winsorised at the top 1% and bottom 99%. 
This treatment of outliers follows previous earnings management literature (e.g.Alhadab et al., 2016; Zalata & 
Roberts, 2017).  
 N Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum 
ADISACC 591 0.0477 0.0433 0.0001 0.2365 
NEG 591 0.1506 0.3580 0.0000 1.0000 
ASGR   591 0.0803 0.1561 -0.2245 0.7424 
CFL   591 0.1067 0.1162 -0.1941 0.4141 
ROA 591 0.0839 0.1013 -0.1813 0.3642 
SEO 591 0.0152 0.1226 0.0000 1.0000 
LEVE 591 0.1011 0.1360 0.0000 0.5697 
LAGE   591 2.6238 0.8812 0.6931 3.9890 
COMLX 591 0.4501 0.4979 0.0000 1.0000 
LOGA 591 14.1985 1.5523 11.0870 19.4204 
BIGAUD 591 0.5736 0.4950 0.0000 1.0000 
DELO 591 0.1675 0.3737 0.0000 1.0000 
ADISACC: absolute discretionary accruals; NEG: negative income; ASGR: assets growth; 
CFL: ratio of operating cash flow; ROA: return on assets; SEO: seasoned equity offering; 
LEVE: leverage; LAGE: log of firm’s age; COMLX: complexity; LOGA: log of total 
assets - firm size; BIGAUD: Big 4 auditors; DELO: Deloitte auditor. 
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that some firms do not manage earnings. Using a sample of 337 observations from Saudi 
Arabia, Habbash and Alghamdi (2016) report that the mean value of absolute 
discretionary accruals is 0.103, with a minimum value of zero and a maximum value of 
0.782. They also report a standard deviation of 0.140, which is higher than the value 
reported in the current study. This indicates that the variation in absolute discretionary 
accruals in their sample is far higher than in this sample. The mean value of Big 4 auditors 
is 0.5736, which indicates that 57.36% (339 observations) of the firm-year observations 
in the sample were audited by one of the Big 4. The mean value of Big 4 auditors in this 
study is close to the values reported by Habbash and Alghamdi (2016) and Gomaa (2013), 
which were 60.8% and 64.1%, respectively. The mean value of Deloitte auditor is 0.1675, 
which indicates that 16.75% (99 observations) of the firm-year observations in the sample 
were audited by Deloitte. This also indicates that around 29% of the firms audited by the 
Big 4 were audited by Deloitte.   
The descriptive statistics of firm characteristics used as control variables in the first model 
are as follows. Negative income (NEG) has a minimum value of ‘0’ and a maximum value 
of ‘1’, as it is a dummy variable. The mean value of NEG is 0.1506, which indicates that 
15.06% of the firms in the sample reported negative income. The mean value of NEG is 
lower than the value of 24% reported by (Francis & Yu, 2009). Assets growth (ASGR) 
has a mean value of 0.0803, which indicates the average growth of assets in the study 
sample is 8.03%. The minimum and maximum values of ASGR are -0.2245 and 0.7424, 
respectively. The value of the mean is close to the value of 0.0723 reported by Boone et 
al. (2015).  
Ratio of operating cash flow (CFL) has a mean value of 0.1067, which is close to the 
value of 0.086 reported by Habbash and Alghamdi (2016). The minimum value of CFL 
is also close to the value of -0.199 reported by them. However, the maximum value in 
this study is higher than the value of 0.361 reported in their study. Return on assets (ROA) 
121 
 
has a mean value of 0.0.0839, with a minimum value of -0.1813 and a maximum value 
of 0.3642. The mean value of ROA is higher than the value of 0.069 reported by(Habbash 
& Alghamdi, 2016). The seasoned equity offering (SEO) has a minimum value of zero 
and a maximum value of 1, as it is a dummy variable. The mean value of SEO is 0.0152, 
which indicates that 1.5% of the firms in the sample raised capital. Nevertheless, the mean 
value of SEO is far lower than the value of 0.17 reported by Francis et al. (1999).  
The mean value of leverage (LEVE) is 0.1011, which indicates that, on average, 10.11% 
of total assets were funded from long-term debt in the study sample. However, the table 
shows the existence of a large variation in LEVE, with a minimum of zero and a 
maximum of 0.5697, which is close to the finding of (Habbash & Alghamdi, 2016). 
Log of firm’s age (LAGE) has a mean value of 2.6238, with a minimum of 0.6931 and a 
maximum of 3.9890. The mean value of LAGE is close to the value of 2.6510 reported 
by Shust (2015). The mean value of complexity (COMLX) is 0.4501, which indicates 
that 45.01% of the firms in the study sample have at least one subsidiary firm. COMLX 
has a minimum value of zero and a maximum value of 1, as it is a dummy variable. The 
mean of this variable is almost the same as the value of 0.44 obtained by (Habbash & 
Alghamdi, 2016). Log of total assets (LOGA) has a mean value of 14.1985, with a 
minimum of 11.0870 and a maximum of 19.4204. The mean value of LOGA is higher 
than the value of 9.239 reported by (Habbash & Alghamdi, 2016). The maximum and 
minimum values of LOGA are 19.420 and 11.087, respectively, which are higher than 
the values reported by Habbash and Alghamdi (2016). 
6.2.2 Correlation matrix 
A problem of collinearity exists because of a high correlation among pairs of  independent 
variables (Gujarati, 2004). This problem leads to the inability to isolate the effects of an 
independent variable that is correlated with another independent variable (Hill, Griffiths, 
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& Lim, 2014). Acock (2008) also argues that estimates might not be reliable when 
multicollinearity exists. 
Using a correlation matrix is one statistical way to detect multicollinearity. The 
correlation matrix will also show the direction of the correlation between a pair of 
variables, as well as its strength. Variables are considered to be highly correlated when 
the correlation coefficient is greater than 0.80 (Gujarati, 2004). Therefore, if a correlation 
coefficient is less than 0.80, it can be said to fall within an acceptable level of 
multicollinearity. However, a correlation matrix does not detect any hidden correlation 
between independent variables (see the next section for more details). 
Table 7 shows the Pearson’s correlation matrix for all the variables, dependent and 
independent. As can be seen in the table, the highest correlation coefficient is 0.67 and is 
relatively far from 0.8, which indicates no multicollinearity among the variables in the 
model.  
The results show that a significant positive correlation exists between the dependent 
variable absolute discretionary accruals (ADISACC) and asset growth (ASGR), which 
indicates that firms that are in growth engage in earnings management. Moreover, the 
results show that a significant negative correlation exists between the dependent variable 
(ADISACC) and operating cash flow (CFL), which indicates that the better performance, 
the less engagement of earnings management. Also, there is a negative association 
between ADISACC and firm size, which indicates that firms that large in size do not 
engage in earnings management as they might be monitored indirectly by outsiders such 
as financial analysts.  
In terms of the main test variable of the Big 4 (BIGAUD), there is a significant positive 
correlation between BIGAUD and leverage (LEVE), which indicates that firms that have 
long term debt intend to hire one the Big 4 accounting firm. Also, there is a significant 
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positive correlation between BIGAUD and complexity (COMLX), which indicates that 
firms that have at least on subsidiary intend to hire one the Big 4 accounting firm. The 
results show that there is a significant positive correlation between BIGAUD and the log 
of total assets (LOGA), which indicates that firms that are large in size intend to hire one 
of the Big 4 accounting firms, as the Big 4 may have enough employees and resources to 
achieve the auditing work on time. The results show that there is a significant negative 
correlation between Deloitte (DELO) and log of age, which indicates that new listed firms 
intend to higher Deloitte. 
The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between leverage (LEVE) 
and the log of total assets at 59% (1% significance level), which indicates that big firms 
tend to rely on long-term debt to fund asset purchases.   
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                Table 7 Pearson’s correlation matrix for the audit quality sample  
 
  ADISACC NEG ASGR  CFL  ROA SEO LEVE LAGE  COMLX LOGA BIGAUD DELO 
ADISACC* 1 -0.04 0.15** -0.19** -0.03 0.07 -0.13** -0.03 0.02 -0.18** -0.10* -0.03 
NEG  1 -0.27** -0.35** -0.59** 0.06 0.06 0.09* -0.07* -0.18** -0.11** 0.00 
ASGR     1 0.05 0.30** 0.33** 0.16** -0.18** 0.16** 0.14** 0.15** 0.09* 
CFL      1 0.67** -0.06 -0.12 0.01 -0.09* 0.14** 0.07 0.06 
ROA     1 -0.08 -0.18** 0.02 -0.05 0.14** 0.07 0.03 
SEO      1 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 
LEVE       1 -0.21** 0.28** 0.59** 0.33** -0.03 
LAGE          1 -0.27** -0.11** 0.33** -0.23** 
COMLX         1 0.42** 0.38** 0.06 
LOGA          1 0.49** 0.05 
BIGAUD           1 0.39** 
DELO            1 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.  
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  
 Variables definitions are listed in table 6. 
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6.2.3 Normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation  
One of the OLS assumptions is the normal distribution of residuals; this study does not 
meet this assumption. However, this does not prevent the researcher using OLS to test the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables, as Hill, Griffiths, and Lim 
(2008) argue that consideration of this assumption is optional. They state that “the 
normality of least squares is of great importance in many aspects of statistical inference 
.... if the sample size is sufficient large26 then the least squares estimators have a 
distribution that approximates the normal distribution” (p. 33). Moreover, Gujarati (2004) 
points out that there is no need to meet the normality assumption “if our sole objective is 
point estimation of the parameters of the regression models”(p. 248). However, he also 
points out this assumption must be met if we make inferences from OLS. Gujarati (2009) 
states that when the assumptions of normality are met, “we can draw inferences about the 
true values of population” (p. 9). Therefore, as no inferences are made in this study and 
the object is to test the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, the 
assumption of the normal distribution of residuals is ignored. Furthermore, t-tests can be 
used to test the significance of the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables, as Gujarati (2004) states that “the usual test procedures—the t and F tests—are 
still valid asymptotically, that is, in the large sample, but not in the finite or small 
samples” (p. 338). OLS still contains the best unbiased estimators (BUE) (Gujarati, 2009). 
Another way of detecting multicollinearity is by running several auxiliary regressions. 
According to this method, each of the predictor variables is regressed on all the other 
predictor variables. Adkins and Hill (2012, p. 205) state that “Although no two variables 
may be highly correlated, several variables may be linearly related in ways that are not 
apparent”. Therefore, this method is more effective than Pearson’s correlation, as it 
                                                           
26  Hill et al. (2008) mention that some statisticians would say 30 observations is sufficient large, others 
would say 50 observations.       
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detects any hidden correlation between predictor variables. According to Adkins and Hill 
(2012), if R-squared is higher than 0.8, this is an indicator of strong collinearity. As can 
be seen from Table 8, the highest R-squared value in the auxiliary regressions is 65%, 
which indicates that it is free from high multicollinearity. 






This study examines for heteroscedasticity, which occurs when the variance of the 
residuals is not constant (Hill et al., 2008). The importance of examining for the existence 
of heteroscedasticity is explained by Hill et al. (2008), who point out that “the least 
squares estimator is still a linear and unbiased estimator, but is no longer best” (p. 201). 
Moreover, they state that “the hypothesis tests that use these standard errors may be 
misleading” (p. 201). In line with their suggestion of testing for heteroscedasticity, this 
study uses the White test. The p-values of the White test for both models (1 and 2; see 
sections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5) are 0.7287 and 0.5432, respectively, which leads to retaining the 
null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogeneous in both models. In other 
words, the models are free from heteroscedasticity. 
This study examines for autocorrelation, as Hill et al. (2008) contend that the least squares 
estimator is inefficient and, therefore, hypothesis testing is no longer valid when 
autocorrelation exists in a model. Following their suggestion in testing for 
autocorrelation, this study uses the Durbin–Watson test. The statistical values of the 
Durbin–Watson test for both models (1 and 2; see sections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5) are 1.981 and 
Auxiliary regressions R-squared 
Model 1 0.33 
Model 2 0.49 
Model 3 0.65 
Model 4 0.46 
Model 5 0.14 
Model 6 0.50 
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2.043, respectively, which leads to retaining the null hypothesis that the variance of the 
residuals is uncorrelated. This is in line with Hill et al. (2008), who contend that if the 
value of this test is close or equal to 2, it indicates that the errors are uncorrelated. 
6.2.4 Model 1: Big 4 audit firms vs non-Big 4 audit firms (H1) 
6.2.4.1 Multiple regression analysis  
This research adopts OLS regression to test the role of Big 4 firms in mitigating 
discretionary accruals in Saudi Arabia. Table 9 shows that the overall model is 
statistically significant, as the F-value is 4.93 with a P-value of 0.00. The value of adjusted 
R-squared is 13%. The adjusted R-squared of this model is higher than the value of 8% 
reported by Becker et al. (1998). It is also higher than the value of 9% reported by 
Habbash and Alghamdi (2016). However, it is lower than the value of 18.3% reported by 
Boone et al. (2015). As shown in the table, the highest variance inflation factor (VIF) 
value is 3.141 for the control variable ROA. According to Gujarati (2004), the existence 
of multicollinearity between explanatory variables is low when the VIF is less than 10. 
This is a third confirmation that multicollinearity does not exist in this model. In the 
previous section, the Pearson’s correlation matrix table and auxiliary regressions also 
confirm that the explanatory variables are not strongly correlated. 
Table 9 shows that the coefficient of the Big 4 auditors (BIGAUD) is not statistically 
significant at all the levels considered (1%, 5% and 10%). This implies acceptance of H1, 
which states that there are no differences in audit quality in firms audited by the Big 4 
compared with firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors. The result is inconsistent with agency 
theory, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory. Therefore, in Saudi Arabia, the external 
auditor is not one of the monitoring devices recognised by agency theory as mitigating 
conflicts between managers and shareholders and reducing agency costs. Furthermore, 
Big 4 auditors do not function as a tool to balance the different interests among 
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stakeholders, as Collier  )2008(  suggests. Legitimacy theory suggests the use of Big N 
auditors as a legitimation tool; however, the result in current study shows the reverse.     
The result is consistent with the result found by Habbash and Alghamdi (2016), who test 
the role of the Big 4 in mitigating earnings management in Saudi Arabia for the period 
2006–2009. The result is also consistent with the finding of (Gomaa, 2013), who tests the 
role of the Big 4 in mitigating earnings management in 72 firms in Saudi Arabia in 2008–
2012. Furthermore, the result is also consistent with the finding of Haniffa et al. (2006) 
for the main Malaysian market, Yasar (2013) in the Turkish context, Piot and Janin (2007) 
for the French stock market, Tsipouridou and Spathis (2012) in Greece, and Jeong and 
Rho (2004) for the Korean stock market. 
The results of this study contradict the findings in a set of prior pieces of research, for 
instance, Becker et al. (1998) and Francis et al. (1999) in the US, Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2008) in private firms in European countries, Alzoubi (2016) in the Amman 
Stock Exchange, and Khalil and Ozkan (2016) in the Egyptian context.  
In terms of the control variables, four variables are statistically significant: assets growth 
(ASGR), operating cash flow (CFL), return on assets (ROA) and leverage (LEVE). The 
rest of the control variables are statistically insignificant: negative income (NEG), 
seasoned equity offering (SEO), log of firm age (LAGE), complexity (COMLX) and log 
of total assets (LOGA). 
The association between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and assets growth 
(ASGR) is statistically significant and positive at the 1% level, which indicates that firms 
with growth in total assets tend to engage in earnings management. This finding is 
consistent with Boone et al. (2015), who find growth has a positive relationship between 
absolute value of discretionary accruals and assets growth in the US. Moreover, Francis 
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and Michas (2013), Francis and Dechun (2008) and Gul et al. (2009) provide evidence of 
a positive association between growth and absolute discretionary accruals.  
Table 9 Regression result of absolute discretionary accruals for Big 4 audit firms vs 
non-Big 4 audit firms (H1) 
 
The ratio of operating cash flow (CFL) is negatively correlated with absolute 
discretionary accruals at the 1% level of significance. This result is consistent with 
numerous studies, such as Dechow (1994), Becker et al. (1998), Francis and Dechun 
(2008), Gul et al. (2009), Myers et al. (2003), Minutti-Meza (2013), Boone et al. (2015) 
and Habbash and Alghamdi (2016). The result indicates that firms with higher operating 
Variables 
Unstandardised 
coefficients   
Collinear
ity 
statistics Expected  
direction 
B Std. error t Sig VIF 
(Constant) 0.090 0.023 3.960 0.000 0.000  
BIGAUD -0.006 0.004 -1.460 0.146 1.563 - 
NEG 0.006 0.006 1.040 0.300 1.674 + 
ASGR   0.040 0.014 2.850 0.005 1.719 + 
CFL   -0.095 0.021 -4.580 0.000 2.115 - 
ROA 0.049 0.029 1.690 0.092 3.141 + 
SEO 0.000 0.015 0.010 0.992 1.255 + 
LEVE -0.029 0.017 -1.650 0.100 2.010 + 
LAGE   -0.003 0.002 -1.380 0.167 1.364 - 
COMLX 0.006 0.004 1.410 0.159 1.476 + 




Dependent variable: ADISACC (absolute discretionary 
accruals) 
 









cash flow engage less in earnings manipulation. In other words, high cash flow is an 
indicator of better performance (Frankel et al., 2002).  
With respect to return on assets (ROA), the results show that absolute discretionary 
accruals are positively associated with return on assets. This reveals that firms with a high 
return on assets engage in earnings management. However, this result cannot indicate the 
exact relationship with income-increasing or income-decreasing activities, as 
discretionary accruals are unsigned, section 6.2.4.2 examines this issue in detail. The 
study’s finding inconsistent with (Habbash & Alghamdi, 2016). 
The above result shows that leverage (LEVE) is negatively correlated with absolute 
discretionary accruals (at the 10% level of confidence). This indicates that, on average, 
firms with long-term debt engage less in earnings management. The sign of the relation 
in this study contrasts with that found in some studies, such as Klein (2002) and Chen et 
al. (2011). However, the sign of the relation is consistent with the finding of Francis and 
Dechun (2008). On the other hand, some studies find no relationship between leverage 
and discretionary accruals, such as Habbash and Alghamdi (2016), Boone et al. (2015) 
and  Krishnan (2003a). 
6.2.4.2 Additional analysis  
6.2.4.2.1 Signed discretionary accruals 
In the main analyses, the absolute value of discretionary accruals is used to measure 
earnings quality instead of discretionary accruals, which captures the joint effect of 
positive and negative earnings management decisions (Gul et al., 2009). Hribar and Craig 
Nichols (2007) argue that a joint effect may bias the test to reject the null hypothesis. 
Following this argument and previous studies that used the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals as a proxy for earnings management (e.g.Gul et al., 2009; Myers et al., 2003), 
the sample is divided into two sub-samples. The first sample contains firms with positive 
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discretionary accruals and the second comprises firms with negative discretionary 
accruals. This division is undertaken to examine if differences exist in the relationships 
between audit quality and discretionary accruals based on the sign of engagement in 
earnings management. 
 Table 10 shows the results of the multiple regression analyses for both positive and 
negative discretionary accruals. The results indicate that the models are statistically 
significant, as the P-value is 0.00 for both models. The adjusted R-squared of the positive 
discretionary accruals model is 41%, whereas the adjusted R-squared of the negative 
discretionary accruals is 24%. This indicates that these models are better at explaining the 
variation in discretionary accruals (dependent variable), as the adjusted R-squared of both 
models is higher than in the absolute discretionary accruals model.  
Surprisingly, the coefficient for the Big 4 (BIGAUD) is not statistically significant in the 
positive model at any of the levels of significance considered (1%, 5% and 10%). This is 
statistical evidence that Big 4 firms are less effective at mitigating income-increasing 
activities in Saudi Arabia. Financial statements audited by Big 4 firms do not differ from 
those audited by non-Big 4 firms in terms of constraining income-increasing activities. 
This finding contradicts the notion that Big N auditors curb earnings management and 
that they are more conservative regarding positive earnings management. Studies such as 
Houqe et al. (2017) and Chen et al. (2011) find the opposite. However, this result is 
consistent with the finding of Habbash and Alghamdi (2016). Moreover, this result is 
consistent with that obtained by Idris (2012), who provides evidence that Big 5 firms do 
not curb positive earnings management in the manufacturing sector in the capital market 
in Jordan. Moreover, this result is in line with that reported by Myers et al. (2003), who 
find that Big N auditors mitigate discretionary accruals in the main analysis, whereas this 
finding does not hold when dividing the sample based on the sign of the discretionary 
accruals. They find that the Big N coefficient is not statistically significant with positive 
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discretionary accruals, whereas Big N is statistically significant with negative 
discretionary accruals, which indicates that the main finding is driven by the role of Big 
N auditors in curbing negative discretionary accruals. In addition, Ashbaugh, LaFond, 
and Mayhew (2003) find that the coefficient of the Big 5 variable in their positive 
discretionary accruals result is not statistically significant, which is consistent with the 
result of this study. 
Table  10  Regression result of signed discretionary accruals for Big 4 audit firms vs 
non-Big 4 audit firms (H1) 
                                                           




Negative                                
discretionary accruals *(-1)27 
B t Sig. B t Sig. 
(Constant) 0.028 0.820 0.413 0.064 2.490 0.013 
BIGAUD -0.002 -0.410 0.679 -0.012 -2.270 0.024 
NEG -0.014 -1.700 0.090 0.006 0.880 0.381 
ASGR   0.016 0.830 0.409 0.023 1.370 0.171 
CFL   -0.336 -11.760 0.000 0.242 7.090 0.000 
ROA 0.194 5.330 0.000 -0.232 -5.480 0.000 
SEO 0.015 0.820 0.414 0.016 0.720 0.473 
LEVE -0.014 -0.660 0.509 -0.025 -1.140 0.257 
LAGE   0.001 0.450 0.653 -0.003 -1.200 0.231 
COMLX -0.003 -0.580 0.564 0.010 2.100 0.036 
LOGA 0.003 1.070 0.287 -0.002 -1.030 0.305 
Dummies  Years and industries Years and industries 
Adjusted  
R-squared 0.41 0.24 
R-squared 0.46 0.29 
F-value 9.57 5.12 
F-sig. 0.00 0.00 
Observation 282 309 
Dependent variable: DISACC (discretionary accruals). 
Variables definitions are listed in table 6. 
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In terms of the Big 4 coefficient (BIGAUD) in the negative model, it is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This indicates that Big 4 auditors are more effective at 
mitigating income-decreasing than income-increasing activities. This result shows that 
the BIGAUD coefficient in the absolute discretionary accruals model is driven by positive 
discretionary accruals, which are not statistically significant in the positive discretionary 
accruals model. This result is in line with that reported by Myers et al. (2003), who find 
Big N auditors constrain negative discretionary accruals for both long-term and current 
discretionary accruals. This result is also consistent with that obtained by Idris (2012), 
who provides evidence that Big 5 firms curb negative earnings management in the 
manufacturing sector in the capital market in Jordan. However, this result is inconsistent  
with that obtained by Habbash and Alghamdi (2016), who find no role for the Big 4 in 
Saudi Arabia in curbing both positive and negative discretionary accruals. Moreover, 
Chen et al. (2011) provide evidence from the Chinese market that Big 8 firms are less 
effective at mitigating negative discretionary accruals. This finding is also inconsistent 
with the result reported by Ashbaugh et al. (2003). 
With regard to the control variables, the NEG coefficient is associated negatively with 
positive discretionary accruals. This indicates that firms that reported a loss engage less 
in earnings management. This result is consistent with that obtained by Francis and Yu 
(2009). Nevertheless, Chen et al. (2011) provide evidence that is contradictory to the 
finding of this result. However, the NEG coefficient is not statistically significant in the 
negative discretionary accruals model. The coefficient of cash flow from operating 
activities (CFL) and return on assets (ROA) is statistically significant in both models. 
6.2.4.2.2 Alternative proxy for earnings management   
Teoh et al. (1998b) argue that managers have more flexibility in managing current 
accruals than long-term accruals. The ease of discretion in current accruals is related to 
daily firm operations. For instance, managers have discretion over how much and when 
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to write off bad loans. Dechow (1994) also contends that the manipulation of total 
accruals comes from the current accruals component. Therefore, this study applies the 
current accruals version of the model by Kothari et al. (2005) to examine whether Big 4 
auditors in Saudi Arabia mitigate current accruals manipulation, which is consistent with  
researchers such as Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Myers et al. (2003), Kim, Chung, and Firth 
(2003), Athanasakou et al. (2009) and Cameran et al. (2015). 
Table 11 shows the results obtained from applying the current accruals version of the 
Kothari et al. (2005) model to test the role of Big 4 firms in mitigating current 
discretionary accruals in Saudi Arabia. As can be seen from the table, Big 4 auditors are 
less effective at constraining current discretionary accruals. The coefficients of Big 4 
auditors (BIGAUD) are not significant at any of the levels of significance (1%, 5% and 
10%) considered for all models: absolute current discretionary accruals, positive current 
discretionary accruals and negative current discretionary accruals. Therefore, in Saudi 
Arabia, the external auditor is not one of the monitoring devices recognised by agency 
theory as mitigating conflicts between managers and shareholders and reducing agency 
costs. The result obtained by Haniffa et al. (2006) is consistent with the finding of this 
study in this regard. The result of this study contradicts the finding of Myers et al. (2003), 
however, who document that Big N auditors curb current discretionary accruals for both 
positive and negative discretionary accruals. 
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                         Table 11 Regression results of the signed discretionary accruals alternative proxy for earnings management (H1) 
 
                                                           
28 Negative discretionary accruals are multiplied by (-1) to make the results easier to understand.  
Variables 
Absolute 
current discretionary accruals 
Positive current 
discretionary accruals 
Negative current                               
discretionary accruals *(-1)28 
B t Sig. B t Sig. B t Sig. 
(Constant) 0.062 1.740 0.082 0.074 1.550 0.123 0.010 0.190 0.849 
BIGAUD -0.003 -0.390 0.693 0.005 0.540 0.588 -0.009 -0.980 0.329 
NEG 0.013 1.410 0.159 0.009 0.690 0.489 0.019 1.400 0.163 
ASGR   0.070 3.210 0.001 0.013 0.410 0.683 0.109 3.610 0.000 
CFL   -0.003 -0.100 0.923 -0.125 -2.740 0.007 0.126 2.530 0.012 
ROA 0.003 0.060 0.954 0.162 2.490 0.013 -0.136 -2.080 0.039 
SEO 0.021 0.880 0.379 0.061 2.070 0.039 -0.032 -0.780 0.437 
LEVE -0.056 -2.090 0.037 -0.002 -0.050 0.959 -0.116 -2.760 0.006 
LAGE   -0.007 -2.050 0.041 0.002 0.420 0.677 -0.012 -2.530 0.012 
COMLX -0.003 -0.480 0.633 -0.009 -1.030 0.302 0.000 0.040 0.968 
LOGA -0.002 -0.580 0.564 -0.004 -1.160 0.248 0.003 0.680 0.500 




R-squared 0.14 0.17 0.20 
F-value 3.91 2.53 2.87 
F-sig. 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observation 591 300 291 
Variables definitions are listed in table 6. 
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6.2.4.2.3 Non-parametric test 
As mentioned in section 6.2.3, the normality assumption has not been met in this study. 
Therefore, the Wilcoxon rank sum (Mann-Whitney) test is used to verify the robustness 
of the OLS results. Doane and Seward (2018) state that the Wilcoxon test “does not 
require normality but does assume symmetric populations. It corresponds to the 
parametric t test for one mean” (p. 693). The test is used in this study to examine 
differences in the medians of absolute discretionary accruals between Big 4 and non-Big 
4 firms. Table 12 shows that the p-value of the Wilcoxon rank sum test is 0.2895, which 
suggests that there is an insignificant difference in the absolute discretionary accruals 
between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms and, therefore, leads to the acceptance of H1. 
Furthermore, the result of this test confirms the OLS result in section 6.2.4.1. 
Table 12 Result of Wilcoxon rank sum test for (H1) 
Hypothesis  Statistic Value p-value 
Big 4 audit firms vs non-
Big 4 audit firms (H1) 
1.0592 0.2895 
 
6.2.5 Model 2: Deloitte audit firm vs the other Big 3 audit firms (H2) 
6.2.5.1 Multiple regression analysis 
Table 13 shows the output of the OLS regression used to test the audit quality of Deloitte 
compared with the rest of the Big 4 in Saudi Arabia. In this model, the sample is restricted 
to the Big 4 auditors, following studies such as Boone et al. (2015), Cahan and Zhang 
(2006), Gul et al. (2009) and Johnson et al. (2002). Excluding non-Big 4 firms from the 
sample allows examination of characteristics of the auditors that differ within firms of the 
same size (Johnson et al., 2002). In addition, excluding non-Big 4 firms allows 
examination of accruals differences that “reflect auditor conservatism rather than quality 
differences between Big 4 firms and non-Big 4 firms” (Cahan & Zhang, 2006, p. 58). 
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Craswell et al. (1995) show that Big 6 firms assign more resources to training their staff 
and developing their expertise. Because of the size of the Big 6 firms, Krishnan (2003b) 
believes that they are able to induce their clients to adopt better accounting practices.  
Table 13 shows that the overall model is statistically significant, as the F-value is 3.82 
and the P-value is 0.00. The value of adjusted R-squared is 16%. The adjusted R-squared 
of this model is higher than the value of 13.5% reported by Gul et al. (2009). It is also 
higher than the value of 8.3% reported by (Cahan & Zhang, 2006). However, it is lower 
than the value of 18.3% reported by Boone et al. (2015). As shown in the table, the highest 
VIF value is 3.514 for the control variable ROA. According to Gujarati (2004), the 
existence of multicollinearity between explanatory variables is low when the VIF is less 
than 10. This is a third confirmation that multicollinearity does not exist in this model. In 
the previous section, the Pearson’s correlation matrix table and auxiliary regressions also 
confirm that explanatory variables are not strongly correlated. 
Table 13 shows that the coefficient of Deloitte is not statistically significant at any of the 
levels considered (1%, 5% and 10%). This provides statistical evidence that there are no 
differences in audit quality between Deloitte and the other Big 4 firms. This implies 
rejection of H2, which states that there are differences in audit quality between Deloitte 
and the other Big 3 audit firms. The result is consistent with Boone et al. (2015), who 
investigate the disciplinary order against Deloitte by the Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) in the US. 
In terms of the control variables, three are statistically significant: assets growth (ASGR), 
operating cash flow (CFL), and return on assets (ROA). The association between the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals and assets growth (ASGR) is statistically 
significant and positive at the 1% level, which indicates that firms with growth in total 
assets tend to engage in earnings management. This finding is consistent with Boone et 
al. (2015), who find growth has a positive relationship between absolute value of 
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discretionary accruals and assets growth in the US. Moreover, Francis and Michas (2013), 
Francis and Dechun (2008) and Gul et al. (2009) provide evidence of a positive 
association between assets growth and absolute discretionary accruals. Moreover, this 
result is consistent with model 1, which indicates that growth firms in Saudi Arabia 
engage in earnings management regardless of the size of the external auditor (Big 4 or 
non-Big 4). 
Table  13  Regression results for the absolute discretionary accruals for Deloitte audit 
firm vs the other Big 3 audit firms (H2) 
 
Operating cash flow (CFL) is negatively correlated with absolute discretionary accruals 
at the 1% level of significance, which is consistent with the result of model 1. This result 
Variables 
Unstandardised 
coefficients   
Collinearity 
statistics Expected  
direction 
B Std. error t Sig. VIF 
(Constant) 0.052 0.030 1.770 0.079 0.000  
Deloitte -0.002 0.005 -0.440 0.661 1.208 + 
NEG 0.005 0.007 0.660 0.512 1.569 + 
ASGR   0.054 0.016 3.480 0.001 1.745 + 
CFL   -0.108 0.027 -4.020 0.000 2.829 - 
ROA 0.073 0.034 2.130 0.034 3.514 + 
SEO -0.005 0.016 -0.340 0.737 1.291 + 
LEVE -0.024 0.017 -1.380 0.168 1.971 + 
LAGE   -0.002 0.002 -0.990 0.324 1.497 - 
COMLX 0.002 0.004 0.470 0.639 1.197 + 




Dependent variable: ADISACC (absolute discretionary 
accruals). 









is consistent with numerous studies, such as (Dechow, 1994), Becker et al. (1998), Francis 
and Dechun (2008), Gul et al. (2009), Myers et al. (2003), Minutti-Meza (2013), Boone 
et al. (2015) and Habbash and Alghamdi (2016). The result indicates that firms with 
higher operating cash flow engage less in earnings manipulation. In other words, high 
cash flow is an indicator of better performance (Frankel et al., 2002). On the other hand, 
a few studies find that operating cash flow (CFL) is not statistically significant with 
absolute discretionary accruals. For instance, Chen et al. (2011) find that this kind of 
association does not exist in the Chinese market. In addition, Haniffa et al. (2006) provide 
evidence of the same result as Chen et al. (2011) in the Malaysian market. 
This result shows that return on assets (ROA) is negatively correlated with absolute 
discretionary accruals (at the 5% level of confidence). This indicates that, on average, 
firms with a low ROA engage less in earnings management. This result is consistent with 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010). However, this finding is consistent with (Habbash & 
Alghamdi, 2016). 
6.2.5.2 Additional analysis  
6.2.5.2.1 Signed discretionary accruals 
Table 14 presents the results of the multiple regression analyses for both positive and 
negative discretionary accruals, which indicate that the models are statistically significant 
as the P-value is 0.00 for both models. The adjusted R-squared of the positive 
discretionary accruals model is 52%, whereas the adjusted R-squared of the negative 
discretionary accruals is 26%. This indicates that positive models are more effective at 
explaining the variation in discretionary accruals (dependent variable), as the adjusted R- 
squared of the model is higher than for the absolute discretionary accruals model. 
The coefficient of Deloitte is not statistically significant in either model at all levels of 
significance (1%, 5% and 10%). This is statistical evidence that audit quality does not 
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differ between Deloitte and the other Big 4 firms in relation to income-increasing or 
income-decreasing activities. The result is consistent with Boone et al. (2015), who 
investigate the disciplinary order against Deloitte by the PCAOB in the US. However, 
this result is inconsistent with the finding of Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008), who 
provide evidence that firms audited by Arthur Andersen engaged in earnings management 
compared with other Big 5 auditors.   
With regard to the control variables, the coefficient of assets growth (ASGR) is associated 
negatively with negative discretionary accruals. This indicates that growth firms engage 
in negative earnings management, which is inconsistent with the argument of Matsumoto 
(2002) that  managers in growth firms engage in accruals income-increasing activities to 
evade unexpected income loss. The coefficient of the ratio of operating cash flow (CFL) 
and return on assets is statistically significant in both models, as it is found in the Big 4 












Table 14 Regression result for the signed discretionary accruals for Deloitte audit firm 
vs the other Big 3 audit firms (H2)  
 
6.2.5.2.2 Alternative discretionary accrual measures   
Table 15 shows the results obtained from applying the current accruals version of the 
Kothari et al. (2005) model to examine if there is any difference between Deloitte and the 
other Big 4 firms in Saudi Arabia. The table shows the coefficients of Deloitte are not 
significant at any of the levels of significance (1%, 5% and 10%) for all the models: 
absolute current discretionary accruals, positive current discretionary accruals, and 
                                                           




Negative                                
discretionary accruals *(-1)29 
B t Sig. B t Sig. 
(Constant) 0.027 0.610 0.543 0.026 0.800 0.424 
Deloitte 0.001 0.230 0.822 -0.005 -0.970 0.333 
NEG -0.010 -1.060 0.290 0.001 0.130 0.896 
ASGR   0.010 0.500 0.619 0.042 2.260 0.025 
CFL   -0.420 -10.670 0.000 0.292 6.570 0.000 
ROA 0.278 6.680 0.000 -0.275 -5.350 0.000 
SEO 0.013 0.690 0.493 0.035 1.650 0.101 
LEVE -0.002 -0.090 0.928 -0.018 -0.850 0.399 
LAGE   0.004 1.410 0.160 -0.004 -1.480 0.140 
COMLX -0.009 -1.650 0.102 0.006 1.310 0.192 
LOGA 0.001 0.430 0.671 -0.002 -0.890 0.377 
Dummies  Years and industries Years and industries 
Adjusted  
R-squared 0.52 0.26 
R-squared 0.59 0.36 
F-value 8.36 3.76 
F-sig. 0.00 0.00 
Observation 160 179 
Dependent variable: DISACC (discretionary accruals). 
Variables definitions are listed in table 6. 
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negative current discretionary accruals. This finding is consistent with previous models, 
which indicates that the Deloitte office does not differ from the rest of the Big 4 in terms 











          Table  15  Regression results of the signed discretionary accruals alternative proxy for earnings management (H2) 
 
                                                           
30 Negative discretionary accruals are multiplied by (-1) to make the results easier to understand.  
Variables 
Absolute  
  current discretionary accruals 
Positive 
current discretionary accruals 
Negative current                               
discretionary accruals *(-1)30 
B t Sig. B t Sig. B t Sig. 
(Constant) 0.051 1.240 0.215 0.071 1.280 0.202 -0.016 -0.250 0.801 
Deloitte 0.010 1.370 0.173 0.010 0.920 0.359 0.017 1.610 0.109 
NEG 0.024 2.040 0.043 0.030 1.790 0.075 0.019 1.090 0.278 
ASGR   0.078 3.110 0.002 0.042 1.070 0.285 0.090 2.600 0.010 
CFL   0.034 0.780 0.436 -0.025 -0.420 0.679 0.096 1.350 0.178 
ROA 0.008 0.150 0.883 0.104 1.370 0.172 -0.079 -0.900 0.369 
SEO 0.006 0.220 0.827 0.035 1.000 0.320 -0.003 -0.060 0.954 
LEVE -0.026 -0.940 0.349 0.001 0.020 0.987 -0.063 -1.470 0.143 
LAGE   -0.006 -1.500 0.134 0.000 -0.060 0.950 -0.008 -1.530 0.129 
COMLX -0.005 -0.730 0.465 -0.012 -1.230 0.221 0.001 0.080 0.934 
LOGA -0.001 -0.320 0.751 -0.003 -0.620 0.537 0.003 0.690 0.493 




R-squared 0.25 0.23 0.38 
F-value 4.68 1.97 4.1 
F-sig. 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Observation 339 168 171 
Variables definitions are listed in table 6. 
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6.2.4.2.3 Non-parametric test 
As section 6.2.3 states, the normality assumption has not been met in this study, so the 
Wilcoxon rank sum (Mann-Whitney) test is used to verify the robustness of the OLS 
results. The test is used to examine differences in the medians of absolute discretionary 
accruals between Deloitte and the other Big 3 audit firms. Table 16 shows that the p-value 
of the Wilcoxon rank sum test is 0.9699, which implies rejection of H2. Furthermore, the 
result of this test confirms the OLS result in section 6.2.5.1. 
Table 16 Result of Wilcoxon rank sum test for (H2) 
Hypothesis  Statistic Value p-value 
Deloitte audit firm vs the 





6.2.6 Discussion  
This study was conducted in response to the ban placed on Deloitte by the CMA in Saudi 
Arabia and re-examines the impact of the Big 4 on earnings management. Unlike previous 
studies that examine audit quality in Saudi Arabia, the sample of this study covers the 
entire period in which data became available, from 2004 to 2014. As mentioned in chapter 
3 section 3.6, these studies have some weaknesses in their methodology. This study, 
therefore, adopts a different methodology by controlling for SEO and excluding the lock-
up period when estimating discretionary accruals. Moreover, this study examines whether 
the audit quality of Deloitte differs from that of the rest of the Big 4. This study uses long-
term and current discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. 
The finding of the above regressions analysis contrasts with the notion that Big 4 firms 
act as a deterrent to income-increasing activities. Moreover, the finding of this study is 
inconsistent with the argument of agency theory, which considers Big N as one of the 
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monitoring devices that mitigate the engagement of earnings management. Stakeholder 
theory suggests that Big 4 auditors do not function as a tool to balance the different 
interests among stakeholders whereas the result of this study shows the opposite. Also, 
legitimacy theory suggests the use of Big N auditors as a legitimation tool; however, the 
result in current study shows the reverse. This result may be explained by Alghamdi and 
Alangari (2005), who find that the professional environment is not of a high quality and 
report violations in implementing quality review programmes in audit firms, which 
indicates that the oversight mechanism of SOCPA is less effective in accounting firms. 
As the oversight mechanism is weak, auditors might not mitigate engagement in earnings 
management and, therefore, economic motivations may encourage auditors to retain 
existing clients, especially when the client is a large firm.   
Saudi Arabia has a less well-developed capital market Habbash and Alghamdi (2016) and 
has weak enforcement mechanisms, as the CMA was only recently established (2003)  
and all the rules and regulations that govern the market have been issued by the CMA. 
Moreover, the ban placed on Deloitte is the first by the CMA. Given these factors, the 
risk of litigation is less in the legal environment of Saudi Arabia, which may explain the 
less effective monitoring role of the Big 4.  
The above finding may be explained by Francis (2004, p. 352), who provides a 
counterargument for the notion that the Big 4 are concerned about their reputation as they 
provide a higher quality service, by stating that this does “not necessitate that Big 8 (now 
Big 4) audits are always superior. Individual audit failures by Big 4 firms can and do 
occur”. He also provides a counterargument for the notion that the Big 4 provide higher 
audit quality as they are sued less compared with non-Big 4 firms. Francis (2004, p. 353) 




This study finds that Big 4 auditors are more effective at mitigating the activities of 
income-decreasing than income-increasing. This finding can be interpreted by the result 
of DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), who argue that firms in financial crisis engage in 
income-decreasing to benefit from debt agreement renegotiations. Big 4 (BIGAUD) 
variable is significantly correlated with the leverage (LEVE) variable in a positive way at 
a value of 33%. Therefore, firms hire one of the Big 4 auditors to add more credibility to 
their financial statements, as lenders will then be more satisfied with the accuracy of the 
statements. Thus, Big 4 auditors are more concerned, in this case, with their reputation. 
Another possible explanation is that lenders force firms to hire one of the Big 4 auditors 
to satisfy themselves with regard to the accuracy of the statements that are used in order 
to take the decision of lending money to the firm.  
As the Big 4 do not curb positive earnings manipulation and the audit quality of Deloitte 
does not vary from the rest of the Big 4, this could be an explanation of the banning of 
Deloitte because of the collapse of the Al-Mojil Group, as there is evidence that Deloitte 
did not prevent its clients from engaging in income-increasing activities, therefore, 
Deloitte may be accountable for the collapse of the Al-Mojil Group. Alternatively, 
Deloitte was examined by the CMA, whereas the others were not, and the CMA found 
that Deloitte violated auditing standards, which may also have been the case with the rest 
of the Big 4, as they do not mitigate engagement in upwards earnings management. 
Moreover, as this ban on Deloitte was the first imposed by the CMA since it was 
established, the CMA may have applied the highest penalties possible to send a strong 
signal to the market that it will not allow any violation of the regulations that govern listed 
firms, including auditing standards. Furthermore, the current research adopts the 
argument of Boone et al. (2015), who investigate the disciplinary order brought against 
Deloitte by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the US. As 
they find that Deloitte did not differ from the rest of the Big 4 in terms of mitigating 
147 
 
earnings management, they argue that PCAOB oversight “was focused on documentation 
and substantiation compliance rather than on a holistic assessment of Big 4 audit 
outcomes” (p. 436). The researcher of this study argues that the same might have been 
the case in the ban placed on Deloitte in Saudi Arabia, particularly in light of the recent 
establishment of the CMA (2003) and its lack of experience, as this was the first ban by 
the organisation. 
6.3 Empirical 2: Earnings Management and IPOs 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics31 
Table 17 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for all the variables (dependent, 
independent and control) used to examine earnings management and audit quality for the 
IPO sample in Saudi Arabia, in which current discretionary accruals (CURRACC) is the 
dependent variable and dummy variable for listing year (IPO_Y0), dummy variable for 
the year before the listing year (IPO_B), dummy variable for firms audited by the Big 4 
before listing (IPO_Big4)  and dummy variable for firms audited by Deloitte before listing 
(IPO_DELO) are the independent variables used in the different models. 
As shown in Table 17, the mean value of the dependent variable CURRACC is 0.0022, 
with a standard deviation of 0.1439. The table also shows the existence of a large variation 
in current discretionary accruals in the study sample, with a minimum of -0.4581 and a 
maximum of 0.4424. The mean value of IPO_Big4 is 0.4048, which indicates that 
approximately 40% of the pre-IPO financial statements were audited by one of the Big 4. 
The mean value of IPO_Big4 in this sample is lower than the value of 57.36% reported 
in the Empirical 1 sample. The mean value of IPO_DELO is 0.2083, which indicates that 
20.83% of the pre-IPO financial statements were audited by Deloitte. The mean value of 
                                                           
31  To minimise the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are Winsorised at the top 1% and bottom 99%. 




IPO_DELO in this sample is higher than the value of 16.75% reported in the sample in 
Empirical 1. IPO_Y0 is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ for a listing year and ‘0’ 
otherwise. IPO_B is a dummy variable that takes ‘1’ for a pre-listing year and ‘0’ 
otherwise. The mean of these variables is 25%, as the sample covers four years. 
Assets growth has a mean of 0.2274, with a minimum of -0.3205 and a maximum of 
1.2327. The mean of this sample is higher than the mean of the non-IPO sample, which 
is to be expected as some firms raise capital during an IPO. An IPO firm has 123.27% 
growth in assets, whereas the highest growth is 74.24% in the non-IPO sample, which is 
clearly due to capital raising during an IPO.  
 Table 17 Descriptive statistics for the IPO sample 
 
 N Mean Std. 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CURRACC 168 0.0022 0.1439 -0.4581 0.4424 
IPO_B 168 0.2500 0.4343 0.0000 1.0000 
IPO_Y0 168 0.2500 0.4343 0.0000 1.0000 
IPO_Big4 168 0.4048 0.4923 0.0000 1.0000 
IPO_DELO 168 0.2083 0.40733 0.000 1.000 
Proceed 168 0.0230 0.0995 0.0000 0.6745 
ASGR 168 0.2274 0.2687 -0.3205 1.2327 
NEG 168 0.0060 0.0772 0.0000 1.0000 
LOGA 168 13.9112 0.8182 11.9694 17.1907 
CFL   168 0.1612 0.1194 -0.1072 0.4313 
ROA 168 0.1424 0.0766 -0.0416 0.4118 
LEVE 168 0.0784 0.1108 0.0000 0.4747 
Complexity 168 0.5714 0.4964 0.0000 1.0000 
CURRACC: Current discretionary accruals; IPO_Y0: dummy variable for listing 
year; IPO_B: dummy variable for the year before the listing year; IPO_Big4: 
dummy variable for firms audited by the Big 4 before listing; IPO_DLEO:  
dummy variable for firms audited by Deloitte before listing; Proceed: IPO 
proceeds divided by average assets; ASGR: assets growth; NEG: dummy variable 
for negative income; LOGA: log of total assets; CFL: operating cash flow; ROA: 
return on assets; LEVE: leverage; LAGE: firm’s age; COMLX: complexity. 
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The mean value of NEG is 0.006, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 1, as it is a 
dummy variable. The size of the firm (log of total assets) has a mean of 13.91, whereas 
the mean of the non-IPO sample has a value of 14.19, which indicates that the size of the 
firms trading in the market is higher than for newly listed firms. The maximum value of 
firm size is 17.19, whereas the maximum of the non-IPO sample is 19.42, which is another 
indicator that trading firms are larger in size. The ratio of operating cash flow (CFL), 
scaled by average total assets, has a mean of 0.1612, with a minimum of -0.1072 and a 
maximum of 0.4313. In the non-IPO sample, the mean of CFL is 0.1067, with a minimum 
of -0.1941 and a maximum of 0.4141.  
Return on assets (ROA) has a mean value of 0.1424, with a minimum value of -0.0416 
and a maximum value of 0.4118. The mean value of ROA is close to the value of 0.0839 
obtained from the non-IPO sample, which indicates that ROA for both newly listed and 
listed firms is almost the same in the market.  
In terms of leverage (LEVE), this has a mean value of 0.0784, with a minimum of zero 
and a maximum of 0.4747. This indicates that, on average, 7.84% of total assets are 
funded from long-term debt in the IPO sample, whereas 10.11% of total assets are funded 
from long-term debt in the non-IPO sample. This indicates that IPO firms rely less on 
long-term debt to obtain assets. 
The mean value of COMLX is 0.5714, which indicates that 57.14% of firms in the IPO 
sample have at least one subsidiary firm. COMLX has a minimum value of zero and a 
maximum value of 1, as it is a dummy variable.  
6.3.2 Correlation matrix 
As mentioned previously, it is important to test the correlation matrix among the variables 
to detect the existence of a collinearity problem. Table 18 shows the Pearson’s correlation 
matrix among all the dependent and independent variables. As can be seen from the table, 
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the highest correlation coefficient is 0.60 and is far from 0.8, which indicates no 
multicollinearity exists among the variables in the model.  
The result indicates that a significant positive correlation exists between the dependent 
variable (CURRACC) and some of the independent variables, namely, year of listing 
(IPO_Y0) and cash proceeds during an IPO event (Proceed), but, by contrast, there is a 
significant negative correlation between the dependent negative income (NEG) and 
operating cash flow (CFL).      
The results show that a significant positive correlation exists between IPO_Y0 and the 
Proceed variable. This is because of cash proceeds that occur during an IPO year. A 
significant positive association also exists between IPO_Y0 and assets growth (ASGR), 
which is to be expected as some IPO firms raise capital during an IPO. 
The IPO_Big4 variable has a significant negative relationship with Proceed and LOGA 
at 19% and 20%, respectively. This indicates that some of the IPO firms that raised capital 
during an IPO selected non-Big 4 firms to audit their pre-IPO financial statements, which 
suggests that some IPO firms that are smaller in size preferred non-Big 4 firms to audit 
their pre-IPO financial statements. It is worth highlighting that there is a significant 
positive correlation between proceeds and assets growth, at 42%, as it was expected that 
this correlation must be positive because of the cash proceeds during an IPO year. As 
shown in the table, there is a significant positive correlation between leverage (LEVE) 
and size (LOGA) at 33% (1% significance level). However, this correlation is far less 
than was found in the audit quality sample (59%), which confirms that IPO firms rely on 
cash proceeds from raising capital during an IPO rather than long-term debt. 
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 Table 18 Pearson’s correlation matrix for the IPO sample
 CURRACC IPO_Y0 IPO_Y-1 IPO_Big4 Proceed ASGR NEG LOGA CFL  ROA LEVE Complexity 
CURRACC 1 0.19* -0.10 -0.03 0.32** 0.13 -0.20** 0.10 -0.27* -0.07 0.04 0.03 
IPO_Y0  1 0.33** -0.48** 0.40** 0.20** -0.04 0.10 0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.06 
IPO_B   1 -0.48** -0.13 -0.15 -0.04 0.20** -0.10 0.11 0.06 0.03 
IPO_Big4    1 -0.19** 0.01 0.09 -0.20** -0.02 0.14 -0.05 -0.05 
Proceed     1 0.42** -0.02 0.23** 0.04 -0.15 -0.02 -0.10 
ASGR      1 -0.07 0.20** 0.06 0.00 0.07 -0.11 
NEG       1 0.16* -0.17* -0.18* -0.05 0.07 
LOGA        1 
-0.13 -0.31** 0.33** 0.20** 
CFL           1 0.60** -0.14 -0.15* 
ROA          1 -0.36** -0.20 
LEVE           1 0.04 
Complexity            1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  
Variables definitions are listed in table 17. 
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6.3.3 Normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
As mentioned in section 6.2.3, this study does not meet the assumption of normality. 
However, this does not prevent the use of OLS, as no inferences are drawn from the 
models.32As mentioned in the previous section, it is important to check for 
multicollinearity by running several auxiliary regressions, as this method is more 
effective than Pearson’s correlation in detecting hidden correlations among predictor 
variables. As can be seen from Table 19, the highest R-squared value in the auxiliary 
regressions is 47%, which indicates that the model is free from a high level of 
multicollinearity. Adkins and Hill (2012) argue that a model suffers from high 
multicollinearity when the R-squared of any of the auxiliary regressions is higher than 
0.8. 






Heteroscedasticity is examined in this research, as Hill et al. (2008) point out that “the 
least squares estimator is still a linear and unbiased estimator, but is no longer best” (p. 
201). A White test is used to test for heteroscedasticity, following Hill et al.’s (2008) 
suggestion. The p-values of the White test for models 3, 4, 5 and 6 are within the range 
for retaining the null hypothesis (from 0.5586–0.6150), which leads to the statement that 
these models are free from heteroscedasticity. 
                                                           
32  See section 6.2.3 for more details about when the assumption of normality must be met. 
Auxiliary Regressions R-squared 
Model 1 0.07 
Model 2 0.23 
Model 3 0.37 
Model 4 0.47 
Model 5 0.21 
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Autocorrelation is also examined in this study, as Hill et al. (2008) contend that the least 
squares estimator is inefficient and, therefore, hypothesis testing is no longer valid when 
autocorrelation exists in a model. Following their suggestion in testing for 
autocorrelation, this study uses the Durbin–Watson test. The statistical values of the 
Durbin–Watson test for models 3, 4, 5 and 6 are within the range for retaining the null 
hypothesis (from 2.035–2.136), which leads to the statement that these models are free 
from an autocorrelation problem. 
6.3.4 Model 3: Multiple regression analysis of earnings management pre-IPO (H3) 
Table 20 shows the results of examining engagement in earnings management in a pre-
listing year by conducting a multiple regression analysis (OLS). Table 20 shows that the 
overall model is statistically significant, as the F-value is 2.48 and the P-value is 0.00. 
The value of adjusted R-squared is 16%. The adjusted R-squared of this model is higher 
than the value of 10.3% reported by Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2011), who examine Malaysian 
IPO firms. It is also higher than the values of 9.01% and 8.1% reported by Alhadab et al. 
(2016) and Rakhman (2013), respectively. It is, however, lower than the value of 18.3% 
reported by Farooq and Benali (2012). As shown in the table, the highest VIF value is 
2.48 for the control variable ROA. According to Gujarati (2004), the existence of 
multicollinearity between explanatory variables is low when the VIF is less than 10. This 
is a third confirmation that multicollinearity does not exist in this model. In the previous 
section, a Pearson’s correlation matrix table and auxiliary regressions also confirm that 
the explanatory variables are not strongly correlated. 
Table 20 shows that the coefficient of the dummy variable for the pre-listing year (IPO_B) 
is not statistically significant at any of the levels considered (1%, 5% and 10%). This 
finding indicates that Saudi IPO firms do not engage in earnings management measures 
in relation to current discretionary accruals. This finding contrasts with the hypothesis 
considered in this section (H3). It also contrasts with signalling theory, which predicts 
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that historical earnings or earnings reported in prospectuses are inflated to signal a 
promising economic future for the firm. This result is consistent with the finding of  
Roosenboom et al. (2003), who examine 65 IPO firms in the Netherlands from 1984 to 
1994 and find that IPOs do not manage earnings in pre-IPO years. This finding is also 
consistent with the result obtained by Alhadab et al. (2016), who examine IPO firms in 
the UK from 1998 to 2008 in both the main market and an alternative investment market.  
The finding of Alhadab et al. (2016) confirms the result found by Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008), who examine IPO firms in the UK from 1992 to 1999 in the main market.  
However, this finding is inconsistent with the results obtained by Rakhman (2013) in 
Indonesia, Nam et al. (2014) in the US, and Chahine et al. (2015) in the case of equity 
carve-outs33 in the US.  
In terms of the control variables, the results indicate that three of them are statistically 
significant: negative income (NEG), operating cash flow (CFL) and return on assets 
(ROA). The association between the value of current discretionary accruals and negative 
income (NEG) is statistically significant and negative at the 1% level, which indicates 
that firms with negative income tend to engage less in current earnings management. 
The ratio of operating cash flow (CFL) is negatively correlated with current discretionary 
accruals at the 1% level of significance. This result is consistent with the finding in the 
audit quality model. The result indicates that firms with a higher operating cash flow 
engage less in earnings manipulation. In other words, high cash flow is an indicator of 
better performance (Frankel et al., 2002). The association between the value of current 
discretionary accruals and ROA is statistically significant and positive at the 5% level, 
which indicates that firms with a higher ROA tend to engage in current earnings 
management. 
                                                           




Table 20 Regression results of earnings management around listing (H3) 
 
6.3.4.1 Non-parametric test 
As mentioned in section 6.3.3, the normality assumption has not been met in this study. 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to check the robustness of the OLS results. Doane 
and Seward (2018) state that this approach is used to “test the median difference in paired 
samples” (p. 693). The test is used in this sudy to examine differences in the medians of 
absolute discretionary accruals between the two years before listing. Table 21 shows that 
the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 0.2082, which suggests that there is an 
insignificant difference in the absolute discretionary accruals between the two years and 
Variables 
Unstandardised 
coefficients   
Collinearity 
statistics Expected  
direction 
B Std. error t Sig. VIF 
(Constant) -0.207 0.230 -0.900 0.370 0.000  
IPO_B -0.027 0.025 -1.060 0.289 1.133 + 
ASGR 0.038 0.045 0.840 0.400 1.433 + 
NEG -0.431 0.144 -2.990 0.003 1.194 + 
LOGA 0.018 0.016 1.130 0.260 1.697 ? 
CFL   -0.464 0.121 -3.850 0.000 2.001 - 
ROA 0.414 0.203 2.040 0.043 2.330 + 
LEVE -0.030 0.109 -0.270 0.786 1.396 + 
Complexity 0.002 0.024 0.070 0.943 1.343 + 
Dummies  Years and industries 
Dependent variable: CURRACC (current discretionary 
accruals). 









leads, therefore, to the rejection of H3. Furthermore, the result of this test confirms the 
OLS result in section 6.3.4. 
Table 21 Result of Wilcoxon signed-rank test for (H3) 
Hypothesis  Statistic Value  p-value 
earnings management pre-
IPO (H3) -101.5 0.2082 
 
 
6.3.5 Model 4: Multiple regression analysis of earnings management in an IPO year 
(H4) 
Table 22 presents the outputs of multiple regressions analysis conducted to test the 
existence of current earnings management in the year of an IPO. The results indicate that 
both models are significant, as the F-values are 2.89 (0.00) and 4.33 (0.00), respectively. 
The results also show that neither model suffers from high multicollinearity, as the VIF 
values for both models are far from 10, the threshold suggested by Gujarati (2004). 
The findings in column (1) show that the coefficient of the dummy variable for the listing 
year (IPO_Y0) is statistically significant at the 1% level. Following Armstrong et al. 
(2015), who argue that the existence of discretionary accruals in an IPO year shown in 
previous studies is due to not controlling for cash proceeds during an IPO, this research 
controls for cash proceeds. When cash proceeds are included in the model, the findings 
in column (2) indicate that the coefficient of IPO_Y0 is not statistically significant at any 
of the levels considered (1%, 5% and 10%). This implies that H4 can be rejected. This 
result is consistent with Armstrong et al. (2015, p. 2), who offer the explanation that 
“Since accruals by definition include changes in working capital, any investments in 
working capital in the same year as the IPO will mechanically increase IPO-year 
accruals”. The importance of proceeds as a control variable is obvious when adjusted R- 
squared is compared between the two models: the value increases from 20% to 31%, an 
157 
 
increase of around 55 percentage points. However, the significance of the control 
variables has not changed for the Proceed variable. The NEG and CFL variables are 
significant as they are found in the previous (pre-listing year) model. 
Table 22 Regression results of earnings management in the year of listing (H4)  
 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study in a developing country 
that applies and follows the argument of Armstrong et al. (2015). From the finding of this 
study, and the finding of Armstrong et al. (2015), all results obtained in previous research 
(e.g.Alhadab et al., 2016; Teoh et al., 1998c) are misleading, as  they do not control for 
cash proceeds during an IPO event. 
Variables 
Without proceeds (1) With proceeds (2) 
B t Sig. VIF B t Sig. VIF 
(Constant) -0.200 -0.890 0.377 0.000 -0.150 -0.720 0.475 0.000 
IPO_Y0 0.067 2.770 0.006 1.111 0.022 0.930 0.353 1.286 
Proceed - - - - 0.632 5.030 0.000 1.838 
ASGR 0.020 0.440 0.662 1.466 -0.068 -1.500 0.136 1.721 
NEG -0.440 -3.150 0.002 1.165 -0.431 -3.340 0.001 1.166 
LOGA 0.018 1.110 0.268 1.693 0.012 0.800 0.425 1.704 
CFL   -0.484 -4.090 0.000 2.009 -0.581 -5.230 0.000 2.071 
ROA 0.421 2.120 0.035 2.314 0.688 3.610 0.000 2.509 
LEVE -0.034 -0.320 0.746 1.384 0.079 0.790 0.433 1.457 
Complexity -0.003 -0.120 0.908 1.350 0.012 0.540 0.589 1.374 




R-squared 0.30 0.41 
F-value 2.89 4.33 
F-sig. 0.00 0.00 
Observation 168 168 
Dependent variable: CURRACC (current discretionary accruals). 
Variables definitions are listed in table 17. 
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 6.3.5.1 Alternative research design for earnings management in an IPO year 
Table 23 presents the results of regression analysis following the research design of  
Armstrong et al. (2015), who introduced it to IPO literature. They run their regression 
without restricting the sample to IPOs, as had been done in previous models. In other 
words, all firms (IPO and non-IPO) are included in the model. They create a dummy 
variable that takes ‘1’ if the firm is in the first year of listing and ‘0’ otherwise, and control 
for cash proceeds during the IPO. 
The purpose of running this model was to test if a different research design leads to a 
different result. The results show that the model is significant overall, as the F-value is 
2.46 and significant at the 1% level. The main variables of interest are IPO_0 and Proceed. 
In the first model, the results show that IPO firms engage in earnings management in an 
IPO year. Nevertheless, when Proceed is added to control for cash proceeds, the IPO_0 
variable becomes insignificant at all levels of significance (1%, 5% and 10%). The 
importance of controlling for proceeds is obvious, as adjusted R-squared increased from 
6% to 8%, a rise of 33 percentage points. As this research design is consistent with the 
result found in the previous model, the researcher can conclude that there is solid evidence 









Table 23  Regression results of an alternative research design for earnings management 
in an IPO year (H4) 
 
6.3.5.2 Non-parametric test 
As mentioned in section 6.3.3, the normality assumption has not been met in this study. 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to check the robustness of the OLS results. The 
test is used to examine differences in the medians of absolute discretionary accruals 
between the year before listing and the listing year. Table 24 shows that the p-value of 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 0.1147, which suggests that there is an insignificant 
difference in the absolute discretionary accruals between the year before listing and the 
Variables  
Without proceeds (1) With proceeds (2) 
B t Sig. VIF B t Sig. VIF 
(Constant) 0.047 0.920 0.360 0.000 0.062 1.210 0.228 0.000 
IPO_Y0 0.056 3.070 0.002 1.108 0.016 0.830 0.408 1.336 
Proceed - - - - 0.476 4.840 0.000 1.406 
ASGR 0.010 0.510 0.607 1.326 -0.015 -0.760 0.449 1.423 
NEG -0.020 -1.600 0.110 1.599 -0.019 -1.540 0.123 1.599 
LOGA -0.002 -0.520 0.601 2.277 -0.003 -0.890 0.373 2.289 
CFL   -0.259 -6.160 0.000 1.849 -0.276 -6.620 0.000 1.863 
ROA 0.137 2.570 0.010 2.614 0.178 3.330 0.001 2.682 
LEVE 0.038 1.050 0.293 1.878 0.059 1.630 0.103 1.905 
Complexity -0.008 -0.970 0.331 1.320 -0.004 -0.470 0.636 1.335 




R-squared 0.06 0.08 
F-value 2.46 3.32 
F-sig. 0.00 0.00 
Observation 975 975 
Dependent variable: CURRACC (current discretionary accruals). 
Variables definitions are listed in table 17. 
160 
 
listing year and leads, therefore, to the rejection of H4. Furthermore, the result of this test 
confirms the OLS result in section 6.3.5. 
Table 24 Result of Wilcoxon signed-rank test for (H4) 
Hypothesis  Statistic Value  p-value 
earnings management in an 
IPO year (H4) 126.5 0.1147 
 
6.3.6 Model 5: Multiple regression analysis of audit quality in pre-IPO years (H5) 
This research adopts OLS regression to test the role of Big 4 firms in mitigating 
discretionary accruals in a pre-IPO year in Saudi Arabia. The sample of this empirical 
analysis is restricted to the two years before an IPO to examine the difference in the audit 
quality before listing. As can be seen from Table 25, the overall model is statistically 
significant, as the F-value is 3.89 and the P-value is 0.00. The value of adjusted R-squared 
is 0.43%. The value of adjusted R-squared in this study is higher than the value of 8.4% 
reported by Vinten et al. (2005).  
The variable of interest in this regression analysis is IPO_Big4, which is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of ‘1’ if the firm is audited by one of the Big 4. The result 
shows that the IPO_Big4 variable is not statistically significant at any of the levels of 
significance considered (1%, 5% and 10%). This indicates that the Big 4 auditing firms 
in Saudi Arabia do not mitigate earnings manipulation in IPO years, which implies that 
H5 can be rejected. Chang et al. (2008) contend that IPO firms signal the quality of their 
firm by hiring one of the Big 4 firms. As the finding of this study shows the opposite, 
signalling theory does not apply in the Saudi IPO context, which indicates that the Big 4 





Table  25  Regression results of audit quality in pre-IPO years (H5) 
This finding is in line with Alhadab et al. (2016), who find that Big N firms do not curb 
earnings management activities in the UK. However, this result contrasts with the finding 
of Vinten et al. (2005), who provide evidence that Big 5 auditors mitigate earnings 
management in IPO firms. The coefficient of negative income and the ratio of cash flow 
is statistically significant, as the prior IPO models suggest. However, the coefficient of 
firm size (LOGA) is significant at the 5% level, which indicates that IPO firms of larger 
size are involved in earnings management in the years before an IPO.  
6.3.6.1 Non-parametric test 
As previously mentioned, the normality assumption has not been met in this study. Thus, 
the Wilcoxon rank sum (Mann-Whitney) test is used to verify the robustness of the OLS 
Variables 
Unstandardised 
coefficients   
Collinearity 
statistics Expected  
direction 
B Std. error t Sig. VIF 
(Constant) -0.559 0.307 -1.820 0.073 0.000  
IPO_Big4 -0.024 0.040 -0.610 0.541 1.694 - 
ASGR -0.090 0.055 -1.630 0.108 1.804 Control variable 
NEG -0.560 0.129 -4.340 0.000 1.370 Control variable 
LOGA 0.046 0.022 2.060 0.044 1.892 Control variable 
CFL   -0.574 0.152 -3.780 0.000 2.329 Control variable 
ROA 0.410 0.248 1.650 0.103 2.782 Control variable 
LEVE -0.043 0.140 -0.310 0.761 1.749 Control variable 




Dependent variable: CURRACC (current discretionary 
accruals) 









results. The test is used to examine differences in the medians of absolute discretionary 
accruals between Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms in pre-IPO years. Table 26 shows that 
the p-value of the Wilcoxon rank sum test is 0.2895, which implies rejection of H5. 
Furthermore, the result of this test confirms the OLS result in section 6.3.6. 
Table 26 Result of Wilcoxon rank sum test for (H5) 
Hypothesis  Statistic Value  p-value 
Big 4 audit firms vs non-
Big 4 audit firms in pre-




6.3.7 Model 6: Multiple regression analysis of the audit quality of Deloitte, Big 3 vs 
non-Big 4 pre-IPO years (H6) 
Table 27 shows the outputs of multiple regressions analysis conducted to test H6. The 
sample cannot be restricted to the Big 4 alone in order to make a comparison between 
Deloitte and the rest of the Big 4, due to the sample size. Therefore, the sample contains 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms. Two dummy variables were created: one for Deloitte and 
another for the rest of the Big 4. 
Table 27 shows that the overall model is statistically significant, as the F-value is 3.84 
and the P-value is 0.00. The value of adjusted R-squared is 44%, which is close to the 
value in model 5. The variable of interest in this regression analysis is IPO_DELO, which 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if the firm was audited by Deloitte. The 
results show that the IPO_DELO variable is not statistically significant at any of the levels 
of significance considered (1%, 5% and 10%). This indicates that pre-IPO firms audited 
by Deloitte did not engage in earnings management activities, which leads to a rejection 
of H6. This is consistent with the result obtained in model 2. This result is a second 
163 
 
confirmation related to the ban on Deloitte. In terms of the control variables, NEG, LOGA 
and CFL are significant, as for the finding of model 5.   
 Table 27 Regression results of the audit quality of Deloitte, Big 3 vs non-Big 4 pre-IPO 
years (H6) 
 
6.3.7.1  Non-parametric tests 
As has been mentioned, in section 6.3.3, the normality assumption has not been met in 
this study. The Wilcoxon rank sum (Mann-Whitney) test is used to check the robustness 
of the OLS results. The test is used to examine differences in the medians of absolute 
discretionary accruals between Deloitte and non-Big 3 in pre-IPO years. Table 28 shows 
Variables 
Unstandardised 
coefficients   
Collinearit
y statistics Expected  
direction 
B Std. error t Sig. VIF 
(Constant) -0.555 0.305 -1.820 0.074 0.000  
IPO_DELO -0.037 0.041 -0.920 0.361 2.839 + 
IPO_Big3 0.006 0.046 0.130 0.894 3.524 - 
ASGR -0.087 0.055 -1.580 0.119 1.807 Control variable 
NEG -0.546 0.129 -4.240 0.000 1.380 Control variable 
LOGA 0.047 0.022 2.130 0.037 1.897 Control variable 
CFL   -0.566 0.151 -3.740 0.000 2.333 Control variable 
ROA 0.383 0.247 1.550 0.127 2.802 Control variable 
LEVE -0.048 0.139 -0.340 0.734 1.750 Control variable 




Dependent variable: CURRACC (current discretionary 
accruals) 









that the p-value of the Wilcoxon rank sum test is 0.2895, which suggests that there is an 
insignificant difference in the absolute discretionary accruals between Big 4 and non-Big 
4 auditors and leads, therefore, to rejection of H6. Furthermore, the result of this test 
confirms the OLS result in section 6.3.7. 
Table 28 Result of Wilcoxon rank sum test for (H6) 
Hypothesis  Statistic Value  p-value 
 Deloitte firm vs non-Big 






6.3.9 Discussion  
This study is the first to be conducted on earnings management in the context of Saudi 
IPOs. This study finds no evidence that IPO firms engage in earnings management in 
Saudi Arabia. The number of firms that went public in Saudi Arabia between 2005 and 
2015 is 58, which is a very low figure. The Saudi market is highly liquid, as IPO firms 
are always oversubscribed. For example, the Electrical Industries Company went public 
in 2014 and was 522.7% oversubscribed.34 Another example shows that the United 
Electronics Company went public in 2011 and was 214.9% oversubscribed. 34F35 The 
researcher argues that, as only a small number of firms went public in Saudi Arabia and 
the market is characterised as being highly liquid, IPO firms in this context are not 
motivated to engage in earnings management, since investors will buy their shares 
anyway.35F36 Thus, the notion that IPOs use earnings reported in prospectuses to convey the 
impression to future investors that the firm has a promising economic future is not 
                                                           
34  See https://goo.gl/RDXnGj. 
35  See https://goo.gl/GzyqEZ. 




applicable in Saudi Arabia as there is no need to engage in earnings management to signal 
the true value of a firm due to high liquidity in the Saudi Market.  Moreover, Roosenboom 
et al. (2003, p. 255) argue that “the timing of the IPO may limit firms’ ability and need to 
make income-increasing accruals in financial statements preceding the IPO”, which could 
be another explanation for the lack of engagement in earnings management pre-IPO. 
As this study finds (in section 6.2) that there is no role for Big 4 accounting firms in 
mitigating income-increasing activities, this study confirms that there is no role for Big 4 
accounting firms in the context of IPOs, which indicates that IPOs do not use Big 4 firms 
as a signal due to the expectation of oversubscription. Therefore, the finding of this study 
is inconsistent with the argument of signalling theory, which suggests that managers of 
IPOs use historical earnings and auditor reputation as positive signals that they send to 
future investors. 
6.4 Summary 
The aim of this research is to examine audit quality in Saudi Arabia among 85 firms in 
the Kingdom. It also aims to examine earnings management and audit quality among 42   
IPO firms. The size of the auditor is used in this research as a proxy for audit quality.  The 
model generated by Kothari et al. (2005) is adopted in this research, as they demonstrate 
that the Jones and modified Jones models suffer from errors in measuring discretionary 
accruals. 
The empirical analysis shows that firms audited by one of the Big 4 auditors do not differ 
from firms audited by non-Big 4 auditors in terms of mitigating absolute discretionary 
accruals for the period from 2004 to 2014. As absolute discretionary accruals do not 
examine the effect of external auditors on the sign of discretionary accruals, the sample 
is partitioned into two sub-samples: positive discretionary accruals and negative 
discretionary accruals. In the positive sample, the results show no difference between Big 
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4 and non-Big 4 auditing firms in terms of curbing positive earnings management. 
However, this finding is contrasted when negative discretionary accruals are examined.  
The results show that Big 4 firms are more effective than non-Big 4 in constraining 
negative discretionary accruals in Saudi Arabia. This study also examines the difference 
in audit quality between the two groups using current discretionary accruals as an 
additional form of analysis. The empirical analysis from current discretionary accruals 
measurement shows that no differences exist between the Big 4 and non-Big 4 groups.  
In response to the banning of Deloitte in Saudi Arabia by the CMA, this study investigates 
if the audit quality in firms audited by Deloitte differs from firms audited by the rest of 
the Big 4. This study also examines if firms audited by Deloitte differ from firms audited 
by the other Big 4 in managing absolute, positive or negative discretionary accruals. The 
results show that the level of discretionary accruals does not vary between the Big 4 
auditors. Another confirmation comes from the regressions analysis conducted using 
current discretionary accruals. Deloitte does not differ from the rest of the Big 4 in 
constraining current discretionary accruals. 
The multiple regression analysis of IPO firms shows that Saudi IPOs are not involved in 
earnings management activities before going public, namely, in the years before listing. 
It also shows that firms do not engage in earnings management activities in the year of 
listing. This conclusion is drawn after controlling for cash proceeds during an IPO, 
following the argument presented by Armstrong et al. (2015). With regard to audit quality 
in IPO firms, the empirical analysis shows that IPO firms audited by one of the Big 4 





Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of Research Motivation, Objectives and Methodology  
This research aimed to examine earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia. The 
research mainly examined the role of external auditors in mitigating earnings 
management engagement in Saudi listed firms. It also examined earnings management 
around IPOs and the role of external auditors in curbing earnings management 
engagement in these firms. 
This research was mainly motivated by the ban placed on Deloitte by the CMA from 
conducting any auditing work for listed firms in Saudi Arabia for two years from 1 June 
2015. Banning one of the Big 4 audit firms raised a question regarding the quality of 
auditing in the Saudi environment, particularly as this was the first ban imposed by the 
CMA since it was established. The ban also motivated the researcher to investigate the 
phenomenon of earnings management in IPO firms, as the ban on Deloitte was in response 
to the collapse of the Al-Mojil Group in 2012, the group having gone public in 2008. 
Deloitte had audited the Al-Mojil Group from 2005 to 2011.   
Six objectives were developed in this study. Two objectives were related to audit quality 
and four to the IPO context. This study examined the role of Big 4 auditors as a deterrent 
to earnings management engagement in Saudi listed firms and whether firms audited by 
Deloitte managed earnings compared with firms audited by the rest of the Big 4. 
Moreover, this study examined earnings management before an IPO event and whether 
engagement in earnings management was higher in the year of the IPO. 
One of the main philosophical positions adopted in accounting research is positivism, 
which presumes an absolute separation between the researcher and the subject. The 
findings of the research, according to this position, can be generalised and result from 
causal effects. This study adopted this position. The research strategy of this study was 
168 
 
quantitative, as it gathered and examined numerical data and conducted statistical tests to 
test the hypotheses developed in this research. As this study depended on agency, 
stakeholder, legitimacy and signalling theories to develop the hypotheses of the current 
research, a deductive approach was adopted. The first source of knowledge in this 
approach is theory, and it proceeds by conducting empirical examination. 
This study adopted Kothari et al. (2005) in estimating discretionary accruals and applied 
a cross-sectional method to do this. The estimation model was run yearly for each industry 
and the sample was restricted to a minimum of eight observations in each industry per 
year. Whereas, for the IPO sample, the estimation model was run yearly instead of on an 
industry basis as running an estimation model by industry excludes some IPO firms. This 
study included a number of firm financial characteristics as control variables that had an 
impact on discretionary accruals: firm size, cash flow, firm leverage, firm performance, 
firm growth, firm age, SOE and complexity. This study adopted OLS regression to test 
the research hypotheses. The research design of this study for testing earnings 
management followed McNichols and Wilson (1988) and was developed using Dechow 
et al. (1995). The sample for testing hypotheses relating to audit quality contained 85 non-
financial firms for the period from 2004 to 2014, whereas the sample for testing 
hypotheses relating to IPO contained 42 IPO firms that went public between 2005 and 
2015.  
7.2 Summary of the Findings  
This study developed six research questions that were answered using OLS regression. 
The first two research questions related to audit quality, whereas the rest of the questions 




The first sample in this study was used to answer the first two research questions. The 
main findings in this sample are as follows. 
• The mean of absolute discretionary accruals was 0.0477, with a maximum of 0.2365 
and a minimum of 0.0001, which indicates that the variation in discretionary accruals 
among the firms was very high. The minimum value indicates that some firms did not 
engage in earnings management.  
• Regarding the descriptive statistics for the audit quality sample, it is worth 
highlighting the following: 57.36% of the firms in the sample were audited by one of 
the Big 4 firms, which indicates that the market is dominated by the Big 4 auditors as 
178 accounting firms are licensed to practice in Saudi Arabia. The result shows that 
45% of the firms had at least one subsidiary. The average value of the leverage was 
0.1011, which indicates that the firms did not rely on long-term debt to fund their 
assets.   
• There was no role for Big 4 firms in curbing earnings management activities, as 
indicated by the regression result of absolute discretionary accruals. However, the 
regression result of signed discretionary accruals showed a contrast and indicated that 
the Big 4 mitigate the activities of income-decreasing activities only in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, which is in contrast with three previous studies that examined the 
role of Big 4 firms in Saudi Arabia. This study found that there was no role of Big 4 
firms in constraining current discretionary accruals, either positive or negative. 
• This study examined the ban placed on Deloitte undertaking any audit work for firms 
listed on the SSM and found that firms audited by Deloitte did not differ from firms 
audited by the rest of the Big 4 in terms of earnings management. This study examined 
absolute discretionary accruals, signed discretionary accruals, absolute current 
discretionary accruals, and signed current discretionary accruals and found no 
evidence that firms audited by Deloitte engaged in earnings manipulation activities.   
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• The output of the regression analysis showed that firms with a growth in assets 
engaged in income-increasing activities, either in the entire sample or in the sample 
of firms audited by the Big 4. This may indicate that Saudi listed firms use accounting 
methods that allow less recognition of depreciation expenses in the early years. 
• Regarding the descriptive statistics for the IPO sample, 40.48% of IPO firms chose 
Big 4 auditors to audit their pre-IPO financial statements and 57.17% of IPO firms 
had at least one subsidiary. The mean value of leverage was 0.0784, which was lower 
than the value of 0.1011 in the non-IPO sample. This is to be expected, as some IPO 
firms raise capital during the IPO stage, which indicates that IPO firms rely on raising 
capital rather than long-term debt.  
• The regression results regarding earnings management around listings indicated that 
there was no evidence to presume that IPO firms in Saudi Arabia manipulate earnings 
before going public. 
• The regression result of earnings management in an IPO year indicated that IPO firms 
engaged in earnings management in the year of an IPO. Nevertheless, the result 
showed a contrast when the researcher added the cash proceeds during an IPO event. 
This study followed Armstrong et al. (2015), who argue that the existence of  
discretionary accruals in an IPO year shown in previous studies is due to not 
controlling for cash proceeds during an IPO event. Therefore, Saudi IPO firms did not 
engage in earnings management in an IPO year. This study is the first to examine this 
in developing countries and the first to confirm this from a different sample.  
• The regression result of audit quality in pre-IPO years showed that Big 4 firms were 
not a deterrent to engagement in earnings management in pre-IPO years. In other 




• The regression result demonstrated that IPO firms audited by Deloitte did not engage 
in earnings management and did not differ from the rest of the Big 4 or other 
accounting firms. 
7.3 Contributions of the Study  
This study adds to existing knowledge of audit quality and earnings management as 
previous research has not reached the same conclusions in terms of the role of the Big 4 
auditors in mitigating engagement in earnings management. Studies such as Becker et al. 
(1998), Francis et al. (1999) and Houqe et al. (2017) find that firms audited by one of the 
Big N show less engagement in earnings management, whereas studies such as Jeong and 
Rho (2004), Piot and Janin (2007) and Huguet and Gandía (2016) find no association 
between earnings management and Big N auditors. This study contributes to Saudi 
literature, as the existing material is limited. This research is the first to examine the ban 
placed on Deloitte by the CMA in Saudi Arabia and provide empirical evidence regarding 
the issue. 
Moreover, this study is the first to examine earnings management around IPOs in the 
context of Saudi Arabia. This study contributes to IPO and earnings management 
literature, as there is a conflict in the findings. Studies such as Teoh et al. (1998b), 
Alhadab et al. (2015) and Gao et al. (2017) find that firms engage in earnings inflation 
around IPOs, whereas Ball and Shivakumar (2008), Cecchini et al. (2012), Kimbro (2005) 
and Roosenboom et al. (2003) find no engagement in earnings management around IPOs. 
This study also adds to IPO and earnings management literature by adopting the 
methodology of Armstrong et al. (2015) in a different legal environment and considering 
a developing country. Moreover, it adds to existing knowledge of audit quality and 
earnings management in the context of IPOs as it examines the role of the Big 4 in curbing 
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earnings management. It also provides empirical evidence that IPO firms audited by 
Deloitte did not engage in upwards earnings management. 
7.4 Implications of the Study  
This research has several implications for investors, lenders, firms and policy-makers. 
The first implication is that investors should not perceive Big 4 auditors as providing 
higher quality auditing than non-Big 4 auditors. The results suggest that Big 4 auditors 
are better only in relation to income-decreasing activities. Moreover, lenders should not 
perceive Big 4 auditors as providing higher quality auditing than non-Big 4 auditors in 
terms of mitigating earnings management manipulations. Lenders could impose some 
conditions on borrowers to improve audit quality, such as appointing an auditor that 
specialises in the industry, as Balsam et al. (2003) and Krishnan (2003a) find that 
discretionary accruals are high when firms are audited by non-industry-expert auditors in 
the US context. Furthermore, firms’ management (particularly, the board of directors) 
should be aware that paying higher audit fees to Big 4 auditors will not prevent positive 
accruals earnings management in the firm. Firms may hire non-Big 4 auditors that might 
be keen to build a good reputation in the market and will, therefore, provide higher audit 
quality with lower audit fees.  
Policy-makers such as the CMA and the MCI in Saudi Arabia should implement policies 
that reduce the domination of the Big 4, as the descriptive statistics show that 57.36% of 
the firms in the sample were audited by one of the Big 4, whereas there are 178 accounting 
firms licensed to practice in Saudi Arabia. This denomination may explain small degree 
of impact of the Big 4 on audit quality, as they might be keen to retain their clients and 
so mitigate the quality of auditing. The researcher adopts the call36F37 for limiting external 
auditors to auditing only five listed firms, which would open the door for small audit 
                                                           
37 See the article by AlKhataf (2015) in the Asharq Alawsat newspaper. 
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firms to audit listed firms and minimise the domination of the Big 4 in the auditing of 
listed firms. Moreover, this may lead to auditors being concerned about the quality of 
auditing, as the market will be more competitive. This may also lead small auditors to 
become specialised in an industry in order to be able to compete and survive in the market 
of auditing listed firms. This study also calls for greater transparency by the CMA 
regarding the ban on Deloitte in Saudi Arabia, as the results of this study suggest there is 
no difference in audit quality between Deloitte and the rest of the Big 4. Reviewing news 
articles and reading the order issued by the CMA do not clarify the underlying reason 
behind the ban.  
While this research finds Big 4 auditors to be less effective at mitigating positive earnings 
management, the researcher also has deep concerns about the audit quality of non-Big 4 
auditors. Therefore, this study also calls for close monitoring of external auditors by 
SOCPA to improve the professional environment, particularly as Alghamdi and Alangari 
(2005) report violations in implementing quality review programmes in audit firms. 
Moreover, the CMA should adopt a policy that prevents inexperienced auditors auditing 
listed firms, particularly as the CMA has enormous powers to regulate listed companies 
under the new Companies Law (issued in 2015). 
In addition to its practical associations, this study offers theoretical implications. Agency 
theory was adopted in the current research, as Piot and Janin (2007) argue that agency 
conflict may create motivations for managers to engage in earnings management. To 
mitigate the desire of managers to engage in earnings management, agency theory 
recognises external auditors as a monitoring device (Piot, 2001). However, the finding of 
this study is inconsistent with the argument of agency theory, which indicates that Big 4 
accounting firms, which are presumed to offer higher quality auditing, are less effective 
in curbing earnings management in the Saudi context. Alghamdi (2012) argues that the 
legal system in Saudi Arabia, which differs from that in all other countries, may mitigate 
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the role of external auditors as a monitoring device. Moreover, the weakness of the 
accounting profession in Saudi Arabia may mitigate the monitoring role of external 
auditors, as local standards are in use (only 23 for accounting38 and 17 for auditing) and 
US and IFRS standards are employed to fulfil accounting standards that are otherwise 
lacking. Francis et al. (1999, p. 19) argue that external auditors “have a strong negotiating 
stance with clients in terms of required adjustments to the financial statements”. However, 
this argument may not be present in Saudi Arabia, as firms can use either US or IFRS to 
recognise transactions that the local standards do not cover. Therefore, external auditors 
may not be in a strong position to make adjustments to the recognition of a particular 
transaction.  
Stakeholder theory was adopted in the current research, as Healy and Wahlen (1999) state 
that some stakeholders might be misled about underlying economic performance by a 
firm’s engagement in earnings management. Therefore, stakeholders may impose a need 
for high audit quality, as they have the ability to monitor earnings management activities 
in listed firms (Ming Chia et al., 2007). However, the finding of this study is inconsistent 
with the argument of stakeholder theory. This contrast with the theory may be explained 
by Sternberg (1997), who argues that stakeholder theory is incompatible with the agent-
principal association, in which the principal directs risk and delegates decision-making to 
the agent. The agent-principal association is very clear in the Saudi context, as Albassam 
(2014) argues that firms on the SSM are largely owned by government and family 
shareholdings, which leads firms to preference the interests of shareholders over those of 
other stakeholders. Legitimacy theory was adopted in this research to explain why firms 
appoint Big N auditors and Big N auditors are perceived as providing higher-quality 
auditing services. This theory suggests that firms hire Big N auditors to legitimise 
financial statements. In addition, Big N auditors legitimise their own work by persuading 
                                                           
38  From 1 January 2017, all listed firms have to abide by IFRS. 
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stakeholders that financial reports can be trusted. However, the finding of this study is 
inconsistent with the argument of this theory. 
Signalling theory was adopted in this research to explain the engagement in earnings 
management around an IPO. Signalling theory is considered as significant for IPO studies 
because of the existence of information asymmetry between two parties: IPO 
management and potential buyers (Brau & Fawcett, 2006). Previous research shows that 
multiple signals might be used during an IPO stage. Two signals were examined in this 
current research: reported earnings and auditor reputation. However, the finding of this 
study is inconsistent with the argument of signalling theory, which suggests that neither 
pre-IPO reported earnings nor auditor reputation are used by Saudi IPO firms. As the 
researcher of this study argues (see section 6.3.8), as only a small number of firms have 
gone public in Saudi Arabia and the market is characterised as being highly liquid, IPO 
firms in this context are not motivated to engage in earnings management, since investors 
will buy their shares anyway. Therefore, there is no need to use a signal to overcome the 
high level of information asymmetry that exists in IPO firms in Saudi Arabia.   
7.5 Research Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Any piece of research will have some limitations that can be considered in future work. 
The limitations of this research and suggestions for future work are presented below. 
• Prior studies offer a number of proxies for accruals earnings management and each 
model has its own limitations and errors in estimating non-discretionary accruals.  
Therefore, there is a general concern about the precision of these proxies in capturing 
accruals earnings manipulation. All accruals-based models suffer from imprecision in 
estimating discretionary accruals (Guay, Kothari, & Watts, 1996). Furthermore, 
accruals models have a lack of power in isolating discretionary accruals (Dechow, 
Hutton, Kim, & Sloan, 2012). Despite these criticisms, numerous studies continue to 
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use these models in examining accruals earnings management. These models remain 
the most suitable, however, due to the lack of an existing model that can enhance the 
power of measuring discretionary accruals.   
• This study used the Big 4 as a proxy for audit quality, whereas the literature offers 
different types of proxies that may be used to measure audit quality in earnings 
management studies. The researcher had no access to the information needed to use 
other proxies, such as audit fees and audit hours. Moreover, using industry specialism 
as an auditor proxy has major limitations, as Audousset-Coulier et al. (2016) examine 
30 industry specialist auditor proxies and conclude that the classification of an 
individual auditor as a specialist in the industry is based on the proxy used. Therefore, 
although this study used the Big 4 as a proxy of audit quality, this proxy has a 
limitation, in that it assumes that the level of audit quality is homogeneous within the 
group (Clarkson & Simunic, 1994).   
• Litigation risk increased for external auditors after the ban and the fine of 300 
thousand SR imposed on Deloitte. Moreover, there is a notion that audit fees increased 
after the ban on Deloitte. Thus, further research could examine the quality of reporting 
for former Deloitte clients after the ban, for example see (Blouin et al., 2007). 
• This study examined earnings management in IPO firms in the main market. On 26 
February 2017, the CMA opened a second market, called the Nomu (or parallel 
market), which has lighter listing rules. Comparing IPO firms in the two markets in 
terms of engagement in earnings management could be another avenue for future 
research.   
• Future research could examine the association between earnings management and the 
stock performance of IPO firms, as well as the association between earnings 
management and accounting performance.  
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• Future research could investigate the ban on Deloitte by conducting interviews with 
officials at the CMA and Deloitte firm as the present quantitative research failed to 
find any engagement in earnings management in firms audited by Deloitte. The 
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Appendix A: List of firms in the audit quality sample  
 Company name Tadawul Code ICB Classification  
1 Takween Advanced Industries 1201 Industrials 
2 Basic Chemical Industries 1210 Basic Materials 
3 Saudi Arabian Mining 1211 Basic Materials 
4 Astra Industrial Group 1212 Basic Materials 
5 Al Sorayai Trade and Industrial Group 1213 Consumer Goods 
6 Al Hassan Ghazi Ibrahim 1214 Consumer Goods 
7 United Wire Factories 1301 Basic Materials 
8 Bawan 1302 Basic Materials 
9 Mohammad Al-Mojil Group 1310 Industrials 
10 Saudi Steel Pipe 1320 Basic Materials 
11 Abdullah A M Al Khodari 1330 Industrials 
12 Altayyar 1810 Consumer Services 
13 Methanol Chemicals 2001 Basic Materials 
14 National Petrochemical 2002 Basic Materials 
15 Saudi Basic Industries 2010 Basic Materials 
16 Saudi Arabia Fertilizers 2020 Basic Materials 
17 Saudi Ceramic 2040 Industrials 
18 Savola Group 2050 Consumer Goods 
19 National Gypsum 2090 Industrials 
20 Wafrah 2100 Consumer Goods 
21 SAUDI CABLE CO JSC  2110 Industrials 
22 Saudi Industrial Development 2130 Industrials 
23 The National Company for Glass Industries 2150 Industrials 
24 Saudi Arabian Amiantit 2160 Basic Materials 
25 Alujain Corporation 2170 Basic Materials 
26 Filing and Packing Materials Manufacturing 2180 Basic Materials 
27 Arabian Pipes 2200 Basic Materials 
28 Nama Chemicals 2210 Basic Materials 
29 National Metal Manufacturing and Casting 2220 Industrials 
30 Saudi Chemical 2230 Industrials 
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31 Zamil Industrial 2240 Industrials 
32 Saudi Industrial Investment 2250 Basic Materials 
33 Sahara Petrochemical 2260 Basic Materials 
34 Almarai 2280 Consumer Goods 
35 Yanbu National Petrochemical 2290 Basic Materials 
36 Saudi Paper Manufacturing 2300 Consumer Goods 
37 Saudi International Petrochemical 2310 Basic Materials 
38 Al-Babtain Power and Telecommunication 2320 Industrials 
39 Advanced Petrochemicals 2330 Basic Materials 
40 Al Abdullatif Industrial Investment 2340 Consumer Goods 
41 Saudi Kayan Petrochemical 2350 Basic Materials 
42 Saudi Vitrified Claymore Pipe 2360 Industrials 
43 Middle East Specialized Cables 2370 Basic Materials 
44 Rabigh Refining and Petrochemical 2380 Basic Materials 
45 Hail Cement 3001 Industrials 
46 Najran Cement 3002 Industrials 
47 City Cement Company 3003 Industrials 
48 Northern Region Cement 3004 Industrials 
49 Arabian Cement 3010 Industrials 
50 Yamamah Saudi Cement 3020 Industrials 
51 Saudi Cement 3030 Industrials 
52 The Qassim Cement 3040 Industrials 
53 Southern Province Cement 3050 Industrials 
54 Yanbu Cement 3060 Industrials 
55 Eastern Province Cement 3080 Industrials 
56 Tabuk Cement 3090 Industrials 
57 Al Jouf Cement 3091 Industrials 
58 Abdullah Al Othaim Markets 4001 Consumer Services 
59 United Electronics 4003 Consumer Services 
60 Duration Hospitality 4010 Consumer Services 
61 Bahri 4030 Industrials 
62 Saudi Public Transport 4040 Consumer Services 
63 Saudi Automotive Services 4050 Consumer Services 
64 Anaam International Holding Group 4061 Consumer Services 
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65 Saudi Transport and Investment 4110 Industrials 
66 Saudi Industrial Export 4140 Industrials 
67 National Agricultural Marketing Co 4160 Consumer Services 
68 Tourism Enterprise 4170 Consumer Services 
69 Fitaihi Holding Group 4180 Consumer Services 
70 Jarir Marketing 4190 Consumer Services 
71 Aldrees Petroleum and Transport Services 4200 Consumer Services 
72 Saudi Research and Marketing Group 4210 Consumer Services 
73 United International Transportation 4260 Consumer Services 
74 Alkhaleej Training and Education 4290 Consumer Services 
75 Halwani Brothers 6001 Consumer Goods 
76 Herfy Food Services 6002 Consumer Goods 
77 Saudi Airlines Catering 6004 Industrials 
78 National Agriculture Development 6010 Consumer Goods 
79 Qassim Agriculture 6020 Consumer Goods 
80 Tabuk Agriculture Development 6040 Consumer Goods 
81 Saudi Fisheries 6050 Consumer Goods 
82 Ash-Sharqiyah Development Company 6060 Consumer Goods 
83 Al-Jouf Agriculture Development 6070 Consumer Goods 
84 Bishah Agriculture Development 6080 Consumer Goods 













Appendix B: List of firms in IPOs sample 
 Company name Tadawul 
Code 
ICB Classification  
1 Takween Advanced Industries 1201 Industrials 
2 MEPCO 1202 Basic Materials 
3 Basic Chemical Industries 1210 Basic Materials 
4 Saudi Arabian Mining 1211 Basic Materials 
5 Astra Industrial Group 1212 Basic Materials 
6 Al Sorayai Trade and Industry 1213 Consumer Goods 
7 Al Hassan Ghazi Ibrahim 1214 Consumer Goods 
8 United Wire Factories 1301 Basic Materials 
9 Bawan 1302 Basic Materials 
10 Electrical Industries 1303 Industrials 
11 Mohammad Al-Mojil Group 1310 Industrials 
12 Saudi Steel Pipe 1320 Basic Materials 
13 Abdullah A M Al Khodari 1330 Industrials 
14 Altayyar 1810 Consumer Services 
15 Abdulmohsen Alhokair Group 1820 Consumer Services 
16 Methanol Chemicals 2001 Basic Materials 
17 Almarai 2280 Consumer Goods 
18 Saudi Paper Manufacturing 2300 Consumer Goods 
19 Saudi International Petroch 2310 Basic Materials 
20 Al-Babtain Power and Teleco 2320 Industrials 
21 Al Abdullatif Industrial In 2340 Consumer Goods 
22 Saudi Vitrified Claymore Pi 2360 Industrials 
23 Middle East Specialized Cab 2370 Basic Materials 
24 Najran Cement 3002 Industrials 
25 City Cement Company 3003 Industrials 
26 Northern Region Cement 3004 Industrials 
27 Abdullah Al Othaim Markets 4001 Consumer Services 
28 Mouwasat Medical Services 4002 Health Care 
29 United Electronics 4003 Consumer Services 
30 Dallah Healthcare 4004 Health Care 
31 National Medical Care 4005 Health Care 
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32 Al Hammadi Company 4007 Health Care 
33 Saudi Company for Hardware 4008 Consumer Services 
34 Saudi Ground Services 4031 Industrials 
35 Aldrees Petroleum and Trans 4200 Consumer Services 
36 Saudi Research and Marketing 4210 Consumer Services 
37 United International Transp 4260 Consumer Services 
38 Saudi Printing and Packagin 4270 Industrials 
39 Alkhaleej Training and Educ 4290 Consumer Services 
40 Halwani Brothers 6001 Consumer Goods 
41 Herfy Food Services 6002 Consumer Goods 






UPR16 – August 2015                                                                      
 
FORM UPR16 
Research Ethics Review Checklist 
 
Please include this completed form as an appendix to your thesis (see the 
Postgraduate Research Student Handbook for more information 
 
 
 Postgraduate Research Student (PGRS) Information 
 
 Student ID:  833676 
 PGRS Name: 
 
 Abdulaziz Sulaiman Alsultan 
 Department: 
 
 ACCFM  First Supervisor:  Prof. Khaled Hussainy  
 Start Date:  
(or progression date for Prof Doc students) 
 
 01/04/2015 
 Study Mode and Route:  Part-time 


















 Title of Thesis: 
 
 
Audit Quality, IPOs and Earnings Management: Evidence from Saudi Arabia      
 
 
 Thesis Word Count:  





 If you are unsure about any of the following, please contact the local representative on your Faculty Ethics Committee 
for advice.  Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University’s Ethics Policy and any relevant University, 
academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study 
Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a favourable opinion, the final responsibility for the ethical 
conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s). 
 
 
 UKRIO Finished Research Checklist: 
(If you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or Departmental Ethics Committee rep or see the online 
version of the full checklist at: http://www.ukrio.org/what-we-do/code-of-practice-for-research/) 
 
 a) Have all of your research and findings been reported accurately, honestly and 
within a reasonable time frame? 
 
 YES 




 b) Have all contributions to knowledge been acknowledged? 
 
 YES 




 c) Have you complied with all agreements relating to intellectual property, publication 
and authorship? 
 YES 




 d) Has your research data been retained in a secure and accessible form and will it 
remain so for the required duration?  
 YES 




 e) Does your research comply with all legal, ethical, and contractual requirements? 
 
 YES 




      
 Candidate Statement: 
 
 I have considered the ethical dimensions of the above named research project, and have successfully 
obtained the necessary ethical approval(s) 
 




 If you have not submitted your work for ethical review, and/or you have answered ‘No’ to one or more of 
questions a) to e), please explain below why this is so: 
 
 I used secondary data. 
 
 
 Signed (PGRS): 
 
  Date: 04/01/2018 
